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ABSTRACT 
 
 
RETHINKING DEATH AND DONATION: MEDIATING DEATH AT THE   
 
END OF LIFE IN THE WAKE OF BRAIN DEATH’S FAILINGS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By 
 
David Scott Henderson 
 
August 2009 
 
 
 
Dissertation Supervised by Aaron L. Mackler 
 
Since its inception in 1968, death by whole-brain criteria, or simply brain 
death, has enjoyed the status of one of the relatively “well settled” issues in 
bioethics.  Indeed, its almost universal acceptance in law and medical practice 
seems to confirm this depiction.  However, over the last fifteen years or so, a 
growing number of experts in medicine, philosophy, and religion regard brain 
death as an untenable criterion for human death.  Given that the debate about 
brain death has occupied a relatively small group of professionals, few are aware 
that brain death fails to correspond to any coherent biological or philosophical 
conception of death.  This is significant, for if the brain-dead are not dead, then 
the removal of their unpaired vital organs for transplantation is the direct cause of 
their deaths.  The aim of this dissertation is to examine and evaluate the social, 
legal, medical, and philosophical problems inherent in the current social policy 
 iv
allowing for organ donation under the brain death criterion of human death.  The 
position I maintain is that brain death is fraught with numerous difficulties that 
render it ethically untenable in current practice and should be abandoned as a 
criterion for determining death.  The chapters are devoted to disclosing these 
specific problems, which include the vexing historical ties between brain death 
and organ donation, the incoherence of its philosophical, biological, and clinical 
conceptions, the confusion of the general public, medical community, and law 
makers regarding its meaning and use, and the problems of alternatives to the 
current standard such as consciousness based definitions of death, eliminating the 
dead donor rule, and the enactment of conscience clauses.  The dissertation 
concludes by suggesting possible avenues to expand discussion in terms of how 
we might proceed in efforts to further organ transplantation in light of the major 
problems that call into question the ethical sustainability of brain death as a means 
for organ procurement. 
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
The boundaries which divide Life from Death are at best shadowy and vague.  
Who shall say when the one ends, and the other begins? 
Edgar Allan Poe 
 
In Edgar Allan Poe’s short story, The Premature Burial, the unnamed 
narrator describes in lurid detail his struggle with taphephobia, the fear of being 
buried alive.  His inebriating fear is provoked by the increasing frequency of 
attacks of catalepsy, a condition in which he randomly slips into a death-like 
trance.  Drawing upon the public’s fascination with stories of people found to 
have been buried alive, in some cases years after their crypts were reopened, the 
narrator describes how this crippling phobia worsens his condition making him 
more prone to slip into a death-like trance.  Obsessed with the possibility of 
falling into such a trance while away from home, he takes measures to ensure that 
he will not be buried prematurely by eliciting promises from friends, not 
venturing away from home, and constructing an elaborate tomb with devices to 
signal for help should he awaken after burial.  The horror story ends with the 
narrator finding himself confined in a small space in pitch darkness, believing that 
“all his infinite miseries” have been realized despite his precautions.  As he cries 
out in utter terror, he is directly restored to his memory that he has simply fallen 
asleep in the small berth of a boat.  This shocking incident serves to relieve the 
narrator’s taphephobia thus restoring him to a life of normalcy.   
 xi
Poe’s story is a reminder of the persistent human fear of being thought 
dead while still alive.  While modern technologies (the invention of the 
stethoscope, for instance) and embalming practices have virtually eliminated the 
possibility of being buried alive, the fear of a premature declaration of death 
exists in other modalities.  Ironically, modern technologies that brought a sense of 
relief with respect to the fear of being buried alive have also created new medical 
situations that perpetuate the question, what is death.  Most notably are the 
perplexing neurological conditions that directly result from the use of life-
sustaining technologies.  Of particular interest in this work, is the condition 
known as brain death.  In this dissertation, much attention is devoted to brain 
death and its concomitant relation to organ donation.  This relation raises several 
questions pursuant to this investigation: Does the permanent loss of all brain 
function (i.e., brain death) correspond to human death? How did brain death gain 
acceptance in medical praxis and social policy?  What is the relationship between 
brain death and how it is understood and used as the basis for organ donation?  
What are the implications in other areas including research ethics and 
experimentation? If brain death were abandoned, how might it affect organ 
donation?  May an exception to the dead donor rule be granted under certain 
conditions?  Such are by no means purely academic questions.  The answers to 
these questions touch upon everyone. 
The aim of this dissertation is to examine and evaluate the social, legal, 
medical, and philosophical problems inherent in the current social policy allowing 
for organ donation under the brain death criterion of human death.  The position I 
 xii
maintain is that brain death is fraught with numerous difficulties that render it 
ethically untenable in current practice and should be abandoned as a criterion for 
determining death. 
The first chapter chronicles the emergence of brain death and its adoption 
as a standard of death in both medical practice and legal jurisprudence.  The 
connections with organ procurement, developing new technologies, and the 
Harvard Committee’s recommendation for the adoption of brain death are 
explored in detail.  In addition, this chapter highlights the various discussions 
following the Harvard Committee’s recommendation of brain death, including the 
search for a coherent conception in support of it culminating in the rationale of the 
President’s Commission Report, and the UDDA (Uniform Determination of 
Death Act). 
The second chapter focuses on the medical problems associated with brain 
death and organ donation.  Areas of exploration include the difficulties of 
establishing somatic neural dependency with regard to brain-death testing criteria, 
the questions raised by common clinical anomalies and physical phenomena in 
brain-dead patients, and the difficulties of maintaining brain death’s consistency 
with traditional cardiopulmonary death.  To further the inquiry into conceptual 
coherency, this chapter examines the clinical tests for brain death and the 
problems of arbitrariness of application and misdiagnosis of the condition. 
The third chapter examines the ongoing problems of brain death’s 
conceptual basis, particularly since its inception with the President’s Commission 
Report and the introduction of the UDDA as the suggested framework for 
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determining death.  Accordingly, this chapter highlights various social attitudes 
and the overall general public confusion surrounding the meaning and application 
of brain death.  To illustrate the extent of this confusion, this chapter underscores 
the struggles of lawmakers to satisfy the demands of the brain-death standard 
resulting in statutory irregularities both here and abroad.  This chapter also 
includes the provision of a catalog of statutes representative of how states 
inconsistently allow death to be defined.  The chapter then shifts to discussion of 
how brain death is used in other areas, such as medical research and 
experimentation on the newly declared dead. 
The fourth and fifth chapters focus on concerns brain death raises with 
respect to the philosophical challenges of its relation to defining death.  Chapter 
Four challenges brain death’s veracity with respect to its definitional and 
metaphysical foundation.  Accordingly, the chapter will discuss the philosophical 
groundwork and assumptions of the underlying metaphysics for the definition of 
death under the current paradigm, the theoretical inconsistencies between the 
organism/substance view and brain death based on the empirical evidence, and 
particular instances of inconsistencies among advocates of the substantial view.  
Chapter Five continues along these lines by assessing the various alternatives and 
modifications to death criteria put forward for the purpose of expanding the pool 
of potential organ donors.  Particular attention is given to higher-brain models of 
death.  These models will be evaluated for their philosophical coherence and with 
current neurological evidence.  Moreover, this chapter explores suggestions 
regarding donation apart from the dead donor rule, particularly with respect to 
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their potential effects on the medical community and society in general.  Finally, 
this chapter considers proposals involving the adoption of conscience clauses for 
those who oppose the legal standard of death. 
In many ways, the sixth chapter is the most important, in that it brings all 
the relevant data from the previous chapters together in order to assess the ethical 
viability of brain death as it relates to organ donation.  This analysis includes the 
application of traditional medical ethics to the problems disclosed throughout 
concerning brain death.  Furthering the evaluative purpose of this chapter entails 
the application of the principles of biomedical ethics and relevant case law to the 
issue of informed consent for organ donors under the brain-death standard.  This 
chapter concludes by considering the ethical feasibility of grounding brain death 
on pragmatism as a sufficient reason for its continued use. 
The final chapter provides a summary of the major problems with brain 
death as a means for organ procurement and, in support of the thesis of this 
dissertation, calls into question the ethical sustainability of current practice.  In 
order to sustain the life-saving practice of organ transplantation, this chapter notes 
some emerging technologies that may eventually lessen the need for cadaveric 
organ and tissue donors.  The dissertation concludes by recommending a new 
policy of death and donation as a means to expand discussion in terms of how we 
might proceed to further organ transplantation in light of the major problems that 
call into question the ethical sustainability of brain death as a means for organ 
procurement. 
 
 
 xv
 1
                                                
 
 
Chapter 1 
 
 
The Origin of the Brain Death Standard 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Determining the moment of human death has always been challenging.  In 
the past, physicians and lay people alike relied upon the absence of breathing and 
pulse as indicators of the occurrence of death.  However, in the eighteenth 
century, accounts of “corpses” reviving during funerals and the discovery of 
exhumed skeletons having clawed at coffin lids created widespread fear of 
premature burial.  In response, a number of creative measures were developed, 
including the sale of coffin lids equipped with speaking tubes or strings linked to 
bells above ground and the employment of guards by mortuaries to monitor the 
newly dead for life signs.1  In the years that followed, the medical press addressed 
these concerns by proposing various methods for confirming death.2   As 
Margaret Lock observes, “Whether the end point of life is recognized as 
putrefaction of the body—a body crawling with maggots, or the point at which a 
 
1Marc Alexander, "The Rigid Embrace of the Narrow House: Premature 
Burial and the Signs of Death," Hasting Center Report 25 (1980). 
 
2J.M. Elliot, "Brain Death," Trauma 5 (2003): 23.  Elliot further notes, 
“These included observation for the gradual rusting of a needle inserted into the 
biceps, the movement of needles with flags attached inserted transcutaneously 
into the heart, and absence of organ movement on X-ray fluoroscopy.” 
feather held in front of the nose stops fluttering,”3 humans have always exhibited 
a keen interest in ensuring the occurrence of death.   
 Progress in medical technology, developed in the 1950s, brought with it a 
new medical phenomenon, which presented new challenges in the determination 
of death.  Some patients who suffered head trauma or spontaneous intracranial 
haemorrhage, would slip into a condition in which the brainstem would undergo 
herniation due to severely elevated intracranial pressure.4  Indicative of the 
severest cases is “permanent loss of consciousness, absence of brainstem reflexes, 
and complete loss of respiratory drive.”5  However, respiratory failure that had 
previously resulted in the death of these patients could now be delayed through 
mechanical ventilation.  Although the patients would expire within a few hours, or 
in some cases a few days, their clinical condition would become known as ‘brain 
death.’6 
The emergence of brain death stems from two seminal events—one 
occurring in late 1967 and the other early in 1968.  In December 1967, Christiaan 
                                                 
3Margaret Lock, "Inventing a New Death and Making It Believable," 
Anthropology & Medicine 9, no. 2 (2002). 
 
4Elliot, 23.  Elliot writes: “Most cases of brain death are due to head 
trauma or spontaneous intracranial haemorrhage.  These conditions may lead to 
herniation of the brainstem through the formamen magnum (‘coning’), due to 
severely raised intracranial pressure.  Less often, brain death is caused by severe 
cerebral hypoxic-ischaemic events, such as after prolonged and/or inadequate 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation.  Brainstem vascular events (infarction or 
haemorrhage) may lead to primary death of the brainstem, with identical clinical 
features.”  
 
5Ibid. 
 
6Today, brain death declarations account for about 1% of all deaths.   
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Barnard successfully transplanted the first human heart into a patient dying from 
heart failure in South Africa.  Although the recipient died eighteen days later, the 
well-publicized event led to the advent of heart transplantation, with over one 
hundred attempted the following year.7   Early failures were attributed to the 
problems of organ rejection by recipients’ immune systems and organ 
deterioration due to the need to wait for sufficient time after cardiac arrest to 
ensure that the donor would not spontaneously resuscitate.8  Although transplant 
researchers debated the neurological criteria for determining death, the Harvard 
report of 1968 marked the first recognized diagnostic criteria for determining 
brain death.  The advantage this offered for transplantation technology was 
obvious—no longer would transplant surgeons have to wait several minutes after 
cardiac arrest to retrieve organs for transplantation, thereby risking organ 
degeneration.  It also increased the viability of transplantable organs because, 
through mechanical ventilation, donors’ hearts would continue to beat.  Thus, 
despite the absence of brain activity, vital organs were infused with oxygenated 
blood until the time that the organs were removed.   Despite sporadic objections 
from physicians and philosophers on both biological and moral grounds, public 
policy embraced the brain death criterion which was reflected in American law.  
During the 1970s, the ethical controversy regarding brain death, as well as 
                                                 
7Tony Smith, “Clinical Freedom.” British Medical Journal 295 (1987): 
1583.  Peter Singer, Rethinking Life and Death (New York: St. Marin's Press, 
1994). 
 
8Some reports suggest that the clinical use of heart-beating cadavers as 
organ sources was taking place years before by some transplant surgeons.  See 
Mita Giacomini, "A Change of Heart and a Change of Mind? Technology and the 
Redefinition of Death in 1968," Social Science Medicine 44, no. 10 (1997): 1466. 
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inconsistencies in legislative initiatives during the 1970s, contributed to the 
creation of the President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in 
Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research.  The Commission was 
charged, among other things, with the task to study "the ethical and legal 
implications of the matter of defining death, including the advisability of 
developing a uniform definition of death."9  In 1981, the Commission issued its 
report, entitled, Defining Death, which proposed a “Uniform Determination of 
Death Act” as a model for legislation.  Over the next twenty years, all states 
adopted, through either legislation or common law, the brain death standard.10   
Despite its prevalence, brain death continues to generate both controversy 
and criticism.  This chapter will discuss the criticism, particularly with respect to 
the claim that brain death does not have valid justification other than advancing 
transplantation research.11  This chapter, therefore, will investigate the historical 
development of brain death and critically assess the justifications proffered by 
various commissions in order to promote its use in medical practice.  Specifically, 
the chapter will provide a brief history of emerging new medical technologies and 
their effect on medical research and practice.  The chapter will then examine the 
Harvard Ad Hoc Committee’s recommendation of the brain death criterion and 
                                                 
9President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine 
and Biomedical and Behavioral Research.  Defining Death: A Report on the 
Medical, Legal, and Ethical Issues in the Determination of Death (Washington, 
DC: Government Printing Office, 1981). 
 
10Jerry Menikoff, Law and Bioethics: An Introduction (Washington, DC: 
Georgetown University Press, 2001), 450. 
 
11Josef Seifert, "Is 'Brain Death' Actually Death?" Monist 76, no. 2 (1993). 
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explore the motivations behind the recommendation.  Finally, the chapter will 
address and evaluate the report of the President’s Commission. 
 
1.2 Emergence of New Medical Technologies 
Historically, brain death emerged at the crossroads of two intersecting 
technological “advances” in medicine, i.e., artificial life-support mechanisms and 
organ transplantation.12  With the advent of flexible plastic tubing and mechanical 
ventilation,13 the beating hearts of patients could be sustained through respiratory 
support when the capacity for breathing was inhibited or lost due to severe or 
irreversible brain damage.  In 1959, P. Mollaret and M. Goulon, two French 
physicians, published an article describing certain mechanically ventilated 
patients in a condition they termed comma depasse, or ‘beyond coma.’14   These 
patients not only exhibited loss of consciousness, but also “showed apnoea, loss 
of brainstem reflexes, and other abnormalities (such as hypotension, presumed 
diabetes insipidus and disturbances of temperature regulation) consistent with the 
                                                 
12Marin S. Pernick, “Brain Death in Cultural Context: The Reconstruction 
of Death, 1968-1981,” in The Definition of Death: Contemporary Controversies, 
ed. Stuart J. Youngner, Robert M. Arnold, and Renie Schapiro (Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999). 
 
13C. Ben Mitchell, “The Church and the Cultural Imperative,” in 
Bioengagement, ed. Nigel M. de S. Cameron, Scott E. Daniels, & Barbara J. 
White (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2000), 211. 
Mitchell writes, “Were it not for flexible plastic tubing, we could not keep 
patients alive on ventilators and IVs.  Without flexible plastic tubing, there would 
be very few end-of-life decisions to make.” 
    
14P. Mollaret and M. Goulon, "A State Beyond Coma. Preliminary 
Report," Revue Neurologique 101 (1959). 
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modern concept of brain death.”15  Patients in this condition nevertheless retain 
hypothalamic-pituitary axis, temperature regulation, and spinal activity for several 
hours, though no documented case of recovery exists.16  Earlier that same year, an 
article was published by M. Jouvet who suggested the use of the 
electroencephalogram (EEG) for diagnosing the death of the central nervous 
system.17  This set the stage for discussions in the decade that followed regarding 
the ethical and legal aspects of comma depasse. 
 Although the first successful transplant of a human organ occurred in 
1954,18 organ and tissue transplantation would not thrive until advances in 
surgical techniques and immunosuppression drugs were developed in the 1960s.  
Due to these advancements, a growing need for cadaveric organs (particularly 
kidneys), which living, related donors could not meet demands, prompted 
discussion concerning the potential source of comma depasse patients.19  These 
                                                 
15Elliot, 24. 
 
16G. Saposnik, J. Maurino, and J. A. Bueri, "Movements in Brain Death," 
European Journal of Neurology 8 (2001): 209. 
 
17M. Jouvet, "Diagnostic Electrosouscorticographique Da La Mort Du 
Systeme Nerveux Central Au Cours De Certains Comas.," 
Electroencephalography and  Clinical  Neurophysiology 3 (1959). 
 
18The first successful kidney transplant was performed by Dr. Joseph 
Murray of the Harvard Medical School on December 23, 1954.  Dr. Murray 
transplanted a kidney from one identical twin brother to another, thereby avoiding  
immuno-system rejection, a practical impossibility at that time.  
 
19Nereo Zamperetti, Rinaldo Bellomo, Carlo Alberto Defanti, & Nicola 
Latronico, "Irreversible Apnoeic Coma 35 Years Later: Towards a More Rigorous 
Definition of Brain Death?," Intensive Care Medicine 30 (2004).  Giacomini, 
1467. 
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discussions preceded 1968, the year in which diagnostic criteria for brain death 
were formally proposed.  As Mita Giacomini observes: 
As early as 1964, researchers considered redefining death to solve 
several technical and ethical dilemmas in transplantation research.  
The shift to cadavers as kidney sources and the superior viability 
of heart-beating cadaver kidneys impelled transplantation interests 
in brain death [although not called brain death at the time].  
Cadaver transplants had become possible owing to improvements 
in immunosuppression.  More importantly, they had become 
necessary owing to the scarcity of—and the health risks to—living 
kin donors.20 
 
Perhaps the most significant discussions preceding 1968 occurred at the 1966 
Ciba Foundation symposium entitled, Ethics in Medical Progress: With Special 
Reference to Transplantation.21  Included in the discussions were physicians 
(two-thirds of whom were transplant researchers), legal scholars, journalists, and 
theologians from the United States and Europe.  Their discussions centered on 
deterioration of organs (kidneys) obtained from cadavers and the possibility of 
procuring more viable organs from brain-injured patients.  With developing 
diagnostic technology such as the EEG, the use of brain-based criteria for 
diagnosing death promised to relieve concerns for donor “mutilation” from live 
kidney donors, which seemed for some a violation of the ethical imperative to 
                                                 
20Ibid. , 1467.  Although Giacomini employs language indicating the issue 
to be one of redefining death, it is more accurate to say the issue was one of 
proposing a new criterion for determining death. 
 
21G. E. W.  Wolstenholme and M. O'Connor, Ethics in Medical Progress: 
With Special Reference to Transplantation. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 
1966).  Cited in Giacomini. 
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“first do no harm.”22  Nevertheless, some physicians at Ciba were not as 
optimistic about the prospects of what they considered “redefining death” in order 
to advance transplant research.  These critics charged that proponents of a brain-
based criterion were interested only in its use on potential organ donors and 
showed resistance to its use on “themselves or their loved ones” should they go on 
life support.23  Moreover, there was some question regarding the physiologic 
meaning of EEG indications in some comatose patients.  Particularly, its sporadic 
use in the study of coma and death raised questions as to its reliability in depicting 
death.  As the conference concluded, more questions were raised than were 
answered.  The apparent unease of many of its participants to propose a new 
criterion for death reflected an overall concern to safeguard respect for the 
medical profession.  Giacomini captures this concern when she writes: 
There was a lack of consensus on whether death should be 
redefined at all, and if so, what the new signs of death might be.  
Those involved in the debate were well aware that, should a new 
definition of death be promoted, any uncertainty might undermine 
respect for the profession of medicine.24 
 
At that time, doctors seemed reluctant to advance a new criterion for determining 
death due to uncertainties in diagnostics and an awareness that such a venture 
might have serious ramifications on the reputation of the medical profession.   To 
be sure, beginning in the 1960s, medical practitioners began to face challenges 
                                                 
22Hippocrates, Hippocrates, Vol. I: Ancient Medicine, Airs, Waters, 
Places, Epidemics 1 & 2. Oath, Precepts, Nutriment, trans. W. H. S. Jones 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984.) 
 
23Ibid. , 1467. 
 
24Ibid. 
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from competing claimants of authority with regard to medical treatment 
decisions.25  Whatever reluctance existed in 1966, Christiaan Barnard’s successful 
heart transplant in December 1967 seemed to embolden some in the medical 
community and assuage previous concerns.  Indeed an “Ad Hoc Committee to 
Study the Problems of the Hopelessly Unconscious Patient” convened at the 
Harvard Medical School in early 1968 to propose new diagnostic criteria for 
determining death. 
 
1.3 The Harvard Ad Hoc Committee’s Recommendation 
 Henry K. Beecher, who was an anesthesiologist and well-known critic of 
unethical research practices, appealed to Robert Ebert, then Dean of the Harvard 
Medical School suggesting that a committee be established to consider some new 
questions.26  In consultation with Dr. Joseph Murray, a kidney transplant pioneer 
at Massachusetts General Hospital, Beecher wrote in a letter to Dean Ebert, “Both 
Dr. Murray and I think the time has come for a further consideration of the 
definition of death.  Every major hospital has patients stacked up waiting for 
suitable donors.”27  This was not the first time Beecher expressed interest in 
                                                 
25Pernick. Pernick writes, “…decisions previously left to the discretion of 
individual practitioners began to be contested by other claimants to authority.”  
(4)  In this important and influential article, Veatch set forth a challenge to end 
paternalistic medicine.”  Robert M. Veatch, "Generalization of Expertise," 
Hasting Center Report 1, no. 2 (1973). 
 
26The letter is dated 30 October 1967.  Henry K. Beecher, Beecher 
Manuscripts. Holmes Hall, Harvard Medical School. Cited in Giacomini.and 
Singer. 
 
27Beecher Letter, cited in Ibid. , 24. 
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furthering transplantation efforts.  In a seminal article published a year earlier, 
Beecher wrote a scathing exposé of the exploitation of patients in clinical 
research.  While the article focused on problems of patient consent and protection, 
Beecher expressed a concern for “the recently added problems arising in the 
transplantation of organs.”28  In the coming months, news of a modestly 
successful heart transplant in South Africa would attest to Beecher’s expectation 
of impending advances in transplantation as well as the necessity of preparing the 
way for its acceptance into medical practice. 
 Christiaan Barnard, a young heart surgeon who had conducted heart 
transplant experiments on canines, decided to attempt the new procedure on a 
human subject.29  Barnard recounts in his autobiography how Louis Washkansky 
was initially presented to him as a candidate for open-heart surgery.  Despite the 
experimental nature of the surgery, Washkansky readily accepted the eighty 
percent chance he was given for the procedure.  Although Washkansky’s 
condition deteriorated during the waiting period for a donor heart, finally one was 
secured when Denise Darvall, a young girl suffering severe brain damage from a 
pedestrian traffic accident, was brought to the hospital where Washkansky was 
waiting.  As her condition deteriorated, her father consented to the harvest of her 
kidneys and heart for donation.  After a touch-and-go double surgery, surgeons 
successfully transplanted her heart into Louis Washkansky.  Washkansky’s death 
                                                 
28H. K. Beecher, "Ethics and Clinical Research," New England Journal of 
Medicine 274 (1966): 1354. 
 
29Christiaan Barnard, Curtis Bill Pepper, One Life (Oxford: Macmillan, 
1969). 
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eighteen days later did not diminish media celebration of the world’s first heart 
transplant.  As Giacomini notes, “The vast publicity focused unprecedented 
attention on the problem of vital organ donation.”30  Questions regarding the 
practice of heart transplantation and the conflicting accounts of Darvall’s death 
raised numerous ethical and conceptual concerns.  A Time editorial illustrated the 
nature of these concerns:  
The real moral and ethical difficulty in heart transplants arises 
from medical uncertainty…The surgeon wants the donor’s heart as 
fresh as possible…--that is, within minutes of death.  This has 
raised the specter of surgeons becoming not only corpse snatchers 
but, even worse, of encouraging people to become corpses.  The 
question remains: Where should the line be drawn between those 
to be resuscitated and those not to be?31 
 
Barnard’s own account reveals a wait of about three minutes after 
Darvall’s heart stopped before proceeding with its removal.32  In an interview 
with Time magazine, Marius Barnard, Christiaan Barnard’s brother and member 
of his surgical team, recalled, “I know in some places they consider the patient 
dead when the electroencephalogram shows no more brain function.  We are on 
the conservative side, and consider a patient dead when the heart is no longer 
working, the lungs are no longer working, and there are no longer any complexes 
on the ECG.”33  Indeed, the procedure followed by Barnard is practically identical 
to what is currently called, non-beating heart donation.34   
                                                 
30Giacomini, 473. 
 
31Editor, "Surgery: The Ultimate Operation," Time, December 15 1967.  
Cited in Giacomini. 
 
32Barnard, 360. 
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 Autopsy results revealed that Washkansky’s death was caused by lobar 
pneumonia.35  During the eighteen days following the transplant, the medical 
team struggled to control infection, but with aggressive immunosuppression 
drugs, infection eventually overcame Washkanky’s weakened and defenseless 
body.  Nevertheless, the transplant surgery was considered a success.  This 
surgical milestone became the impetus not only for further attempts at heart 
transplantation, but it also may have provided the incentive for a committee to 
examine a new criterion of death.    
 Within a month of the well-publicized transplant in South Africa, 
Harvard’s Dean Ebert approved Beecher’s request for convening a committee and 
appointed him to chair it.  Ebert believed Harvard was in the best position to 
undertake the project, owing to its achievements in transplant technology.  In a 
letter of invitation to committee members, Ebert wrote: 
Dr. Beecher’s presentation re-emphasized to me the necessity of 
giving further consideration to the problem of brain death.  With its 
pioneering interest in organ transplantation, I believe the faculty of 
the Harvard Medical School is better equipped to elucidate this 
area than any other single group.36 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
33Editor, as cited in Giacomini, 1473. 
 
34D. Alan Shewmon, "'Brainstem Death,' 'Brain Death' and Death: A 
Critical Re-Evaluation of the Purported Evidence," Issues in Law and Medicine 
14, no. 2 (1998). 
 
35Barnard, 463-465. 
 
36Henry K. Beecher, "Definition of Irreversible Coma, Manuscript Draft 
of 11 April, 1968," Henry K. Beecher Manuscripts, Holmes Hall, Harvard 
Medical School.  Cited in Giacomini, 1474. 
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Ebert appointed a thirteen-member committee, most of whom were 
physicians and “well-acquainted colleagues.”37 The committee finished its work 
six months later and published its report in the Journal of the American Medical 
Association under the title: “A Definition of Irreversible Coma.”38  The report 
addressed several items, including the clinical description of irreversible coma, 
recommended procedures for its diagnosis, and justifications for this new criterion 
for diagnosing death.  Chiefly, the committee established four requirements for a 
determination of death: 1) lack of reception or response to external stimuli; 2) no 
spontaneous respiration for three minutes off of a respirator; 3) no reflexes; 4) a 
flat electroencephalogram for at least ten minutes, repeated after twenty four 
hours.39 
The most publicized aspect of the report is the Committee’s reasoning 
behind ‘brain death’ as the criterion for determining death which was described as 
follows: 
Our primary purpose is to define irreversible coma as a new 
criterion for death.  There are two reasons why there is a need for a 
definition: (1) Improvements in resuscitative and supportive 
measures have led to increased efforts to save those who are 
desperately injured.  Sometimes these efforts have only partial 
success so that the result is an individual whose heart continues to 
beat but whose brain is irreversibly damaged.  The burden is great 
on patients who suffer permanent loss of intellect, on their 
families, on hospitals, and on those in need of hospital beds 
already occupied by these comatose patients.  (2) Obsolete criteria 
                                                 
37Ibid.  The committee also included a lawyer, theologian, and historian. 
 
38 "A Definition of Irreversible Coma: Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of 
the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death," Journal 
of the American Medical Association 205 (1968). 
 
39Ibid. 
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for the definition of death can lead to controversy in obtaining 
organs for transplantation.40 
 
The public’s initial impression of these remarks was that the Committee began 
investigating the features of irreversible coma as a criterion for death and 
discovered fortuitously the benefits it also would have in obtaining transplantable 
organs.  Scant references to transplantation in the report suggest that the issue was 
peripheral to the Committee.   Gary Belkin, responding to critics of the report, 
argues that, “A more careful history of the report pushes interest in transplantation 
to the side,” and instead highlights “…the combination of ethical concerns and 
clinical efforts to consider limits on the use of intrusive technologies, framed 
within emerging paradigms of the neurology of consciousness.”41  While these 
efforts and concerns contributed to the content of the report’s rationale, 
transplantation interests were far from marginal, as Belkin suggests.  Earlier 
manuscript drafts and memos reveal that the Committee’s mission was to 
“advance the cause of organ transplantation.”42  In fact, one early draft concludes 
with words explicitly demonstrating the centrality of organ transplantation: “The 
question before this committee cannot be simply to define brain death.  This 
would not advance the cause of organ transplantation since it would not cope with 
the essential issue of when the surgical team is authorized—legally, morally, and 
                                                 
40Ibid. , 85. 
 
41Gary S. Belkin, "Brain Death and the Historical Understanding of 
Bioethics," Journal of the History of Medicine 58 (2003).(327) 
 
42Beecher, "Definition of Irreversible Coma, Manuscript Draft of 11 April, 
1968. “Definition of Irreversible Coma,” manuscript draft of 11 April, 1968.  
Cited in Giacomini. 
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medically—in removing a vital organ…”43 However, Dean Ebert requested the 
committee to “tone down” the references pertaining to the need of transplantable 
organs to better ensure public acceptance of the report.44   
 Additional evidence of the need to accommodate transplantation surfaces 
in earlier drafts of the report in which protocols for speeding up the diagnosis of 
death (to ensure fresher organs) were advanced.  For example, originally the 
report recommended protocols for signs of death at twenty-four-hour intervals 
over a period of three days before terminating life support.45  Transplant 
surgeons, however, objected to this long interval and the committee acquiesced to 
a twenty-four-hour period.  In a later address published in the International 
Journal of Clinical Pharmacology, Beecher stated: 
                                                
There is indeed a life-saving potential in the new definition, for, 
when accepted, it will lead to greater availability than formerly of 
essential organs in viable condition, for transplantation, and thus 
countless lives now inevitably lost will be saved…At whatever 
level we choose to call death, it is an arbitrary decision.  Death of 
the heart?  The hair still grows.  Death of the brain?  The heart may 
still beat.  The need is to choose a level where the brain no longer 
functions.  It is best to choose a level where, although the brain is 
 
43Ibid. , 1474. 
 
44An earlier draft stated: “With increased experience and knowledge and 
development in the field of transplantation, there is great need for the tissues and 
organs of the hopelessly comatose in order to restore to health those who are still 
salvageable.”  Ebert responded, “The connotation of this statement is unfortunate, 
for it suggests that you wish to redefine death in order to make organs readily 
available to persons requiring transplants.  Immediately the reader thinks how this 
principle might be abused…Would it not be better to state the problem, and 
indicate that obsolete criteria for the definition of death can lead to controversy in 
obtaining organs for transplantation?” Beecher, "Definition of Irreversible Coma, 
Manuscript Draft of 11 April, 1968.  Cited in Giacomini, 1475. 
 
45Ibid. 
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dead, usefulness of other organs is still present.  This we have tried 
to make clear in what we have called the new definition of death.46 
 
With the rise of advanced transplantation technology in the 1960s, a new 
form of scarce medical resource was created, viz., transplantable organs.  The 
need for life-saving organ transplants increased exponentially as more patients 
were added to waiting lists for suitable donors.  The new brain death criterion, it 
was hoped, would facilitate transplantation efforts by increasing the pool of organ 
donors, thus providing a practical solution to organ shortages.  Although the 
Committee attempted to cast transplantation interests as a secondary concern, the 
second of the two justifications in the report was heralded (more accurately, 
perhaps) as the primary justification for brain death by major news reporting 
agencies from the New York Times to the Chicago Tribune.47   From the outset 
there was public suspicion about the Committee’s criterion due in part to both the 
way in which it was reported and the increasing unease of public sentiment 
toward the medical profession as a whole.  Reports of secret government-
sponsored medical experimentation on unknowing human subjects no doubt had 
affected the public’s perception of experimental medicine.  Transplantation 
technology was still considered as experimental in the late 1960s, and thus for 
                                                 
46Henry K. Beecher and H. I. Dorr, "The New Definition of Death: Some 
Opposing Views," International Journal of Clinical Pharmacology 5 (1971): 120-
1. 
 
47Pernick.  Pernick reports, “Although the Harvard report mentioned both 
respirators and transplants as reasons for redefining death, all 17 New York Times 
articles on the issue from 1967 to 1970 and 9 of 14 such articles from 1971 to 
1974 attributed the need to redefine death primarily to transplantation.  The 
Washington Post, Chicago Tribune, and Associated Press followed suit.” 
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many people it represented an uncertain practice.  An impression that medical 
professionals introduced brain death as a way to further organ transplantation 
likely contributed to public distrust. 
According to Pernick48 and Giacomini,49 the Committee was less 
concerned with conceptual abstractions such as personal and organism identity, 
and more concerned with solving practical problems.  In conjunction with the 
promotion of organ donation, the Committee also wanted to protect the medical 
profession against critics of transplantation.  As Pernick observed, “[Beecher] 
hoped the Harvard criteria would not only increase the supply of organs but, more 
broadly, defend the entire medical profession against the public perception that 
transplant surgeons were organ-stealing killers.”50   In addition, Pernick noted 
“Beecher’s repugnance at what he considered the futile waste of vital resources 
linked his concerns about transplantation and mechanical ventilation.”51  For 
Beecher, according to Pernick, the use of mechanical ventilation on those who 
had no use of their organs was a futile endeavor and constituted a waste of 
transplantable organs.  As Beecher himself asked, “Can society afford to discard 
the tissues and organs of the hopelessly unconscious patient when he could be 
used to restore the otherwise hopelessly ill, but still salvageable individual?” 52  
                                                 
48Ibid. 
 
49Giacomini. 
 
50Pernick. 
 
51Ibid.  
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Moreover, having a keen interest in human experimentation, Beecher recognized 
the permanently comatose as a potential source of various sorts of medical 
experimentation.  Relying on Beecher’s personal correspondences, Pernick 
suggests, “Beecher apparently hoped that experimenting on brain-dead bodies 
could reduce the need for live human guinea pigs and thereby avoid the ethical 
complications caused by using live human subjects.”53 
 Giacomini offers an expansive contextual analysis concluding that, “Brain 
death was socially as well as clinically constructed.”54  He notes how various 
competing and cooperating interests negotiated their claims over the new territory 
represented by “the irreversibly comatose body.”  Giacomini characterizes these 
discussions as, “A veritable zoo of 1960s-era technologies meandered through 
early brain death debates.”  Included among them were successes such as heart 
transplantation and renal dialysis, and failures (at the time) such as the artificial 
heart and lung transplantation.  One such evolving technology was the EEG, as 
mentioned earlier.  But, as Giacomini notes, “By 1968 the EEG presented neither 
necessary nor sufficient diagnostic evidence for [determining] death to the 
satisfaction of authoritative groups.”55  Clearly, transplantation influenced the 
Committee’s deliberations: “The criteria [for determining brain death] were 
                                                                                                                                                 
52 H. K. Beecher, "Ethical Problems Created by the Hopelessly 
Unconscious Patient," New England Journal of Medicine 278 (1968). 
 
53Pernick, 10. 
 
54Giacomini, 1478. 
  
55Ibid. 
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deliberated within a very short time frame, due to the publicity created by the first 
heart transplant.”56 
 The Harvard Committee’s concerns over solving important practical 
problems made it vulnerable to criticisms.  Central to the criticisms is the lack of 
supporting evidence substantiating the burden posed by coma depasse patients.57  
The report indicates that these patients pose great burdens on themselves, their 
families, hospitals, and those who need beds otherwise occupied by comatose 
patients.  While it is difficult to know how patients in this state are a burden to 
themselves, the notion that care of these patients is a burden on hospital resources 
seems incredible for two reasons.  First, as the Committee noted, most coma 
depasse patients undergo conventional death within a few hours to a few days.  It 
is unlikely that, in 1968, care for these patients had created a crisis.  Second, as 
Giacomini observes, “The burden of transplantation research on scarce resources 
may have captured more critical attention”58 than the burden of care for 
permanently comatose patients.   Indeed, the survival rate of heart-transplant 
recipients in the year following Barnard’s success was no greater than eleven 
months.  Resources consumed for the first heart transplant in the United States 
                                                 
56Ibid. , 1479. 
 
57Another similar criticism concerns the lack of scientific evidence 
provided in the Report to justify its diagnostic criteria.  There was no reference to 
1959 French report on coma depasse nor to the Ciba symposium.  The latter 
contained discussions on defining death.   
 
58Giacomini, 1471. 
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included $30,000 for the transplant surgery and 304 pints of blood that eclipse any 
other consumption of resources.59   
 Describing the burden posed to families of the permanently comatose, 
Josef Seifert notes, “The discontinuation of extraordinary means of life-support 
(artificial respirators, etc.) could be justified without maintaining that irreversible 
breakdown of brain function is identical with death.”60  Since 1957,61 Catholic 
theologians and ethicists have recognized that there is no moral obligation to 
extend the lives of the gravely suffering or permanently unconscious through 
extraordinary means.  Hence, the first justification of the report that “the burden is 
great on patients who suffer permanent loss of intellect, on their families, on 
hospitals, and on those in need of hospital beds already occupied by these 
comatose patients” is unnecessary.  Indeed, some commentators note that 
physicians, prior to 1968, had long been making decisions regarding foregoing 
treatment for patients whose conditions they judged as irreversible.   Margaret 
Lock writes:  
Prior to 1968 physicians in North America and Europe had, as a 
matter of course, quietly turned off the ventilators of patients 
whose condition they firmly believed was irreversible and would 
                                                 
59R. M. Titmuss, The Gift of Relationship: From Human Blood to Social 
Policy (New York: Vintage Books, 1971).  Cited in Giacomini.  See also 
Margaret Lock, Twice Dead: Organ Transplants and the Reinvention of Death 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002). 
 
60Josef Seifert, “Brain Death and Euthanasia,” in Beyond Brain Death: 
The Case against Brain Based Criteria for Human Death, ed. Michael Potts, Paul 
A. Byrne and Richard G. Nilges (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000), 
206. 
 
61Pope Pius XII, "The Prolongation of Life: An Address of Pope Pius XII 
to an International Congress of Anesthesiologists," The Pope Speaks 4 (1958). 
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soon result in conventional death…In performing such acts, 
physicians were participating in a long-standing but discreet 
medical tradition.  As the number of artificial ventilators 
accumulated in ICUs, intensivists had to deal increasingly with 
unconscious patients with severe head trauma whose condition 
was, in their estimation, irreversible.  Although many died 
precipitously, others lingered on for days, and doctors had to 
decide whether to remove such individuals from life support.  
Nevertheless, the practice of unplugging the ventilator remained 
informal, and more or less concealed, in large part because neither 
the media nor the public evinced much interest in the practice.62 
 
In addition, Giacomini observes that in public forums during the 1950s and 1960s, 
“the sporadic criticism of life support centered not on the appropriate 
determination of death, but on the extent of a doctor’s obligation to postpone 
dying.”63  Family members often lamented over the indignity imposed on their 
loved ones due to medicine’s ability to prolong the dying process unnecessarily.  
Hence, the crisis at the time seemed less focused on “the ambiguity of the 
patient’s alive-vs-dead status, but rather… on the horror of dying slowly in the 
hospital and new anxiety about the doctor’s ability to prolong it.”64  Physicians 
seemed to find little moral impediment to withdrawing life-support from patients 
when they deemed that continuation was futile.  According to critics, this 
seriously undermined the legitimacy of the Harvard report’s first justification.  Its 
                                                 
62Lock, Twice Dead: Organ Transplants and the Reinvention of Death, 
103.  In addition, Giacomini claims that the use of heart-beating cadavers as organ 
sources preceded the deliberations of the Harvard Committee in 1968, noting, 
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second justification, (Obsolete criteria for the definition of death can lead to 
controversy in obtaining organs for transplantation), is equally questionable.   
 In bioethics literature, critics of brain death continue to characterize it as 
“legal fiction” whose only purpose is to facilitate organ donation.65  From this 
perspective, the endorsement of brain death seems to have been a utilitarian move 
lacking an adequate justification.  One writer, for example, characterizes the 
second justification of the Harvard report as both unnecessary and 
counterproductive.66  He notes that the first successful heart and liver transplants 
in the 1960s were carried out without the need for a brain death declaration.  A 
careful analysis of the harvesting procedure employed in early transplantations 
suggests that declaring brain dead patients as “dead” may have been unnecessary 
for the retrieval of their organs.  Indeed, Barnard’s first heart transplant involved 
removing the heart and kidneys of a donor post circulatory standstill following the 
discontinuation of ventilator support.  Shewmon presents the procedure as an 
alternative to brain death for procuring vital organs for transplantation.  He writes, 
“The procedure would not begin until after final (though not yet irreversible) 
circulatory standstill following discontinuation of the ventilator and after a latency 
sufficient for moral certainty that the heart will not spontaneously start beating 
again if the body is left undisturbed (probably a couple of minutes would 
suffice).”67  Prior placement of arterial catheters in order to perfuse select organs 
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with preserving medications ensures minimal deterioration upon cardiac arrest.   
“Although the heart is still in principle resuscitatable,” Shewmon writes, “if the 
foregoing of the ventilator is ethical, all the more so would be the foregoing of 
resuscitation immediately thereafter.”  Hence, the excision of the heart at this 
point would not alter in any way the physiology of the circulation-less body in the 
remaining few minutes of the dying process.  “Thus,” he concludes, 
“transplantation techniques could be modified (and in some centers already have 
been) to fall under the moral rubric of donation inter vivos rather than of the Fifth 
Commandment or the so-called ‘dead-donor rule.’"  To be sure, the entire 
procedure would require prior informed consent.   
What Shewmon is describing is a form of NHBD (non-heart-beating organ 
donation).  Although NHBD is currently controversial, it nevertheless represents 
an alternative to the use of brain death, especially in light of the fact that it was 
the procedure employed by Christiaan Barnard in the first human heart transplant.  
However, prior to the use of brain death, this method of procurement ran the risk 
of producing damaged, unusable organs due to the lack of blood flow during 
procurement.  Today medical advances lessen the problems faced by transplant 
teams in the 1960s and 1970s and the premature deaths of many organ 
recipients.68   
 The preceding discussion thus far indicates several important implications.  
First, initial discussions concerning the permanently comatose patient took place 
in the context of advancing transplantation interests in the early to mid 1960s.  
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However, due to uncertainties in diagnostics, as well as concern for the reputation 
of the medical community, it seemed that many physicians were reluctant to 
advance a new criterion of death at that time.   Second, despite these reservations, 
with the highly publicized success of heart transplantation, this reluctance was 
overcome when the Harvard Ad Hoc Committee proposed neurological criteria 
for determining brain death. Though effort was made by the Committee to cast 
transplantation as a secondary benefit of the new criterion, there is strong 
evidence that the motivations of the Committee were centered on the 
advancement of organ transplantation.  Third, as critics note, the Harvard report’s 
dual rationale failed to accord with the concern of the times and rather may have 
inadvertently caused more confusion and harm to the advancement of 
transplantation than good.  Regardless of these problems, in the decade that 
followed the new criterion of death found its way into medical practice and law, 
stimulating further debate and refinements. 
 
1.4 The Need for Further Refinement 
In the decade that followed the Committee’s recommendation, several 
crucial activities suggested the need for further refinement.  First, “judicial 
decisions and state legislation created a patchwork pattern of conflicting new and 
old methods for establishing that a person had died.”69  As early as 1970, “the 
Kansas legislature took the first legal action in an American jurisdiction 
                                                 
69Pernick, 
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recognizing brain-based criteria for the determination of death.”70  The Kansas 
Legislature drafted a statute employing brain death in response to the 
developments in organ transplantation as well as medical support of dying 
patients.  The Kansas statute included the traditional heart-lung criterion and the 
Committee’s criteria for determining brain death.71  Critics of the Kansas statute 
complained that the language appeared to suggest two separate, conflicting 
definitions of death.72  Depending on which paragraph is used, a person can be 
                                                 
 
70President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine 
and Biomedical and Behavioral Research.  Defining Death: A Report on the 
Medical, Legal, and Ethical Issues in the Determination of Death (Washington, 
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dead or alive.73  Attempting to correct the problems of the Kansas statute, 
Professor Alexander Morgan Capron and Dr. Leon R. Kass proposed a model 
statute in a law article published in 1972.  The Capron-Kass proposal more clearly 
spelled out the synchrony between the two standards of death and avoided 
language that implied terminating treatment for the dying.  This model statute was 
adopted in some form by seven states.74  
Between 1970 and 1978, nineteen states adopted legislation recognizing 
the brain death criterion.75  In 1975, the American Bar Association House of 
Delegates formulated a legal definition of brain death.  The ABA defined brain 
death as an “irreversible cessation of total brain function, according to usual and 
customary standards of medical practice.”76  In 1979, the National Conference of 
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Commissioners of Uniform State Laws approved the Uniform Brain Death Act, 
which incorporated the ABA’s recommended definition.77 
Despite the approval of legal scholars and practitioners, the act fell short 
in two important respects: 1) it addressed the concept of brain death only, but not 
the criteria used to conclude that death had occurred,78 and 2) it omitted the 
traditional cardiopulmonary criterion.79 
To further illustrate these shortcomings, an article published in 1979 by 
the New England Journal of Medicine claimed that, unlike many other countries, 
no American consensus existed as to which criteria should be used in determining 
a brain death diagnosis.80  Moreover, the article pointed out that despite the fact 
that many articles had been written claiming that brain death criteria were 
“dependable and duplicable,” various advisory groups had recommended over 
thirty different sets of criteria.  Later, the President’s Commission would 
acknowledge the problem of statutory inconsistencies and the need for a uniform 
standard.81   
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Another major activity in the same decade was the emergence of the 
bioethics community.  Foremost among the issues discussed by members of that 
community were those related to death.  Those issues included whether death was 
an event or a process, whether whole brain or “higher” brain functional loss was 
adequate to determine death, and whether certain brain functions could be ignored 
in declaring patients brain dead.82   Although these questions were not new, they 
emphasized the need to conceptualize brain death for both medical practice and 
legal policy.   
In summary, two important factors emerge from the debates over the 
Harvard criteria in the 1970s.  First, the struggle of the medical community to 
retain its professional power in the face of increasing distrust by the press and 
public led to the intervention of law in standardizing death.  Second, a growing 
recognition “that the development of criteria for determining death is at once a 
medical and a philosophical-theological task,”83 led to the influence of a larger 
and varied group of cultural elites.84 This set the stage for the President’s 
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Commission whose mandated study included refinement of the definition and 
criterion of death.  
 
1.5 The President’s Commission Report and the UDDA 
Following developments in transplantation and the Harvard Ad Hoc 
Committee’s report, President Jimmy Carter appointed a Commission for the 
Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research 
in 1978.  Specifically, the President charged the Commission with the 
responsibility to “study and recommend ways in which the traditional legal 
standards can be updated in order to provide clear and principled guidance for 
determining whether such [artificially maintained] bodies are alive or dead.”85  
Assuming that traditional standards of death were outdated and incapable of 
accounting for artificially maintained bodies, the Commission sought to discover 
“whether the law ought to recognize new means for establishing that the death of 
a human being has occurred.”86 In addition, the Commission endeavored to 
improve upon the inadequacies of the diagnostic criteria of the Harvard 
Committee’s recommendation.  The Commission’s report was published in July 
1981 under the title, Defining Death, in which the Commission defended the 
concept of “whole brain death.”   The Commission, working in conjunction with 
                                                 
85President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine 
and Biomedical and Behavioral Research.  Defining Death: A Report on the 
Medical, Legal, and Ethical Issues in the Determination of Death (Washington, 
DC: Government Printing Office, 1981), 3. 
 
86Ibid. 
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the American Bar Association, the American Medical Association, and the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, recommended in 
its report a Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA). The Act essentially 
bifurcated the standard of death in the following way: 
An individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of 
circulatory and respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation 
of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem, is 
dead.  A determination of death must be made in accordance with 
accepted medical standards.87 
 
Owing to the influence of the President’s Commission report, the UDDA’s 
inclusion of brain death into its bifurcated standard has since been adopted in 
some way by every state.88   
The reports issued by the President’s Commission and the Harvard 
Committee differed in several important respects.  First, unlike the Harvard 
Committee, which was composed mostly of physicians, less than half of the 
Commission’s members were physicians.  This was to ensure that the discussions 
included the interests and concerns of those outside the medical field.  Second, a 
related but distinct concern was to ensure that there were no conflicts of interest 
by excluding transplant surgeons from the Commission’s make-up.    Third, the 
Commission heard testimony on a range of issues related to a standard for 
determining death from experts in fields ranging from neurology to philosophy.   
                                                 
87President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine 
and Biomedical and Behavioral Research.  Defining Death: A Report on the 
Medical, Legal, and Ethical Issues in the Determination of Death (Washington, 
DC: Government Printing Office, 1981), 4. 
 
88Menikoff, 450. 
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And finally, a careful review was conducted of the views of prominent members 
of the “right to life” movement, to ensure support of the idea of “whole brain 
death.”89  These measures exemplified the Commission’s attempts to propose 
policy recommendations that would “accurately reflect the social meaning of 
death and not constitute a mere legal fiction.”90 
Central to the Commission’s report is its conceptual foundation for whole-
brain death (or simply, brain death), which is attributed to the influence of a group 
of physicians from Dartmouth.  Led by James L Bernat,91 they argued that the 
conception behind brain death rested on the notion that the brain was the source of 
                                                 
89Lock, Twice Dead: Organ Transplants and the Reinvention of Death, 
111-112. 
 
90President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine 
and Biomedical and Behavioral Research.  Defining Death: A Report on the 
Medical, Legal, and Ethical Issues in the Determination of Death (Washington, 
DC: Government Printing Office, 1981), 33.  Moreover, the Commission 
overwhelmingly agreed upon a statutory recommendation of brain death for the 
following reasons: 
(1) Such a law would establish the legality of pronouncing death based on 
brain criteria. 
(2) The use of the brain-based standard when the heart-lung standard is not 
applicable would protect patients against ill-advised, idiosyncratic 
pronouncements of death. 
(3) Legal recognition of the brain-based standard would remove the doubt 
that exists in some states over the use of patients without brain functions as organ 
donors. 
(4) A single set of standards for death pronouncements is appropriate for 
all legal purposes (encompassing inheritance, taxes and criminal trials, as well as 
medical treatment). 
(5) Maintaining a dead body on artificial support systems consumes scarce 
medical resources and may unnecessarily deplete the family's emotional and 
financial resources.  See page 10 of the Commission report. 
 
91James L. Bernat, Charles M. Culver, & Bernard Gert, "On the Definition 
and Criteria of Death," Annals of Internal Medicine 94 (1981). 
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integration for the organism as a whole.  As such, when the brain suffers 
irreversible loss of its integrative functions, then the capacity for organizational 
function for the organism as a whole is also lost and, hence, the organism is 
essentially dead.  Although artificial support for respiration and heart rate may 
give the appearance of some organizational unity, the capacity for spontaneous 
function is, in reality, non-existent.  According to the Dartmouth group, this lies 
in the fact that the human body is an integrated organism of interrelated systems 
and organs.92  No single part of the integrated organism constitutes life itself, but 
rather it is the unitary functioning of the organism as a whole that constitutes a 
living body.  The fact that a heart can be taken from one body and placed into 
another indicates that the organizational unity of the body does not necessarily 
reside in the heart.  While the heart is a vital organ, it can be replaced.  Not so, 
however, with the brain.  Since the brain is responsible for integrating bodily life, 
when the whole brain permanently loses it functional capacities, the body is, for 
all practical purposes, dead.  The application of artificial life support, however, 
maintains a collection of interrelated organs and systems, thereby giving the false 
impression of a living body.  
Following investigation of and debate about the issues, the Commission’s 
report maintained that the whole-brain definition of death is best suited to provide 
the means for accurately diagnosing the death of the person.93  Additionally, the 
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93President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine 
and Biomedical and Behavioral Research.  Defining Death: A Report on the 
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report asserted that brain death was a universally accepted concept, although there 
was no evidence to substantiate that assertion.94  The Commission seemed 
inclined to ensure that the new brain death conception appeared consistent with 
the traditional cardio-pulmonary understanding of death.  Some members of the 
Commission feared that the appearance of a radical “paradigm shift” from 
conventional death may prevent public cooperation with donation due to the 
perception that the definition of death was being manipulated.95  In response to 
this concern, the report “made clear [that] the traditional means of diagnosing 
death actually detected an irreversible cessation of integrated functioning among 
the interdependent bodily systems.”96 Traditionally, heart and respiration were the 
basic vital signs whose absence denoted the cessation of organic unity.  
Accordingly, the President’s report explains, “Breathing and heartbeat are not life 
itself.  They are simply used as signs—as one window for viewing a deeper and 
more complex reality: a triangle of interrelated systems with the brain at its 
apex.”97 Thus, the traditional heart and respiratory means of detecting death are, 
                                                                                                                                                 
Medical, Legal, and Ethical Issues in the Determination of Death (Washington, 
DC: Government Printing Office, 1981), 35. 
 
94Lock, Twice Dead: Organ Transplants and the Reinvention of Death.  
Lock notes that this claim was anecdotal at best. 
 
95David Lamb, Death, Brain Death, and Ethics (London: Croom Helm, 
1985). 
 
96President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine 
and Biomedical and Behavioral Research.  Defining Death: A Report on the 
Medical, Legal, and Ethical Issues in the Determination of Death (Washington, 
DC: Government Printing Office, 1981), 34. 
 
97Ibid. , 33. 
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in fact, detecting the permanent cessation of the integrated functioning of the 
organism as a whole.  In contrast, the brain death criterion allows doctors to see 
through the mask of artificial life support in order to ascertain whether the 
integrated functioning of the organism as a whole has irreversibly ceased.  In 
short, this means that the criterion has changed but the conception remains the 
same. 
More to the point, when the use of artificial life support mechanisms 
obscures the means for viewing the traditional signs of heart and respiration, these 
vitals are reduced to artifacts of the mechanical life support itself.  One approach, 
which seeks to explain the conception behind the whole brain definition, views 
“the traditional ‘vital signs’ of heartbeat and respiration [as] merely surrogate 
signs with no significance in them.”98  The importance of these vital signs is that 
when they irreversibly cease, the brain ceases to function.99  Under this 
conception, a functioning brain is necessary for regaining consciousness and 
regulating the vital functions of the body.   
Furthermore, the Commission recognized that its work would have 
ramifications on organ transplantation.  While the Commission acknowledged that 
“advances in organ transplantation were a major impetus in the early development 
of brain-based criteria for death,” it reasoned that current practice indicates, “that 
                                                 
98Ibid. , 34. 
 
99Ibid.  Other signs accompanying these are simply “indicative of loss of 
the functions of the whole brain.”  The report also notes: “On this view, death is 
that moment at which the body's physiological system ceases to constitute an 
integrated whole. Even if life continues in individual cells or organs, life of the 
organism as a whole requires complex integration, and without the latter, a person 
cannot properly be regarded as alive.” See page 33 of the Commission report. 
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the criteria are being applied primarily outside the context of organ donation.”100  
For example, a study was conducted in which prolonged ventilator support 
became the primary qualification for a determination of brain death.  Like the 
Harvard Committee’s report, the Commission’s report lacked a cohesive legal 
framework with respect to foregoing life-support and hence saw brain death as a 
means to relieve the burden of ventilator-supported patients who had no hope of 
recovery.  Even so, transplantation interests influenced the framing and direction 
of many of the arguments contributing to the uniform standards the Commission 
recommended.  As one commentator observed, “It was…emphasized that 
physicians must know as early as possible along the continuum of dying when a 
mechanically supported patient’s brain ceases to function, in order to care 
properly for organs designated for transplant.”101  The Commission noted that the 
internal organs of ventilator-supported patients undergo substantial changes 
making them less fit for transplantation.  Hence, the earlier a brain-death 
declaration, the sooner transplantable organs can be perfused with organ 
preserving medications.  Moreover, given that these discussions were taking place 
as new immunosupressive drugs were becoming available and organ transplants 
were increasing,102 it is evident that, as with the Harvard Committee’s report, 
transplantation interests played an important role in the formation of 
recommendations in the Commission’s report.   
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 The Commission, like the Harvard Committee, adopted a neurological 
conception of death consistent with “irreversible loss of all brain function.”   This 
conception distinguishes patients in a persistent vegetative state, whose brain 
stems continue to function, from those patients who fail to exhibit brain function 
in either the upper or lower portions of the brain.  Patients in a persistent 
vegetative state (PVS), such as Karen Quinlan103 and Nancy Cruzan,104 whose 
                                                 
 
103 In 1975 in New Jersey, 21-year-old, Karen Ann Quinlan slipped into a 
coma and was later diagnosed as PVS.  Karen was admitted to an ICU and placed 
on a vent because of her inability to breathe properly.  Her parents were of the 
Catholic faith and remained hopeful until a meeting in which Karen’s physicians 
informed them Karen would not recover.  They understood the Catholic teaching 
as not requiring extraordinary means to prolong life and felt they knew their 
daughter’s wishes.  With this in mind Karen’s parents asked the physicians to 
remove the vent and after signing a release form the physicians and hospital 
agreed.  However, the next day the physician informed the Quinlans he could not 
remove the vent unless they obtained a court order allowing the action.  Mr. 
Quinlan then launched the battle for guardianship of Karen and the right to 
remove his daughter from the vent.  The Quinlan’s lost their first round in the NJ 
Superior Court but they prevailed in the NJ Supreme Court and Mr. Quinlan was 
granted guardianship. The Quinlan’s attorney filed for removal of the vent under: 
1. The first amendment: Freedom of Religious Beliefs 2. The eighth amendment: 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment 3. The thirteenth amendment: Liberty.  The courts 
agreed with Liberty, i.e., intimate personal decision making and the vent was 
removed.  Karen died nine years later.  In this case the courts talked of the need 
for Ethics Committees.   
 
104 In 1983 a motor vehicle crash left 25 year old Nancy Cruzan in a 
persistent vegetative state, permanently unconscious and without any higher brain 
functioning.  She was kept alive with a feeding tube.  After seven years in this 
state Nancy’s parents went to the circuit court on her behalf to ask that the feeding 
tube be removed.  Nancy’s parents argued if it was not for the feeding tube she 
would die of her head injury and the circuit court judge agreed with her parents.  
However, the Missouri attorney general appealed to the MO Supreme Court and 
the decision was reversed.  The court ruled that ‘the states’ interest in life is 
unqualified’ and that clear and convincing evidence was needed when a life was 
hanging in the balance.  The Cruzans appealed to the US Supreme Court and with 
a 5 to 4 vote the US Supreme Court ruled the Cruzans needed clear and 
convincing evidence and there was none that proved Nancy would not want the 
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brain stems continue to function, would not fall under the Commission’s criteria 
for brain death.  The significance of this is that such patients, under the 
Commission’s conception, constitute persons, while brain dead patients merely 
constitute a collection of interrelated organs and systems.  Some critics of the 
Harvard Committee note the lack of clarity of the report and the potential 
confusion between patients who suffer permanent loss of consciousness and 
patients who suffer loss of all brain function.  In response to this, the Commission 
sharpened the distinction, thereby rejecting appeals to incorporate neo-cortical 
death into the standard.    
The influence of the Commission’s report with respect to social policy is 
evident in several important cases.  Following the UDDA, several courts 
established legal precedence that recognized the new standard.  In 1980, the 
Supreme Court of Washington took up several questions relating to brain death In 
re Bowman.105  Five year old William Matthew Bowman (Matthew), suffered 
massive physical injuries which resulted in the irreversible loss of brain activity.  
The question presented to the court was to whether Matthew had in fact died upon 
suffering irreversible loss of brain activity, and as a result, medical practitioners 
were legally protected when removing life support systems from patients 
                                                                                                                                                 
tube feedings despite what her parents had reported.  The family then went back 
to the MO courts and the courts ruled to remove the feeding tube based on “clear 
and convincing evidence” after new evidence was presented.  Nancy died within a 
few days of having the tube removed.  The case established: 1. State courts can 
require clear and convincing evidence when life is hanging in the balance.  2. 
There is no “right to die” but instead a right to liberty, which recognizes the right 
to refuse treatment.  3. The case was instrumental in Congress passing the 
“Patient Self-Determination Act.”  
 
105In re Bowman, 617 P.2d 731 (Wash. 1980), cited in Menikoff, 444-450. 
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suffering from brain death.  The trial court employed the UDDA standard, under 
which the court ruled that Matthew was dead.  The State Supreme Court, on 
appeal, recognized that Bowman raised a number of issues involving the 
cooperation of law and medicine concerning the determination of death.  The 
court ruled that it is for the law to define the standard of death, that brain death 
should be the standard in Washington, and that it is for the medical profession to 
apply acceptable medical standards in determining brain death.106    
 Courts have applied the UDDA standard even in the most difficult of 
cases.  In re T.A.C.P is instructive in this regard.107  There, the Florida Supreme 
Court ruled that the parents of an anencephalic infant could not donate her organs, 
despite the fact that the child possessed only a brain stem.  (In this condition, 
children lack the ability to develop cognition, a sense of pain or sensation, and 
usually die shortly after birth.)108  The court reasoned that an anencephalic child 
does not satisfy Florida’s statutory definition of death, and declined to carve out 
an exception in this case.109  The court recognized that, according to the UDDA, 
brain death is defined as the permanent cessation of all functions of the entire 
brain, including the brain stem.  The court reasoned that anencephalic children, 
                                                 
106 Ibid. , 445. 
 
107In re T.A.C.P., 609 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1992), cited in Menikoff, 455-461. 
 
108See Shewmon’s interesting discussion on this issue in, D. Alan 
Shewmon, "Recovery from 'Brain Death': A Neurologist's Apologia," Linacre 
Quarterly, (1997). 
 
109As a case of first impression, this court avoided the temptation to craft 
new law concerning anencephalic infants and organ donation, but rather rendered 
its ruling in accordance with common law and Florida statutes regarding death. 
 38
though lacking significant parts of their brains (cerebrum and cerebral cortex), 
nonetheless possess active brain stems.  As such, they do not satisfy the brain 
death criterion.110  Based upon common law and the UDDA, the Florida court 
recognized that T.A.C.P. was a “live” birth and not a “fetal” death.  Although the 
courts in both Bowman and T.A.C.P. ruled that brain death was the legal standard, 
the Washington court held that it was for the law to determine the standard of 
death, and the Florida court refused to grant an exception to brain death, thus 
upholding it as the legal standard. 
In both of these cases, the courts reached uniform legal conclusions 
recognizing the legal standard and conception of death as exemplified in the 
President’s Commission report and the UDDA.  In short, death is best defined as 
the death of the organism as a whole, satisfied by either the cardiopulmonary or 
brain death criterion.   
Despite the fact that some state courts and legislatures have struggled to 
consistently apply the new standard, today all U. S. jurisdictions have accepted 
brain death as the legal standard underscoring the Commission’s success in 
standardizing death in the United States.    Further confirmation of this success is 
supported by the fact that later commissions have neither sought to revise nor 
revisit the earlier commission’s findings or recommendations.  To characterize the 
two seminal events which brought about the establishment of brain death in the 
                                                 
110In fact, if the court had granted an exception for anencephaly, it would 
have implicitly recognized new-cortical death as a viable option, since neo-
cortical death focuses on permanent loss of higher brain functions associated with 
the parts of the brain missing in anencephalic children. 
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United States, it would be fair to say that while the Harvard Committee 
endeavored to frame death as a purely medical matter, the President’s 
Commission transformed it into a matter of law.111 
 
1.6 Summary and Assessment 
 This chapter explored the historical development of brain death in the 
context of emerging technologies.  In particular, the chapter investigated the 
criticism that brain death has never been legitimately justified as a valid criterion 
of death, but instead was advanced by committee in order to promote organ 
transplantation.   This chapter represents one part of a larger analysis in support of 
the thesis that brain death is fraught with numerous difficulties that render it 
unethical as a means for determining death.   
The boundary between life and death has always been a subject of 
discussion and controversy.  The emergence of new biomedical technologies 
brought new challenges and controversies concerning the proper diagnostic 
methods for determining death.  The concept of brain death was created in the 
midst of a complex of 1960s-era technological innovations and interests which 
involved, in some cases, competing claims over a curious product of medicine’s 
ability to exponentially suspend the dying process, viz., the irreversibly comatose 
patient.  
                                                 
111It is important to note that acceptance of the US brain death concept has 
been practically universal.  Most other countries have employed it in some way 
with the exception of the UK and India.  In the UK, brainstem death is the 
preference.    
 40
Historical analysis reveals that the earliest discussions concerning the 
irreversibly comatose patient took place in the context of developing kidney 
transplant technology in the 1960s.  Due to improvements in immunosuppression, 
cadaver kidney transplants became realizable as a new source to supplement the 
scarcity of living kin donors.   Recognizing the superiority of heart-beating 
cadaver kidneys, as well as emerging EEG technology as a potential diagnostic 
tool, transplant researchers began discussing the possibility of facilitating the 
brain dead as organ sources.  However, most physicians who participated in these 
early discussions were reluctant to advance a new criterion for death owing to 
disagreements regarding the signs of death and concern for how respect for the 
medical community might be affected. 
Perhaps the most significant influence was the first heart transplant in 
1967, which inspired a surge in heart transplants around the world.  This was 
followed almost immediately with the formation of an Ad Hoc Committee from 
the Harvard Medical School, known for its interest in transplantation, whose 
purpose was to discuss how best to diagnose neurological death.   Though the 
published report made scant reference to transplantation interests, other 
documents from committee members reveal transplantation interests to be the 
primary motivation for advancing a new criterion for death.  The memos of 
Beecher and Ebert document their concerns and interests in advancing 
transplantation while at the same time attempting to downplay its prevalence in 
the published report.    Additionally, rather than offering support through 
scientific literature, the report offered two pragmatic justifications: 1) to relieve 
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the burdens posed by permanently comatose patients; and 2) to relieve the 
controversies surrounding obtaining transplantable organs.  Analyses provided by 
Seifert, Lock, and Giacomini indicate that the degree to which these patients 
posed burdens upon themselves, their families, and medical resources was little 
noticed in the late 1960s.  Indeed, given that the practice of withdrawing life-
support from ventilator dependent patients at that time was morally justifiable and 
commonplace, it is doubtful that the concerns expressed by the Harvard 
Committee, at least in this respect, reflected the concerns of the public or medical 
community in general.       
The necessity of advancing a new criterion of death to advance 
transplantation also was challenged by Shewmon.  He noted that early heart 
transplant surgeries were performed without the need for a neurological criterion, 
rendering such a move as unnecessary and perhaps counter-productive as an effort 
to secure more transplantable organs.  Pernick suggested that other interests 
contributed to the motives of the committee headed up by Beecher, including the 
use of permanently comatose patients for medical experimentation purposes.   
Despite general acceptance by the medical and legal press in the decade 
that followed, some ambiguities remained with respect to the meaning and 
application of brain death in medial praxis and social policy.  In light of varied 
sets of diagnostic criteria and model statutes, the President’s Commission in 1981 
published its report, Defining Death, in which it proposed a conceptual basis for 
brain death and a model statute in an attempt to make death uniform.  What was 
lacking in the Harvard Committee’s report, the President’s report attempted to 
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clarify and amend, viz., a biological, philosophical, and legal basis for 
standardizing death.   
This chapter has argued that, historically, brain death emerged at the 
crossroads of intersecting technological developments and interests.  In an effort 
to advance experimental medicine, particularly organ transplantation, some 
researchers looked to the permanently comatose patient as a means of resolving 
some practical obstacles in research medicine.  In failing to provide an adequate 
justification for why permanently comatose patients should be considered dead, 
the Harvard Committee opted to a problems-oriented approach thus disclosing the 
seemingly dubious priority of advancing research interests over precision 
regarding the definition and criterion of human death.   
Although the President’s Commission report enjoyed success in 
standardizing death in the 1980s and 1990s, further analysis regarding the 
controversies of the President’s Commission’s adopted conceptual framework 
reveal that controversy regarding brain death continues to linger on, and in some 
cases, has grown in intensity.112  The aim of Chapter Two is to investigate the 
conceptual challenges raised by numerous thinkers in regard to the consistency of 
brain death with the death of the organism as a whole, calling into question its 
legitimacy in the face of emerging science.  Included in the discussion will be an 
examination into the scientific validity of the criteria and clinical tests for brain 
death, as well as the doubts and unease exhibited by many clinicians regarding the 
                                                 
112Alan D. Shewmon, "The Brain and Somatic Integration," Journal of 
Medicine and Philosophy 26, no. 5 (2001): 459. 
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use of brain death for transplantation.   While some have described the issue of 
brain death as “well settled yet still unresolved,”113 a closer examination discloses 
reasons for re-thinking previous conclusions concerning the conceptual basis for 
brain death as a valid standard of death. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
113Alexander Morgan Capron, "Brain-Death: Well Settled Yet Still 
Unresolved," The New England Journal of Medicine 344, no. 16 (2001). 
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Chapter 2 
 
 
 Medical Misgivings with Brain Death 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Brain death was first introduced as a pragmatic solution to the problem 
surrounding the treatment of comma depasse patients and the removal of donative 
organs.  Although the Harvard Committee recommended tests for determining 
brain death in patients, the report failed to say why a diagnosis of brain death 
should be equated with human death.  Over a decade later, the President’s 
Commission articulated a conceptual basis for brain death in an attempt to 
validate its use as a criterion for human death.  Additionally, the Commission 
provided a model statute in an attempt to standardize brain death in the United 
States.  Since that time, there has been global acceptance of brain death.  This has 
led many to conclude that, despite questions that still persist, the issue of brain 
death is “well settled yet still unresolved.”114    
Specifically, medical experts question the scientific basis for brain death, 
often pointing to arbitrariness in testing and clinical evidence of long-term 
                                                 
114Alexander Morgan Capron, "Brain-Death: Well Settled yet Still 
Unresolved," The New England Journal of Medicine 344, no. 16 (2001): 16. 
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survival of some brain dead patients.115  In 2002, a survey conducted in eighty 
countries revealed major differences in the procedures for diagnosing brain death 
in adults.116  Chief among those differences is the apnea test, which in some cases 
may lead to a misdiagnosis, or even premature death.117   Researchers from the 
Harvard Medical School also have reported that brain death “fails to correspond 
to any coherent biological or philosophical understanding of death.”118  A 
growing number of experts in neuroscience, philosophy, and religion claim that a 
prognosis of brain death, which will inevitably lead to somatic death, is not 
identical to a diagnosis that somatic death has actually occurred.119  
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the challenges surrounding brain 
death and its clinical and scientific basis in particular.  This will involve an 
assessment of its biological conceptual basis, giving particular attention to the 
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Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000). 
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difficulties of establishing somatic neural dependency respecting brain death’s 
clinical criteria.  Additionally, the chapter will discuss the various clinical 
anomalies and physical phenomena that occur in brain-dead patients and 
determine whether they are consistent with the “standard paradigm” as set forth in 
the brain-death standard.    Related to this discussion are the difficulties of using 
the brain-death criterion along with the cardiopulmonary-death criterion as 
required by the President’s Report.   
This chapter is divided into four parts.  Section 2.2 deals with the 
problems of conceptual consistency.  Sections 2.3 and 2.4 explore the evolution of 
brain death’s clinical criteria and tests.  Section 2.5 discloses and assesses data 
from various surveys of clinicians (doctors and nurses) who deal with brain death 
and its use in organ procurement.  
 
2.2 Problems of Conceptual Continuity 
Despite more than thirty years as the standard for determining death,120 
brain death “remains as confused and controversial today as ever.”121  Beginning 
in the 1970s, a number of experts challenged the idea that brain death could be 
conceptually sustained and clinically diagnosed.122  Bioethics literature reflects 
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122Ibid.  Shewmon cites the following: Henry K. Beecher and H. I. Dorr, 
"The New Definition of Death: Some Opposing Views," International Journal of 
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criticisms and calls for the abandonment of brain death altogether, which medical 
practitioners and policy makers have tended to ignore.  When one considers the 
implications of the collapse of brain death for solid organ donation, it is not 
difficult to understand why such calls have been ignored.  As several writers note, 
“The issues of brain death and organ transplantation go hand in hand, for when 
unpaired vital organs are taken from heart-beating brain dead patients, it causes 
their somatic death, as in the case of heart transplantation.”123     
Inconsistencies in determining brain death give rise to a three-tiered 
problem:  1) the tests for diagnosing brain death; 2) the clinical criterion for brain 
death; and 3) the definition or conception of death.124  As Robert Truog explains: 
“In other words, individuals who fulfill the tests must also fulfill the criterion, and 
those who satisfy the criterion must also satisfy the definition.”125  The definition 
of death is: “the permanent cessation of functioning of the organism as a 
                                                                                                                                                 
Clinical Pharmocology 5 (1971).  Paul A. Bryne and others, "Brain Death-the 
Patient, the Physician, and Society," Gonzaga Law Review 18 (1982/83).  D. W. 
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whole.”126  The criterion is: “The permanent cessation of functioning of the entire 
brain.”   The clinical testing includes:  127
…A battery of tests and procedures, including establishment of an 
etiology sufficient to account for the loss of all brain functions, 
diagnosing the presence of coma, documenting apnea and the 
absence of brain-stem reflexes, excluding reversible conditions, 
and showing the persistence of these findings over a sufficient 
period of time.128    
 
This interrelationship satisfies each of the three levels; otherwise, serious doubt is 
cast on the legitimacy of brain death as criterion of death.  Brain-death supporters 
are at great pains to maintain this consistency in the face of growing challenges.  
Indeed, some researchers maintain that brain death cannot sustain such challenges 
any longer and therefore should be discarded entirely.129 
 The concept of brain death, originally articulated by Bernat, Culver, and 
Gert, which had been adopted by the President’s Report, rests on two related, 
though distinct, claims.  First, the brain is the source of integration for the 
organism as a whole, and as such, is consistent with the traditional 
cardiopulmonary criterion.  Consistency is maintained given the fact that after an 
accurate brain-death diagnosis, cardiopulmonary death quickly follows despite 
continued intensive care.  This is known as the somatic disintegration 
                                                 
126James L. Bernat, Charles M. Culver, & Bernard Gert, "On the 
Definition and Criteria of Death," Annals of Internal Medicine 94 (1981). 
 
127Ibid. 
 
128Truog, "Is It Time to Abandon Brain Death?" , 30.  
 
129Ibid. 
 
 49
hypothesis.130  Under this hypothesis, the brain (whole brain) is the critical organ 
that controls or integrates other bodily systems, and when it ceases to function, 
the remaining bodily systems are unable to survive.   
Early in the debate over the Harvard Report’s recommended new criterion 
of human death, Hans Jonas raised questions regarding the accuracy and 
sustainability of a brain-oriented definition of death. Parsing out the distinction 
between “organism as a whole” and “whole organism”, Jonas saw the latter as 
constituting local subsystems (e.g., the continued functioning of cells and tissues) 
and hence, not “affecting the definition of death by the larger criteria of the 
whole.”131   He argued that respiration and circulation do not fall into this 
category because their effect is realized throughout the organism as a whole and 
“ensures the functional preservation of its other parts.”132    Additionally, 
introducing the idea of “irreversible cessation” provides no further clarity since it 
may refer to the function itself or to the spontaneity of the function.  Jonas 
reasoned that a cessation could be either irreversible or reversible depending on 
which is emphasized.   For example, if physicians could do for the disabled brain 
what they can do for the heart and lungs, i.e., provide an external agency for its 
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continued functioning, such functioning would not matter more so than the lack of 
spontaneity at its cerebral source.133  In other words, the location of the agency of 
functioning, whether interior or exterior, has no bearing on the integration itself.  
Thus, maintaining cardiorespiratory functions artificially simply does not affect 
the status of the life of the organism as a whole. 
 Another early critic of the whole-brain conception of death is Robert 
Veatch.  For more than thirty years Veatch has challenged brain death on the basis 
that it cannot be sustained.134  Focusing on the notion that the entire brain must be 
dead for the individual as a whole to be dead, Veatch has raised—and continues 
to raise—doubts about whether a whole-brain conception can be consistently 
maintained.  His main argument is that remaining cellular, electrical, and 
supercellular functions are ignored as insignificant by brain-death defenders.135  
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To be sure, today it is universally recognized that many brain-dead patients who 
satisfy all the standard clinical tests continue to exhibit integrative functions of the 
brain.136  Some of these functions include: 1) continued functioning of the 
auditory pathways as evidenced by brainstem evoked potentials; 2) continued 
cortical functioning as evidenced by EEG readings;137 and 3) continued retention 
of free-water homeostasis through the neurologically mediated secretion of 
arginine vasopressin, as evidenced by serum hormonal levels and the absence of 
diabetes insipidus.138 
  
The arbitrary way in which these qualifications occur hardly 
represents the idea that the whole-brain must be dead in order to declare an 
individual dead.  If one accepts that all functions of the entire brain must 
permanently cease for an individual to be dead, then it is difficult to justify why 
certain functions can be ignored in clinical testing.139
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These concerns have not gone unanswered.  While recognizing that all 
functions of the brain must cease irreversibly before declaring that an individual is 
dead, Bernat suggests, “Not all functions of the organism as a whole must be lost 
in brain death.”140  In an effort to refine his earlier account of brain death, Bernat 
suggests that “Death should be defined as the permanent cessation of the critical 
functions of the organism as a whole.”141  He defines the critical functions as 
those necessary for the continued health and life of the organism as a whole. 
While many functions are attributable to the organism as a whole, only the 
critical functions such as breathing, circulation, and awareness matter in assessing 
whether the critical system of the organism as a whole has been destroyed.  
Bernat makes clear that it is these critical functions that he and President’s 
Commission had in mind when they used the term functions.142 
Bernat further suggests that, “With destruction of the organism’s critical 
system, inevitably spontaneous fluctuations will irreversibly further degrade the 
organism and increase entropy until all systems no longer retain the capacity to 
operate.”143  His suggestion is based on a thermodynamics theory in which the 
brain governs entropy production.  “When the brain is destroyed,” he explains, 
“the critical system is destroyed and the organism can no longer survive in a state 
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of minimal entropy production.”144   The loss of all critical systems of the brain 
entails the beginning of this process, in which case, the death of the organism as a 
whole has occurred. 
Such refinements like that offered by Bernat have not satisfied critics of 
brain death who argue that Bernat’s criteria seem arbitrary145 and ad hoc.146  In 
particular, they complain that Bernat dismisses any evidence or anomaly contrary 
to the “standard paradigm” simply because it does not comport with the notion 
that the brain is the primary integrator of the organism’s critical functions.  It is 
unclear as to whether narrowing the sense of “integrated functioning” to include 
only those functions that are consistent with maintaining the current standard is 
justifiable.  Indeed, due to the more “dynamical-systems-enlightened biology of 
the 1990s”147 a broader reading of “integrated functioning” suggests that 
integration is not localized in any one part of the body, including the brain.  This 
broader reading poses a direct challenge to the claim that the brain is the primary 
source of integration.  This challenge, among others, will be considered in the 
next section.   
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2.3 Arbitrariness of the Criterion 
According to the current standard that comprises brain death, death occurs 
when the whole brain irreversibly ceases to function.  As Bernat explains: 
[I]t is primarily the brain that is responsible for the functioning of 
the organism as a whole: the integration of organ and tissue 
subsystems by neural and neuroendocrine control of temperature, 
fluids and electrolytes, nutrition, breathing, circulation, appropriate 
responses to danger, among others. The cardiac arrest patient with 
whole brain destruction is simply a preparation of unintegrated 
individual subsystems, since the organism as a whole has ceased 
functioning.148  
 
Alan Shewmon, a pediatric neurologist, has scrutinized Bernat’s rationale in light 
of the empirical evidence opposing the idea of the brain as the organ of somatic 
integration.  The criterion rests on the idea that the brain serves as the integrator 
of the organism as a whole.  That is, the integrated unity of the organism as a 
whole is sustained and directed primarily by a functioning brain.  If this claim is 
mistaken, the conceptual basis for brain death is untenable.  Shewmon, whose 
multiple conversions, (due to the more “dynamical-systems-enlightened biology 
of the 1990s”)149 from neo-cortical death to whole-brain death, and finally to a 
holistic, systems oriented criterion of death, offers criticisms that are instructive 
on this point.150  Many physicians cite to Shewmon’s work and that the role of the 
brain, with regard to its contribution to the organism as a whole, is best described 
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“as modulator and enhancer rather than integrator.”151  As such, integration may 
not be reducible to a single part or organ of the body.  Rather, as Shewmon 
explains, “Each part of the body, especially the brain, contributes to the stability, 
robustness, and richness of the body’s vitality and unity, but no one part or even 
combination of parts constitutes that vitality or unity.”152  As Shewmon further 
explains, “What is of the essence of integrative unity is neither localized nor 
replaceable—namely the anti-encephalic mutual interaction of all the cells and 
tissues of the body, mediated in mammals by circulating oxygenated blood.”153  
This suggests that the traditional cardiopulmonary criterion (or some modified 
form of it) is best suited for determining the death of the organism as a whole.   
In support of his claims, Shewmon documents 175 brain-dead patients 
whose survival rates varied from one week, to several months, and, in one case, to 
fourteen years.154  The greatest survival rates were among children who had 
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exhibited a remarkable capacity for prolonged survival.  Other cases include 
brain-dead pregnant women and other adult patients whose survival rates were 
significantly less.  Shewmon concludes: 
These data teach us several lessons: (1) "Brain death" does not 
necessarily lead to imminent cardiac arrest despite all treatment. 
(2) The heterogeneity of survival duration is largely explainable by 
non-brain factors. Moreover, the process of brain damage leading 
up to "brain death" frequently induces secondary damage to heart 
and lungs. Therefore, the tendency to early cardiac arrest in the 
majority of patients is attributable more to somatic factors than to 
mere absence of brain activity per se. (3) The first few weeks are 
especially precarious. But those who make it through tend to 
stabilize, no longer requiring sophisticated technological support. 
Some have even been discharged home on a ventilator. Although 
some personhood-consciousness reductionists might try to argue 
that these are not human persons, no one can seriously claim that 
they are not living human organisms, living human beings.155 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
T.K.'s mother gave me permission to examine him and to document 
everything photographically. I was satisfied that he had no brainstem function. 
The skin of his face and upper torso did, however, become mottled in response to 
my pinching parts of his body, associated with a rise in heart rate and blood 
pressure. This spinally mediated stress response could not be elicited from the 
face, sensory input from which is processed in the brainstem, which in him is 
missing.  
Further confirming the diagnosis, evoked potentials showed no cortical or 
brainstem responses, a magnetic resonance angiogram showed no intracranial 
blood flow, and an MRI scan revealed that the entire brain, including the 
brainstem, had been replaced by ghost-like tissues and disorganized proteinaceous 
fluids.  
T.K. has much to teach about the necessity of the brain for somatic 
integrative unity. There is no question that he became ‘brain dead’ at age four; 
neither is there any question that he is still alive at age nineteen.”  I should note 
that in a recent conversation (November, 2006) with Dr. Paul Byrne, a 
neonatologist who treated TK, he disclosed that TK lived five more years before 
passing away at age 23. 
 
155Ibid.  Emphases in original. 
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Some brain-death defenders have challenged the diagnoses in Shewmon’s 
cases.  Wijdicks and Bernat,156 for example, raised doubts given the incomplete 
information provided by the cases.  Particularly, they cite to the lack of a 
‘denominator’ and the exclusion of information regarding drug effects as well as 
the details of apnea testing as shortcomings.  Yet, as Elliot notes, “It seems 
unlikely that all of these cases could have been misdiagnoses,” otherwise, “the 
implication must be that many other misdiagnosed patients have had support 
discontinued, or have been subjected to organ harvesting.”157   
To further support his claim that brain-death criteria are arbitrary, 
Shewmon refers to non-brain integrative ‘holistic’ functions of patients who had 
been declared to be brain dead.158  These functions include: 
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 homeostasis of a limitless variety of physiological 
parameters and chemical substances  
 assimilation of nutrients  
 elimination, detoxification and recycling of cellular wastes;  
 energy balance  
 maintenance of body temperature (albeit subnormal)  
 wound healing  
 fighting of infections and foreign bodies  
 development of a febrile response to infection (albeit 
rarely)  
 cardiovascular and hormonal stress responses to incision 
for organ retrieval  
 successful gestation of a fetus (as in thirteen pregnant 
women of the prolonged survivors)  
 sexual maturation (in two prolonged-surviving children)  
 proportional growth (in three children) 
 recovery and stabilization following cardiac arrest and 
other complications (at least in some cases)  
 spontaneous improvement in general health, such as loss of 
the need for pressor drugs to counteract hypotension, return 
of gastrointestinal motility (allowing tube feedings), etc.  
 ability to maintain fluid and electrolyte balance with rare or 
no serum monitoring and rare or no adjustment of fluid 
volume and composition  
 the overall ability to survive with little medical intervention 
outside a hospital (as in seven of the prolonged survivors). 
159 
 
Furthermore, Shewmon claims that most brain-mediated integrative 
functions are not somatically integrating.  While many of these integrative 
functions are endogenous within the brain, very few have to do with the 
integration of the body.  As such, they do not confer unity upon the body; rather 
they enhance or preserve the somatic unity that is already presumed.   Consider 
breathing and nutrition, for example.  If breathing is understood as a brain-
mediated function, then it constitutes only the moving of air in and out of the 
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lungs (in the bellows sense) involving the “the phrenic nerves, diaphragm and 
intercostals muscles.”160  However, as Shewmon notes, given that “fetuses in 
utero and patients on cardiopulmonary bypass or extracorporeal membrane 
oxygenation are quite alive without movement of air driven by either brain or 
ventilator,” breathing in the bellows sense is best understood as “merely a 
condition for somatic integration to take place under ordinary circumstances, not 
an essential aspect of somatic integration itself.”161  If breathing is understood as 
respiration (the exchange of oxygen and carbon dioxide), then breathing is not 
mediated by the brain.  Similarly, if nutrition is understood as “eating and 
drinking” or merely “swallowing,” it is a brain-mediated function.  But if it is 
understood as the break down of food into smaller elements for absorption into 
the body’s structure, it is not.   
The somatic disintegration hypothesis is further weakened when the 
integrative capacities of certain brain-dead patients are considered.162  Perhaps the 
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greatest difficulty for advocates of the brain-death standard, and the one that some 
have suggested is “the straw that breaks the conceptual camel’s back,”163 is found 
in brain-dead pregnant women who are sustained on life support and continue to 
carry developing children in their wombs to near full term delivery (in one case 
107 days).   Commenting on the implications of this phenomenon, a 164 Japanese 
cardiologist, Dr. Yoshio Watanabe, explains, 
…if the entire brain including the brain stem has indeed sustained 
irreversible damage, cardiorespiratory arrest would inevitably 
ensue, bringing about the person’s death. However, the duration of 
this stage may well last for several days to several weeks when a 
respirator is used and hence, this stage at best only predicts that 
death of the individual is imminent, not that it is confirmed. The 
fact that some brain dead pregnant women have given birth to 
babies can be taken as strong evidence that the person is still alive, 
and the use of terms such as biomort or heart-beating cadaver is 
nothing but a sophism to conceal the contradiction in transplant 
protagonists’ logic.165 
 
It seems difficult for those who advocate the brain-death standard to account for 
this phenomenon if the brain provides the integrative functioning of the organism 
as a whole.  As Karen Granstrand Gervais observes, “The organism as a whole 
                                                                                                                                                 
Cengiz, M. Yilmaz, A. Ramazanoĝlu, “Frequency of spinal reflex movements in 
brain-dead patients,” Transplant Proc 36(2004): 17-19. 
 
163M. Siegler and D. Wikler, "Brain Death and Live Birth," JAMA 248 
(1989): 1101.  
 
164Bernstein. 
 
165Yoshio Watanabe, “Brain Death and Cardiac Transplantation: Historical 
Background and Unsettled Controversies in Japan,” in Beyond Brain Death: The 
Case against Brain Based Criteria for Human Death, ed. Michael Potts, Paul A. 
Bryne, and Richard G. Nilges, Philosophy and Medicine (Dordrecht, The 
Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000), 192. 
 
 61
must be functioning for the uterus to remain a hospitable environment for the 
developing fetus.”166   
 The preceding discussion suggests several implications.  First, the 
rationale for the brain-death criterion, as developed and articulated by Bernat, et 
al, continues to be challenged in spite of refinements.  Specifically, recent 
findings by Shewmon disclose that brain-dead patients exhibit a litany of 
biologically integrative activity indicative of somatic life, not death.  As a result, 
many thinkers no longer consider the somatic disintegration hypothesis a 
legitimate conceptual basis for brain death.  The influence of Shewmon’s work is 
particularly troublesome for brain-death advocates.  In a recent exchange between 
James Bernat and another researcher, he candidly admits, “Alan Shewmon has 
written convincingly that the integration argument alone is inadequate. After 
numerous conversations with him over the years I have come to conclude that he 
is probably correct. I have struggled to discern what else is important in addition 
to the integrator theory.”167  Nevertheless, the problems surrounding the brain-
death standard do not end here.  They include the difficulty of maintaining 
consistency in clinical testing.  This difficulty is central to the standard as a 
whole, which will be critiqued in the next section. 
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2.4 Incoherencies of the Clinical Tests 
Maintaining conceptual clarity requires consistency with regard to the 
clinical tests-criterion relation for determining brain death.  Since its inception, 
brain-death testing guidelines have undergone numerous revisions.  The Harvard 
Committee recommended testing to determine the following: 1) lack of reception 
or response to external stimuli; 2) no spontaneous respiration for three minutes off 
of a respirator; 3) no reflexes; and 4) a flat electroencephalogram for at least ten 
minutes, repeated after twenty four hours.168   Missing from the Committee’s 
report was data from studies that qualified uses of these tests.  In 1971, two 
Minneapolis neurosurgeons published their study of twenty-five brain-dead 
patients.169  Of the twenty-five, only nine had EEG testing and of those, two had 
“biologic” activity after having been declared brain dead.  The Minnesota 
Criteria, as it became known, not only removed the necessity of EEG testing, but 
also reduced the twenty-four hour period for neurologic confirmation of no 
spontaneous movement to twelve hours.   
The most significant study to date was conducted by the National Institute 
of Health.170  This “Collaborative Study” was conducted on 804 patients, with 
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data provided for only 503 of them.  The limits of the study resulted in a 
recommendation for a larger clinical trial, which has not occurred as of the 
writing of this project.  In contrast to the thirty sets of criteria that were used as 
the basis for brain death during the 1970s, today there are over forty. 
While brain death has gained global acceptance, the criteria for 
determining brain death varies considerably from country to country, and in 
different areas of the same country.  In 2002, neurologist Eelco Widjicks, 
published a study on brain death, which consisted of a survey of eighty countries 
regarding diagnostic testing procedures.171  Of the eighty countries, Widjicks 
found that seventy had adopted guidelines permitting a brain-death diagnosis.  
Although relative uniformity exists with respect to the definition of brain death, 
the requirements for diagnosing the condition can differ.  In some countries, 
several specialists must confirm the clinical diagnosis, while in others a single 
physician can make the diagnosis. 
Of specific concern to Widjicks are the differences between countries 
regarding confirmatory testing, such as the apnea test.  Variations in guidelines 
for apnea testing indicate these tests are not conducted uniformly.  In fact, some 
countries do not accept apnea testing as confirmatory, while others vary in the 
timing of its application.172  A study conducted by Coimbra suggests that apnea 
testing may result in a misdiagnosis of respiratory center failure if inadequately 
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stimulating, and if stringently applied may induce brain death.173  Apnea testing is 
carried out by disconnecting the patient from the ventilator over a period of time 
(up to ten minutes) allowing for a specified build-up of carbon dioxide in the 
blood sufficient to exceed the threshold level for stimulation of the respiratory 
center.  Simultaneously, oxygen is delivered at a high flow rate directly through 
the trachea throughout the period of disconnection to protect transplantable organs 
from hypoxic damage.  The problem is that the addition of oxygen to protect 
wanted organs removes the stimulus for spontaneous breathing 
.  In addition, when CO2 levels 
rise in the brain, additional swelling occurs which may further compromise an 
already damaged brain.   If the apnea test is stringently applied prior to other 
in patients who 
may have lost their hypercapneic respiratory drive
174
                                                 
173Coimbra.  The conclusion of this study is: “Patients declared brain-dead 
may actually sustain global or regional (brain-stem) ischemic penumbra and 
respond to moderate hypothermia and/or thrombolysis. Time-consuming 
procedures currently in use may induce rather than diagnose irreversible brain 
damage. The 30-year old guidelines for diagnosis of brain death are to be urgently 
reconsidered.”  Norm Barber explains: “Coimbra shows there are two ways of 
treating severe brain injury that may produce recovery even in apparently 
hopeless situations. One is hypothermia that reduces the brain’s use of oxygen 
and gives doctors more time to treat the patient before further damage occurs due 
to lack of oxygen.  
Another is the controversial, and some say unproven, hyperventilation that 
is intended to increase the amount of oxygen reaching the brain. Both treatments 
are intended to minimize oxygen deprivation in the brain, hyperventilation by 
maximizing oxygen reaching the brain and hypothermia by minimizing the 
brain’s oxygen requirements by slowing the metabolism.”  Norm Barber, The 
Nasty Side of Organ Transplantation: The Cannibalistic Nature of Transplant 
Medicine, Third Edition ed. (Adelaide, Austrailia: Norm Barber, 2007), 13. 
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bedside reflex testing (as is often the case), it practically ensures patient failure of 
the other tests.  Coimbra suggests that some patients could have survived if organ 
removal had not been rushed. 
[A] review of the literature shows that some of even the most 
severely head-injured patients (GCS of 3 or 4, with pupils fixed to 
light) who are not subjected to apnoea may recover to normal life. 
Early labeling of these patients as dead (for transplant purposes) 
during the past 3 decades has diverted medical researchers away 
from developing novel therapeutic resources that could already 
have saved many thousands of human lives throughout the 
world.175 
 
Surely a test that predisposes a patient to be declared brain dead is unacceptable. 
Doctors in the United States also are inconsistent when determining brain 
death in patients.  For example, in diagnosing brain death in children, special (and 
in some cases exclusionary) criteria must be considered.176  This is due to “many 
factors including difficulties of clinical assessment, determination of proximate 
cause of coma, and certainty of the validity of laboratory tests” unique to infants 
and children.177  In addition, variations exist from state to state.  For example, 
while most states require one physician to make the determination, others require 
a second independent physician to confirm the diagnosis.178  In two states, a nurse 
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176Currently, the US criteria for adults are described in terms of practice 
parameters by the American Academy of Neurology.  See: American Academy of 
Neurology (Quality Standards Subcommittee), "Practice Parameters for 
Determining Brain Death in Adults," Neurology 45 (1995). 
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can determine that a patient is brain dead, provided that a physician confirms that 
determination within twenty-four hours.  The New Jersey State Board of Medical 
Examiners has recently considered “easing” brain-death testing criteria in an 
effort to procure more transplantable organs.   If approved, the new criteria 
would require only one physician to make the diagnosis instead of two, and 
furthermore, eliminate the need for a neurologist or neurosurgeon to confirm the 
condition.  As previously discussed in relation to the problem of clinical 
confusion, these changes also may increase the potential for misdiagnoses.      
179
Of particular concern is the exclusion of EEG testing.180  In the United 
Kingdom, EEG tests are not required because the death of the brainstem is 
sufficient to produce the irreversible loss of consciousness and the capacity to 
breathe.181   If EEG testing is eliminated from the testing protocol, it is possible 
that some patients who satisfy the other tests may nonetheless retain some 
neocortical activity which suggests the possibility of minimal consciousness in 
some of these patients.  More troubling is the fact that even if EEG testing is 
applied, it only is capable of evaluating the outer part of the cortex.  Most 
investigators conclude that brain-dead patients lack consciousness when the 
anatomic seat of consciousness is destroyed.  However, some investigators 
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suggest that it is not possible to exclude the possibility that some deeply comatose 
patients who satisfy standard clinical testing may retain preserved cerebral 
hemispheres, and hence might be capable of thinking, feeling, etc.182  Given the 
subjective nature of consciousness, “…even though wakefulness may be 
permanently lost, the preformed content of consciousness may still reside intact in 
the cerebral hemispheres—at least in the cases of ‘BD’ [brain death] where there 
is real electrical cerebral activity—but it is impossible to be inspected directly.”183 
The preceding discussion discloses several implications.  First, although 
the Harvard Committee recommended tests for determining brain death, a 
substantial clinical trial confirming diagnostic tests has never occurred.  As a 
result, over forty different sets of criteria are presently in use worldwide.  For 
many, this generates further confusion and controversy with respect to the 
meaning of a brain-death diagnosis.  More troubling is the questionable nature of 
some confirmatory tests for brain death, such as the apnea test, which may induce 
brain death in patients, when stringently applied.  In addition, the use of the EEG, 
as a confirmatory measure, lacks universal application.  This is due in part to the 
ongoing complexities surrounding the nature of consciousness.  To be sure, 
variations in diagnostic criteria for brain death signify the difficulties of satisfying 
a perpetually qualified criterion, calling into question the clinical tests-criterion 
relation.  Indeed, some proponents of brain death admit that the criterion and 
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related testing seem arbitrary.184  Robert Truog, a critic of brain death, calls into 
question whether brain death can be accurately diagnosed prior to 
cardiopulmonary death.  He writes: 
Unfortunately, a study of over 500 patients with both coma and 
apnea (including 146 autopsies for neuropathologic correlation) 
showed that "it was not possible to verify that a diagnosis made 
prior to cardiac arrest by any set or subset of criteria would 
invariably correlate with a diffusely destroyed brain." On the basis 
of these data, a definition that required total brain destruction could 
only be confirmed at autopsy. Clearly, a condition that could only 
be determined after death could never be a requirement for 
declaring death.185  
 
Physicians and nurses acutely experience these uncertainties, particularly those 
who are involved in organ procurement and transplantation procedures.  While 
many clinicians “feel comfortable” with brain death as the standard by which to 
declare human death, others are uneasy with it in practice.  The nature of their 
uneasiness will be the focus of the next section.   
 
2.5 Doubts Among Clinicians 
Chief among clinicians’ doubts is the way in which the brain-dead display 
behavior indicative of life, not death.  Many patients who satisfy the standard tests 
for brain death often exhibit unusual physical movements.  These include, unusual 
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spontaneous movements, such as the “Lazarus” sign186, unusual extension and 
rotation of limbs, referred to as “decerebrate posture,”187 and the continuation of 
heart rates for brain-dead patients for months, and sometimes years.188  For some 
clinical investigators, this indicates that continued brain function remains.  As 
David Hill, an anaesthetist, expressed: 
  
"A measure of life is the continuing 
hypothalamic function which controls body temperature. If the patient is warm 
then that part of the brain is functioning." All of these phenomena, it is argued, 
are indicative of some remaining integrative function in the so-called “dead 
brains” of patients who satisfy the tests. 
189
  
Those who are most closely associated with the removal of donor organs 
express unease and doubts that brain death is not actually death.  When 
considering the experiences of surgical organ transplant team members involved 
in organ retrieval, it is easy to understand why.  Brain-dead “corpses” rarely act 
like other corpses.  When surgeons insert scalpels to surgically remove the organs 
from the brain-dead corpses, the heart rates and pulses increase and bodily 
movements suggest “fear and panic.”190  In some cases, the reactions suggest 
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“coordinated attempts to ‘grab the knife.’”191  The solution to this reaction is to 
immobilize the patient by administering paralyzing drugs.  An anaesthetist in the 
United Kingdom has expressed the concerns of many surgeons who have 
participated in the procurement of organs: 
Almost everyone will say they have felt uneasy about it. Nurses get 
really, really upset. You stick the knife in and the pulse and blood 
pressure shoot up. If you don't give anything at all, the patient will 
start moving and wriggling around and it's impossible to do the 
operation. The surgeon always asked us to paralyze the patient.192   
  
These concerns have prompted one physician to quip, “I don't carry a donor card 
at the moment because I know what happens.”193  Indicative of this uncertainty is 
the reluctance of many intensivists to become organ donors.  One survey discloses 
that among intensivists, only about nineteen percent are card-carrying organ 
donors.194  Lock reports that none of the reasons given for failing to sign organ 
donor cards is convincing.  
Reports of uneasiness from nursing staff and physicians of transplant 
teams are not uncommon.  Such uneasiness stems from the belief that they 
actually killed the organ donors.195  Nurses, too, believe this and have recorded 
the time of death of donors after the retrieval surgery.196  Perhaps the most 
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difficult task for nurses in the management of patients who have been diagnosed 
as brain dead is to suppress their own intuitive sense that the patient is not yet 
dead.197  This counter-intuitive notion is further confounded when the brain-dead 
are seen to yawn, cough, or cry.198  While most accept the rationale for brain 
death, it is nonetheless taxing on one’s acuity to consider a patient who remains 
warm, pink, with an independently beating heart as dead.  Moreover, transplant 
surgeons convey continued uneasiness with the difficult job of organ procurement 
even after multiple surgeries.  Dr. David Evans, for example, states that 
physicians do not seem to get over the uneasiness of organ procurement, despite 
doing it many times.199   
In the study of organ procurement, Margaret Lock reports that, although 
all of the physicians she interviewed agree that accurate brain-death diagnoses are 
robust, simple, and infallible, they do not believe that patients are biologically 
dead when taken to the operating room for organ retrieval.  She reports that none 
of the physicians interviewed thinks brain death is the end of biological life, 
though they believe that brain death is an irreversible diagnosis.200  Despite 
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uniformity among clinicians regarding the irreversibility of brain death, doubts 
and uncertainty still remain as to its accuracy in depicting human death.     
Given the prevalence of doubts and uncertainties among health care 
professionals who diagnose and declare brain death, it seems sensible to think that 
similar doubts and uncertainties about brain death exist in the community at large, 
including a deep-seated fear of being declared dead while still alive.  As Michael 
Potts points out, “A deep seated fear may yet be rational.”201  Further 
investigation regarding public sentiment on brain death will be the subject of 
Chapter Three.     
 
2.6 Summary and Assessment 
In the previous chapter a historical analysis was conducted in an effort to 
chronicle the development of brain death as well as the rationale for its 
incorporation into medical praxis and social policy. It was argued that the 
proposed justifications for advancing a brain-based criterion for death were based 
not on conceptual or biological grounds, but rather on desires to advance 
experimental medicine—most directly transplantation efforts.  In support of the 
central thesis of this dissertation, this argument demonstrates that the way in 
which the brain-death standard arose has contributed greatly to ongoing 
controversy and confusion regarding its meaning and application in law and 
medicine.  
                                                 
201Michael Potts, "Letters: Editor's Choice: Deep Seated Fear," British 
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The focus of Chapter Two was to explore the clinical and scientific 
challenges to brain death.  Specifically, several important implications emerged.  
First, this chapter began by exploring the conceptual foundation for brain death as 
advanced by Bernat and colleagues in conjunction with the President’s 
Commission report.  From its inception, brain death, understood as the permanent 
cessation of all functions of the entire brain, has been criticized at its conceptual 
basis.  Section 2.2 focused on early critics, such as Jonas and Veatch, who pointed 
out that despite satisfying all the standard clinical tests, many brain-dead patients 
continue to exhibit neurological activity in some form.  Additionally, clinical 
anomalies and physical phenomena in brain-dead patients suggest that not all 
neurological functions have ceased.  In full recognition of these problems, brain-
death supporters have attempted to qualify which functions (deemed “critical”) 
should count in constituting the conceptual foundation that the brain is the 
primary integrator of the organism as a whole.   
Their attempts notwithstanding, it is increasingly apparent that the 
conceptual foundation for brain death is crumbling.  As section 2.3 made clear, 
there is substantial evidence for continued somatic integrative life in brain-dead 
patients.  The evidence included a litany of non-brain integrative functions that 
continue in patients, despite satisfying the clinical tests for brain death.  Perhaps 
the greatest challenge to the somatic disintegration hypothesis, is brain-dead 
pregnant women who continue to provide a hospitable environment for fetal 
development.     Yet some still seem to ignore the mounting evidence against 
neurologic somatic dependence in these patients.  This seems arbitrary, at best.  
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Given Bernat’s admission that somatic integration is insufficient to ground brain 
death, the first claim upon which the conception is based collapses.  Simply put, 
most integrative functions are not brain mediated.  As such, the primacy of the 
brain with respect to somatic integration is seriously challenged.202  It would seem 
that brain-dead individuals are alive as long as at least one integrative bodily 
system remains in tact (the circulatory system being the key).203   
Moreover, the second claim regarding consistency within the bifurcated 
standard cannot be sustained.  When the brain dies, bodily functions may continue 
for some time when life-support measures are provided.  Jonas has pointed out 
that maintaining cardiorespiratory functions “artificially” does not affect the life 
of the organism as a whole.  Given that certain capacities can be supplemented, as 
is the case with brain-dead patients, such capacities cannot be said to constitute 
life, or with their permanent loss, death.  Rather, it is what these capacities do that 
constitute life, i.e., sustaining bodily functioning.  Since these capacities can be 
supplemented, then life can continue despite the loss of certain capacities.  
Advanced technologies will no doubt continue to supplement the loss of particular 
brain functions.204  Should they become readily available, then it appears Jonas’ 
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inquiry concerning what matters most (i.e., the functioning itself or the lack of 
spontaneity at its cerebral source) becomes all the more relevant.  Understood in 
this way, brain death may be a form of reductionism, particularly when viewed as 
a lack of capacity for consciousness, respiration, and heart rate, even when these 
capacities are supplemented. 
While brain death has been accepted worldwide as the standard for 
determining death, clinicians’ inability to uniformly apply the testing criteria 
suggests that the concept of brain death is flawed as well.  In particular, section 
2.4 revealed the lack of coherence with respect to the criterion-tests relation.   
While brain death has been accepted by most modern countries, clinical testing 
varies greatly from country to country, state to state, and in some cases from 
hospital to hospital, depending on which of the forty available sets of criteria are 
utilized.  Currently lacking is a thorough clinical trial capable of establishing 
uniformity with respect to the proper diagnostic tests in confirming the criterion.  
Recent challenges regarding confirmatory testing, such as the use of the apnea test 
or the meaning of EEG analysis, demonstrate a lack of understanding with regard 
to the proper tools for confirming a diffusely destroyed brain.  Indeed, data 
indicates that, at present, brain death cannot be confirmed prior to autopsy 
following cardiopulmonary death.   
Adding to these concerns are the doubts and unease of clinicians, 
highlighted in section 2.5, who are directly involved in the organ procurement 
process.  Given that brain-dead patients often exhibit behavior indicative of life, 
not death, some transplant team members struggle in their efforts to suppress their 
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intuitive sense that those who are declared to be brain dead are not really dead.  
That these uncertainties are influential is evidenced by the fact that few clinicians 
directly involved in organ procurement carry organ donor cards.  But if the 
analysis to this point is correct, it is not clear why clinicians and patient relatives 
ought to suppress their intuitions concerning the brain dead.  Perhaps, as Potts has 
suggested, fear has its basis in reason.   
At this juncture, it is appropriate to relate how the conclusions of this 
chapter contribute to the central thesis of this dissertation.  Thus far, it has been 
noted that the conceptual foundation for brain death is crumbling due to the 
overwhelming data contradicting both its biological basis as well as its clinical 
coherency.  Contributing to the analysis undertaken in this dissertation to examine 
the social, legal, medical, and philosophical problems of brain death, this chapter 
contributes to the central thesis that brain death is ethically untenable due to its 
lack of a biologically coherent foundation.   
Further analysis entails an examination of social policy issues related to 
brain death.  Chapter Three examines the ongoing problems of brain death’s 
conceptual basis, particularly since its inception with the President’s Commission 
Report and the introduction of the UDDA as the suggested framework for 
determining death.  Various social attitudes and overall general public confusion 
surrounding the meaning and application of brain death are explored.  To 
illustrate the extent of this problem, the struggles of lawmakers to satisfy the 
demands of the brain-death standard resulting in statutory irregularities both here 
and abroad are underscored.  Chapter Three catalogs how states define death.  
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Moreover, it is important to discuss how brain death is used in other areas, such as 
medical research and experimentation on the newly declared dead.  These uses 
generate important moral, ethical, and policy questions regarding the scope and 
extent of application. 
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Chapter 3 
 
 
Social Policy Problems with Brain Death 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Prior to the advent of advanced medical technologies, the moment of death 
seemed clearly definable; namely, when all visible life signs have ceased, then the 
person is dead.  For most, the absence of such signs was definitive and final.  
Public attitudes about death were shaped largely by shared experiences often 
steeped in religious and family traditions.  Common deathbed scenes at home 
with families gathered around a loved one waiting in vigil for the final draw of 
breath and exhalation reflect a by-gone era.205  Today, medical institutions 
regulate and organize death to such an extent that families often have to be told 
when their loved ones have died.    Life-sustaining technologies not only expand 
the time to death, but also have altered, in some cases, the way in which death is 
now conceived.  Most important among these advanced medical technologies is 
the influence of organ transplantation.  In previous chapters it was argued that the 
need for obtaining transplantable life-saving organs from cadaver donors has in 
                                                 
205My father relayed to me the scene of his grandmother’s death at his 
Pennsylvania childhood home in the 1950s.  Following the “death rattle”, and 
when all life signs had ceased, family members placed a rolled-up cloth under her 
chin and coins on her eyes.  
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large measure shaped and expanded the criteria of death, which ultimately led to 
the inclusion of brain death.  That process, beginning in the late 1960s has been 
little informed, if any, by public attitudes and opinions.  For the most part, the 
debate about brain death has occupied a relatively small group of professionals.  
Although a clear consensus of acceptance exists, the public in general remains 
confused and poorly informed about the controversies surrounding brain death 
and organ donation. 
Additional confusion is evident as lawmakers attempt to craft statutes in 
order to satisfy a standard about which they have little understanding.   Though 
most states follow the Uniform Determination of Death Act as the framework for 
the determination of death, applying the bifurcated standard does not lead to 
consistency in how states allow for a determination of death.   Statutory 
irregularities are common, indicating for some that defining death is outside the 
purview of law.206  This is significant, given the overall goals of both the 
President’s Commission and the UDDA to facilitate termination of treatment, 
improve organ supply, and make death uniform.  Despite widespread adoption of 
brain death, problems of “overtreatment—the continuation of life-sustaining 
treatment on patients who have no reasonable prospects for meaningful survival 
and often no clear interest in or desire for such treatment”207—and a widening gap 
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between organ supply and demand indicate the problems are more widespread 
today than in 1968. 
Although brain death is most often associated with organ donation, many 
are unaware of its unsettling use in certain areas of medical research and 
development.  Performing medical procedures on the newly dead or dying is a 
traditional training activity among physicians.208  Experiments and other 
procedures vary from endotracheal intubation and central venous catheter 
insertion to the administration of certain drugs to measure effectiveness.  It is 
argued by some physicians that since corpses no longer have autonomy, and 
families have limited determination over a decedent’s remains, consent is 
unnecessary for training purposes.   Issues of informed consent and the treatment 
of the dead come into question upon consideration of the methods of 
experimentation and resuscitation of the newly dead for research purposes.   What 
is more, if the brain dead (sometimes referred to as “biomorts”) are not really 
dead, then further troubling implications arise, deserving careful examination. 
This chapter examines the ongoing problems of brain death’s conceptual 
basis, particularly since the President’s Commission Report and the introduction 
of the UDDA as a model framework for standardizing death in the US.  This will 
involve an assessment of social attitudes and ongoing public confusion 
surrounding the meaning and application of brain death.  Related to this 
discussion is the way in which influential pro-life groups have rationalized their 
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acceptance of brain death.  Additionally, the chapter will discuss the measure of 
success purported by supporters of the UDDA, despite ongoing inconsistencies in 
statutory law.  Finally, this chapter considers how brain death is used in other 
areas, such as medical research, training, and experimentation on the newly 
declared dead. 
This chapter is divided into four parts.  Section 3.2 deals with the 
problems of general societal confusion.  Section 3.3 explores the rationale of 
various pro-life groups regarding their acceptance of brain death.  Section 3.4 
assesses the way in which some states have attempted to incorporate the UDDA 
into statutory from.  Section 3.5 discloses the way in which brain death is applied 
into areas of medical training and experimentation. 
 
3.2 Social Attitudes and Public Confusion 
There is little doubt that public attitudes regarding the diagnosis of death 
were aroused as news coverage of Christaan Barnard’s first heart transplant raised 
ethical concerns about the practice.  As early as 1968, a survey of public attitudes 
toward the determination of death revealed that popular awareness had been 
influenced by the reports.  Of the 112 people surveyed, about sixty percent 
indicated they had “[given] thought to the issues of how death is determined.”  
Nevertheless, only nine percent “thought of death in terms of irreversible loss of 
cerebral function.”209  A few years later, another survey indicated that sixty 
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percent of lay people, forty-two percent of medical students, and forty-six percent 
of physicians did not consider brain death an adequate criterion for death.210  
In the decade that followed, the popular press and scholarly publications 
continued to question the theoretical and moral bases of neurological death.211   
Regardless of these challenges, more recent evidence suggests a greater 
acceptance of brain death, due in great measure to its commonplace use.  Yet 
what is unclear is whether the term brain death is sufficiently understood by both 
laity and professionals alike.   
Youngner, in a 1992 article, notes the problems of linguistic ambiguity 
regarding the use of the term brain death and the ongoing debate concerning the 
whole-brain and higher-brain definitions of death.212  Any semblance of 
consensus, he notes, is both superficial and fragile, given public confusion on the 
meaning of the term.  In a noteworthy study delivered at the 1996 Annual 
Meeting of the Division of Transplantation, significant gaps were found to exist in 
families’ understanding of brain death despite the fact that 95.7 percent discussed 
brain death with their relatives’ physicians.  Indeed, of the 164 donor and non-
donor families surveyed in the study, forty-five percent could not differentiate 
                                                 
210F. L. Delmonico and J. G. Randolph, "Death: A Concept in Transition," 
Pediatrics 51 (1973). 
 
211Laura A. Siminoff and Alexia Bloch, “American Attitudes and Beliefs 
About Brain Death: The Empirical Literature,” in The Definition of Death, ed. 
Stuart J. Youngner, Robert M. Arnold, and Renie Schapiro (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1999), 184. 
 
212Stuart J. Youngner, "Defining Death: A Superficial and Fragile 
Consensus," Archives of Neurology 49 (1992). 
 
 83
between brain death and coma, and 31.7 percent believed that a brain dead patient 
could recover.213   
More recent surveys of public attitudes and beliefs about death and 
donation reveal similar findings.214  Of particular note is a recent survey revealing 
that, “in every country 20 to 40% of the population doubts the idea of brain 
death.”215  In the United States, Siminoff et al216 report that while ninety-eight 
percent of survey respondents were aware of the term “brain death”, only about 
one third believed that a brain-dead patient is legally dead.  While roughly eighty-
six percent were able, under a certain scenario, to identify a brain-dead patient as 
dead, about fifty-seven percent confused patients in a coma as dead and 34.1 
percent identified PVS (persistent vegetative state) patients as dead.  Regarding 
the desire to donate organs under different scenarios, most respondents were 
unwilling to violate the dead donor rule.  However, a substantial minority (33.5 
percent) was willing to donate the organs of patients under certain scenarios they 
classified as still alive.  This study concluded with a call for further public 
dialogue and education concerning brain death and donation. 
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The preceding chapter illustrated substantial variation with regard to the 
clinical testing methods employed by health-care professionals to determine brain 
death.  Among those professionals who should have intimate knowledge of brain-
death criteria and its application, further detailed examination of their knowledge 
reveals that misinformation and confusion still exists.  One survey reports that of 
the 195 physicians and nurses likely to be involved in organ procurement, only 
thirty-five percent were able to correctly identify both the legal and medical 
criteria for brain death.217  Another study reveals that one-half of ICU nurses 
believe physicians were unsure of the criteria for determining organ donor 
eligibility, while one-third of nurses also expressed their own uncertainty of the 
criteria.218  Moreover, a 2006 article reported a survey that revealed “significant 
confusion about the concept of BD among pediatric intensivists.”219  In an effort 
to determine whether pediatric intensivists are aware of the controversies 
surrounding the concept of brain death, the authors reported that among those 
comfortable diagnosing brain death, only twenty-two percent identified brain 
death with the loss of integration of the organism as a whole.  The report 
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concluded with a call to the medical community to reconsider whether brain death 
is equivalent to death. 
Additionally, this author conducted formal and informal surveys among 
physicians in three community hospitals in West Virginia and Ohio.220  
Physicians who had experience with cadaveric organ procurement registered 
significant opposition to the use of brain death.  Some of these physicians 
indicated that their experience led them to oppose organ donation and admitted 
encouraging other health-care providers to do the same because of their first-hand 
knowledge of the details of the organ procurement process.221  While most 
physicians indicated they were organ donors and encouraged their patients to 
become donors, many of these same physicians exhibited a lack of awareness 
with regard to the controversies surrounding brain death. More than two-thirds 
expressed they were concerned or troubled upon disclosure of the details of th
controversies.
ese 
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brain-death criterion as stated in the UDDA, nonetheless exhibited confusion and 
uncertainty with respect to the legitimacy of its application in the clinical setting.   
                                                
This confusion and uncertainty extends to the experiences of donor 
families as well.  Commenting on his personal experiences with donor family 
members, one bioethicist writes,  
When members of the family later investigate and find out, for 
instance, sometimes for the first time, that organs are taken while 
the heart still beats, or that the practice is to administer a general 
anesthetic to donors for the harvesting operation (which the 
relatives often interpret as implying the need to suppress capacity 
to feel pain indicating continued brain function), they may be 
extremely distressed and feel exploited.223  
 
He further notes that in many of the accounts given by donor families, “the 
matter of being confronted by the concept and reality of death by brain death, and 
being asked for consent to donation, was later seen as part of the original 
trauma.”224  In other words, the trauma of events which occur for the sake of 
organ donation, added to the devastating events of the brain injury suffered by the 
relative, often cause family members to feel assailed or assaulted.  Indeed, many 
times after having agreed to organ donation, family members expressed doubt as 
to whether their loved one was in fact dead at the time of organ procurement.  
Often overlooked is the fact that the grieving process experienced by family 
 
223Nicholas Tonti-Filippini, "Revising Brain Death: Cultural Imperialism," 
Linacre Quarterly 65, no. 2 (1998): 51-72. 
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members can be greatly complicated in such circumstances by the notion that they 
have betrayed their loved-one.225 
In the aftermath of the surgical removal of their children’s organs, mothers 
often express a sense of betrayal and guilt for their consent to a procedure and 
event (brain death) the details of which they were uninformed.  As a case in point, 
one mother describes the pressures and uncertainties of being confronted with the 
prospects of donating her fifteen year-old son’s organs after he suffered a tragic 
accident and was later diagnosed as brain dead.   She laments, “The doctor urged 
us to consent as there were other parents being as desperate as we sitting at the 
bedside of their children but we were able to help them!  I didn't want anyone to 
die neither my child nor any other children.”226  Depicting her uncertainties about 
the meaning of her son’s brain-death diagnosis, she expresses how she “had to say 
goodbye to him forever while he was still treated while he was warm while the 
monitors were on and while he was given infusions.”  She continues, “I failed to 
see that he was ‘dead’, but believed in what the doctors said and trusted them.”227  
However, after looking through the medical report and discovering three different 
death notices, she asks, “How often can a human being die, how many deaths can 
he die?”  To complicate matters further, the family discovered after the surgery 
that, unknown to them at the time, their consent included their son’s heart, liver, 
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kidneys, eyes, and the removal of his pelvic bones, which were sold.  In an 
expression of guilt and betrayal, the boy’s mother writes, “Our consent to the 
removal of one organ had been changed into a multi-organ removal without 
asking us. The last sight of my child burnt itself into my soul. When I think of 
him I have to fight the horrible impression that he was looking so undignified and 
exploited. This sight of my son still haunts me in my dreams.”228  
This mother is not alone in expressing her doubts and anguish concerning 
her personal experience in consenting to donation under the brain-death criterion.  
After exhibiting similar frustrations with the process of consenting to donation of 
her son’s organs, another mother quips, “The lives of a lot of donor families have 
been shaken, and many of us have lost their [sic] peace of mind.”229  Believing 
that the process lacks relevant disclosure for informed consent, she offers this 
eight-fold advice: 
 You have the right simply to say NO, especially when they ask 
you about the presumed will of your brain dead family 
member.  
 If you are willing to donate your organs, insist on your rights!  
 Make sure that you get all the relevant information.  
 Discuss organ donation with your family because it will have 
an impact on their mourning.  
 Decide which organs and tissues you are willing to donate and 
which not.  
 Insist on a general anesthesia during the organ removal.  
 Your next of kin has the right to see your dead body right after 
the organ removal operation.  
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 Your next of kin has the right to inspect the files.230  
Although lack of education about brain death and organ donation may 
account for some of the above data, there remains for many the difficulty of 
reconciling common-sense notions about death with a corpse that exhibits many 
characteristics indicative of organizational life.  As R. Taylor notes,  
Persons who meet whole-brain criteria of death, if mechanically 
ventilated, typically remain normothermic, continue to grow hair 
and fingernails, often retain spinal reflexes, maintain cardiac and 
circulatory function, digest and absorb food, filter blood through 
both liver and kidneys, urinate and defecate, heal wounds and may 
even gestate fetuses.231 
  
Peter Singer observes that the view of life and death implicated in the concept of 
brain death is counterintuitive even to those who employ it.232  In an attempt to 
ease the counterintuitive reactions of family and medical staff that the brain dead 
are still alive, these systemic integrative activities are often attributed to 
remaining insignificant vestiges of non-integrated biological activity.233  As one 
commentator remarks, “The antagonism between the perception of a warm and 
breathing body and the notion of death is rationalized by proponents of ‘brain 
death’ as an opposition between sensual perception and intellectual 
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knowledge.”234    In assessing what to do with patients who are diagnosed as brain 
dead, it is argued that conclusions should not be based on empirical observations 
but rather on rational grounds.235  As such, brain death is thus depicted primarily 
as a rationalistic conception, which boasts a superior epistemic foundation for 
distinguishing between reality and illusion. 236    
However, as previous chapters indicate, there is little by way of scientific 
reason to substantiate the conceptual coherence of brain death.  As a valid rational 
conception, it must withstand challenges to its internal coherence and remain 
impervious to empirical challenges. The tendency to dismiss any empirical 
evidence that challenges the rationalistic framework of brain death reveals the 
assumptive nature indicative of a purely rationalistic approach.  Indeed, the a 
priori dismissal of the intuitive notions of family and medical staff reveals the 
ongoing lack of import from the public that has characterized the emergence of 
brain death from its inception.     
Regardless of these epistemological gaps, the fact remains that brain death 
has slowly gained acceptance since its introduction in 1968.  Important to this 
chapter is an examination of several dominant religious groups, particularly those 
identified as pro-life.   Given the sociological impact that these groups continue to 
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have on social policy, it is worth exploring and evaluating the rationale behind 
their acceptance of brain death. 
 
3.3 Social Influence of Pro-Life Groups 
Michael Potts notes, “One of the most remarkable aspects of the 
introduction of brain-based criteria for human death…has been its almost 
universal acceptance by society, both among the intelligentsia and people in 
general.”237  Few seem willing to challenge the fundamental change in the way 
life and death is construed with the acceptance of the brain-death standard.  Of 
particular note is the seeming lack of resistance by traditional pro-life groups.  
Peter Singer, commenting on this point observes: 
But the most extraordinary aspect of the process was the lack of 
opposition from the groups that could be expected to protest 
vigorously against any attempt to deny the sanctity of any member 
of our species, from the point of conception onwards.  Where was 
the pro-life movement?  Where was the Roman Catholic 
Church?238 
 
Singer suggests that the acceptance of brain death in 1968, and later confirmed in 
1981 by the President’s Commission Report, served as a turning point away from 
the traditional Judeo-Christian ethic, which upheld the absolute wrongness of 
taking innocent human life.  He further suggests that society now seemed willing 
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to accept that a certain group of individuals could be “excluded from the 
community of human persons,”239 and be killed for the sake of others.   
 Singer offers two suggestions to explain the lack of substantial pro-life 
opposition to the proposed brain-death criterion.  First, in a 1958 address by Pope 
Pius XII to an International Congress of Anesthesiologists,240 the Pope seemed to 
suggest that defining death belongs to the physician alone, exclusive of 
theological or philosophical input.  Hence, when a group of physicians, such as 
the Harvard Ad Hoc Committee, recommended a new way for determining death, 
it was only reasonable for Roman Catholics to embrace it. 
 Second, Singer says those in the pro-life movement “…were worried that 
the wave of support for turning off the respirators on those whose brains would 
stop working would sweep over into other areas and, in particular, euthanasia.”241  
In an effort to work more effectively to ban euthanasia, pro-life strategists 
embraced the rationale, beginning with the Harvard Committee and culminating 
in the President’s Report, that the permanent loss of all brain function indicates 
the loss of organic integrated unity and the death of the organism as a whole.   
 A third reason is suggested by Potts.  He proposes that widespread 
acceptance of organ transplantation made it difficult to argue against the new 
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criterion of death without appearing to be anti-life.242  For if the brain dead are 
not dead, he argues, then removing their vital organs for transplantation would be 
the direct cause of their deaths.   A strict sanctity of life ethic opposes the 
intentional direct killing of an innocent person.  However, people who receive 
vital organs would die without them.243  Given the overwhelming wave of suppo
for organ transplantation, and in an effort to avoid appearing to oppose life-givi
organ donation, the pro-life movement accepted brain death.  This section will 
explore the rationale for pro-life acceptance of brain death in light of the
suggestions. 
rt 
ng 
 above 
                                                
 Strong papal support for organ donation comes directly from Pope John 
Paul II’s encyclical letter, Evangelium Vitae.  In an effort to promote and build up 
a “culture of life,” the Pope speaks of the everyday heroism exhibited by various 
individuals.  As an example he promotes organ donation as a heroic measure 
when he writes, “A particularly praiseworthy example of such gestures is the 
donation of organs, performed in an ethically acceptable manner, with a view to 
offering a chance of health and even of life itself to the sick who sometimes have 
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no other hope.”244  Some conservative Catholic groups maintain that the Church’s 
official teaching embraces brain death as a moral means for organ procurement.  
Supportive of this claim are certain comments in an address given by Pope John 
Paul II to the XVIII International Congress of the Transplantation Society.  In 
words reminiscent of Pope Pius XII, John Paul II writes: 
With regard to the parameters used today for ascertaining death—
whether the “encephalic” signs or the more traditional cardio-
respiratory signs—the Church does not make technical decisions. 
She limits herself to the Gospel duty of comparing the data offered 
by medical science with the Christian understanding of the unity of 
the person, bringing out the similarities and the possible conflicts 
capable of endangering respect for human dignity.  
Here it can be said that the criterion adopted in more recent times 
for ascertaining the fact of death, namely the complete and 
irreversible cessation of all brain activity, if rigorously applied, 
does not seem to conflict with the essential elements of a sound 
anthropology.245  
 
In these two paragraphs the Pope seems to confirm that defining death primarily 
resides in the realm of medical science.  Since medical science has, in recent 
times, expanded the criteria for determining death to include the irreversible 
cessation of all brain activity, then there seems to be no conflict with the 
anthropology taught by the Church.   
 Further recognition of this is evident in the commentary on brain death 
offered by the National Catholic Bioethics Center, a group devoted to the teaching 
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Magisterium.   They contend that the use of neurological criteria (brain death) is 
legitimate according to the Catholic Church, noting that, “ Pope Pius XII and 
Pope John Paul II both said the Church has no competency in determining death; 
this properly belongs to medical science.”246  They further note that those who 
reject brain death as a viable criterion for determining death “are in tension with 
sound Catholic teaching.”  This, of course, presupposes that medical science 
offers a coherent biological basis that supports brain death as human death.  In 
same address, the Pope writes, “Acknowledgement of the unique dignity of the 
human person has a further underlying consequence: vital organs which occur 
singly in the body can be removed only after death—that is, from the body of 
someone who is certainly dead.”  However, what is evidently uncertain, as 
previous chapters indicate, is that the brain dead are in fact certainly dead.   
Other Catholic writers reveal the same presumption as they attempt to 
qualify consistency of brain death with traditional Christian anthropology.247 
Traditional Christian anthropology construes a living human person as an 
essential unity or composition of body and soul.248  Following Thomas Aquinas, 
this view rejects a strict dualism of body and soul, as Plato and Descartes held, 
while recognizing a duality of body and soul, in which the soul informs or 
                                                 
246National Catholic Bioethics Center, FAQ's on Brain Death 
(http://www.ncbcenter.org/FAQ_BrainDeath.asp, Accessed: December, 2006). 
 
247James M. DuBois, "Organ Transplantation: An Ethical Road Map," The 
National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 2, no. 3 (2002). 
 
248Eric F. LaRock, "Dualistic Internaction, Neural Dependence, and 
Aquinas's Composite View," Philosophia Christi 3, no. 2 (2001). 
 
 96
animates the body as the life-giving principle.  As long as organizational integrity 
is intact, then the soul’s presence remains. 
Jason Eberl argues that a Thomistic understanding of death entails that,  
“A human being dies when her body ceases to function as an organism with 
integrative unity.”249  Eberl articulates Bernat’s conceptual basis of brain death 
and then applies the single organ hypothesis to the integrative functions of the 
whole brain.  While St. Thomas contended that organizational unity is maintained 
by the heart, Eberl suggests that were St. Thomas alive today, he would 
recognize, based on current medical opinion, that the brain is the organ of 
integration.  In concert with this understanding, a Working Group with the 
Pontifical Academy of Science issued a statement in which they conclude: 
It appears evident that the establishment of total and irreversible 
loss of all brain functions is the true medical criterion of death and 
that this criterion can be established in two ways.  Either by 
establishing the cessation of circulation and respiration or directly 
by demonstrating the irreversible loss of all brain function (brain 
death).250 
 
It is significant to note that Catholic authorities are more careful than some of 
their interpreters to avoid absolute language with regard to their acceptance of 
brain death.  Notice that “it appears” in the above paragraph and “does not seem 
to contradict” in Pope John Paul II’s statement reflect a cautious embracing of the 
conclusions of medical science.  This is understandable given the tentative nature 
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of general scientific conclusions, which are subject to modification and change.  
Moreover, these statements reflect that current accepted medical criteria for 
defining death do not  “constitute binding magisterial teaching.”251 
A second large constituancy of the pro-life movement are Evangelical 
Protestant Christians.  Though diverse in many respects, this group maintains a 
core of five fundamental doctrines of belief.  They are: (1) the innerrancy and 
infallability of the Bible, (2) the deity of Jesus, (3) the substitutionary atonement 
of Jesus, (4) the literal, physical, bodily resurrection of Jesus, and (5) the literal, 
bodily return of Jesus from heaven to earth.252  Additionally, many Evangelical 
Christians hold to a central conviction regarding the sanctity of life from 
conception to natural death.   Their greatest social concerns include the issues of 
abortion and euthanasia, both of which are viewed as moral evils plaguing secular 
society.  These Christians, under the dictate to be “salt and light,” see themselves 
as preservers of truth and light in a morally decaying and dark world.   
Having a high regard for Scripture, Evangelical scholars generally attempt 
to ground their thinking on principles and commands derived either explicitly or 
inferentially from biblical texts.  Campbell explains: 
The believer identifies and organizes the facts of Scripture 
regarding the nature of reality and then derives general principles 
and underlying patterns that are coherent with these facts.  For 
example, the biblical posture about life gradually unfolds and 
supports a claim about the sanctity of human life.  A discerning 
organization of biblical evidence on human nature is expressed in 
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the idea that persons are created in the “image of God” (Gen. 1:27-
28).  All of life, from beginning to end, is portrayed as subject to 
the sovereignty and dominion of God who gives breath to human 
beings that they may live (Gen. 2:7) and deprives them of breath 
when they expire (Ps. 104:29).  Human beings are therefore 
accountable and responsible for exercise of their moral agency, 
expressed in the value of stewardship.253 
 
Campbell further notes that discussions regarding the definition of death are most 
likely situated within the context of the social acceptance of euthanasia.  Social 
policy that attempts to revise death in order to facilitate organ procurement is 
viewed as a means to hasten death for the comatose and other vulnerable patients.  
The most ardent opposition regarding the debate on how death should be defined 
concerns the use of the neo-cortical or higher-brain criterion.254   The fear is that 
as the line of demarcation between life and death is moved forward, more 
vulnerable populations are put at risk.  As John M. Frame notes: “Without a strict 
criterion of death, it is difficult to guard against abuses, such as hastening a 
declaration of death to obtain organs for transplant.”255   
While emphasizing a “rigorous medical definition of death,” most 
evangelical scholars nevertheless embrace brain death.  J. Kerby Anderson 
expresses his acceptance when he writes, “A comatose patient without any brain 
                                                 
253Courtney S. Campbell, “Fundamentals of Life and Death: Christian 
Fundamentalism and Medical Science,” in The Definition of Death: 
Contemporary Controversies, ed. Stuart J. Youngner, Robert M. Arnold, & Renie 
Schapiro (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 197-8. 
 
254B. Holly Vautier, “Defining Death,” in Dignity and Dying, ed. John F. 
Kilner, Arlene B. Miller, and Edmund D. Pellegrino (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. 
Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1996). 
 
255John M. Frame, Medical Ethics: Principles, Persons, and Problems 
(Phillipsburgh, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 1988), 62. 
 99
wave activity (A flat EEG, electroencephalogram) should be removed from life-
support systems; he is considered to be already dead.”256  Similarly, Norman L. 
Geisler expresses a cautious embrace of brain death when he writes: 
Death is difficult to define, but in general terms it means vital signs 
are lacking, such as breathing, pulse, nerve reaction, or brain wave 
(EEG).  This does not mean that after the person dies that the body 
cannot be kept “alive” by machine to prevent organ decay.  It 
simply means that we should not hasten death in order to get a 
fresh organ.257 
 
In sync with Roman Catholic authorities, Evangelicals tend to express concern as 
to how death is defined, while nevertheless generally accepting the medical 
consensus regarding brain death.258 
 Judaism, “guided by the concept of the supreme sanctity of human life and 
of the dignity of man created in the image of God,”259 also has a stake in the 
debate about death.  Although the idea of ethics is not found in Jewish thought, 
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latter-day scholars have attempted “to describe the methods and concepts implicit 
in the tradition itself.”260  In so doing, certain statements are gleaned from the 
tradition providing guidelines for adjudication in moral matters.  The process by 
which this is accomplished proceeds out of a deep respect for halakhah261 (Jewish 
Law).  Halakhah encompasses the legal aspect of Judaism and “embraces 
personal, social, national, and international relationships, and all the other 
practices and observations of Judaism.”262  It may be said that it provides the 
basis, or story, for meaning in the ascertainment of duty and obligation in the 
world.  This story contains the narrative of creation and the responsibilities for 
which beings created in God’s image are accountable.  It also includes the story of 
the fall resulting in a broken world and adding to the responsibilities of which 
human persons are obligated to each other, and ultimately to God to maintain.     
 The traditional methodology for deliberation concerning current ethical 
discussions is characterized as a legal process by which individual texts are 
sought out for application.  The process includes examining commentaries and 
previous legal decisions of these texts in an effort to discover their applicability to 
current situations.  David Novak explains: 
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The basic scriptural norm is located, its rabbinical elaborations are 
traced through the Talmud and related literature, its authoritative 
structure is determined, relevant precedents (if any) are culled from 
the vast literature of legal responsa by individual rabbinic 
authorities, and finally the person accepted by a community of 
Jews as their legal authority frequently seeks the council of learned 
colleagues.263  
 
This method is by no means easily achieved.  It is a careful process that 
recognizes human fallibility by including minority opinions and interpretations of 
biblical texts.  The sources from which one must cull are vast containing many 
legal decisions, propositions, narrative accounts, and debates.  As Jewish thinkers 
grapple with the relation between tradition and modernity, they vary in opinion on 
the criterion of death, often engaging in intense debate.  However, what is rarely 
at issue among Jewish thinkers is the question of whether Jews should donate 
organs.264   
 Jewish thinkers, like their Catholic and Evangelical Protestant 
counterparts, express concern that organ donors may be killed for their 
transplantable organs.  Thus, in matters of organ donation, defining criteria 
appropriately consistent with traditional modalities is crucial for Jews.  In 
accordance with Jewish methodology, rabbinic opinion is by no means unitary 
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with regard to whether brain death is an acceptable criterion for human death.  It 
is a well-known fact that some Orthodox Jews do not accept brain death, and that 
significant segments of their population in the state of New Jersey have 
influenced the passage of a statutory exception regarding the use of brain death 
for religious reasons.265  J. David Bleich, an Orthodox Rabbi states: “It is 
axiomatic, according to Halakhah, that death coincides with cessation of 
respiration.”266  Owing to the Scriptural references “God breathes life into Adam” 
(Gen 2:6) and  “…all in whose nostrils is the breath of the spirit of life” (Gen 
7:22), Jewish sources (e.g., Yoma 85a) indicate that evidence for life resides at the 
nose.  However, after citing a variety of opinions from Jewish sources, he 
concludes that death only occurs at the cessation of both cardiac and respiratory 
functions, due to the fact that the “lack of respiration is also indicative of prior 
cessation of cardiac activity.”267  According to Bleich, Halakhah does not permit 
the use of brain death as a criterion of death.  In fact, Halakhah obligates medical 
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treatment and resuscitation for all human beings, no matter how debilitating their 
injury. 
 Nonetheless, other Orthodox Jews are more willing to accept brain death.   
They cite sources in the Talmud and Codes of Jewish Law which indicate that a 
criterion of irreversible cessation of respiration in an individual who shows no 
movement and is unresponsive to stimuli is to be considered dead.  Fred Rosner 
notes, “Jewish writings provide considerable evidence for the thesis that the brain 
and brainstem control all bodily functions, including breathing and heartbeat.”268  
Hence, cessation of all brain function, including the brainstem, is an acceptable 
criterion for determining death.  Further qualification of the acceptability of the 
brain-death criterion is advanced by a figurative analogy with the thesis of 
physiological decapitation.  Based on a talmudic discussion regarding individuals 
who had sustained broken necks, these persons are considered dead despite 
retaining for a short period of time spastic, convulsive movements and heartbeats.  
Since the brain dead exhibit similar phenomena, these thinkers suggest that one 
may therefore conclude they are the functional equivalent of a decapitated body.   
 The physiological decapitation thesis receives favorable attention from 
many commentators and is deserving of evaluation.269  Though some have found 
the analogy convincing, questions pertaining to the critical differences between 
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decapitated individuals and the brain dead suggest the thesis involves a faulty 
analogy.  As Paul A. Byrne et al note:  
It may be noted that decapitation is not the cutting off of a brain 
but of a head, with all its arteries and veins, bony and muscular 
structure, and upper spinal cord, so that neither literal beheading 
nor its equivalent through having one’s head smashed in an 
accident is the same as ‘brain death.’  In decapitation, the heart 
quickly stops and the rest of the body begins to disintegrate.  By no 
means is the brain alone affected.  Indeed, one could argue that 
death by decapitation comes primarily from cardio-respiratory 
failure.270 
   
Despite the lack of similarity between a decapitated body and a brain-dead 
patient, the decapitation thesis continues to be the primary mode of persuasion for 
many, including those who would not necessarily describe themselves as pro-life.  
In fact, a participant in a recent discussion on brain death by the President’s 
Bioethics Commission relayed to this writer that the main argument upon which 
its continued acceptance rests, is the decapitation thesis.271  This is unfortunate 
given the fact that the empirical evidence renders the thesis demonstrably false.  
As one former supporter of this thesis notes: 
Until relatively recently (1992), as an ethicist, I was myself misled 
in this respect, having had brain death explained to me and seen it 
explained to donor families many times as the brain event 
equivalent of having been guillotined. Having now studied the 
medical literature I know that to be false, and more than that, it 
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271This information was relayed to me by Patrick Lee, a former colleague 
of mine, and Professor of Bioethics at Franciscan University of Steubenville.  In 
2007, he was invited by Robert George, a member of the President’s Bioethics 
Commission, to observe and participate in the panel’s discussion on brain death.  
He provided helpful information relevant to the current misunderstandings 
surrounding the decapitation hypothesis.      
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was known to be false as early as 1977 following the multi-center 
study funded by the National Institutes of Neurological Disease 
and Stroke.272 
 
Other Jewish thinkers accept brain death on other grounds.  Since 1976, 
Conservative Jews have embraced, as sufficient for determining death, a flat 
electroencephalogram (EEG), which indicates “succession of spontaneous brain 
activity.”273  Their willingness to adopt the new criterion rests on the fact that 
since “ancestors determined Jewish law in light of medical practice of their 
time,”274 it seems reasonable to accept testing that conforms to current medical 
practice.  In 1988, the Chief Rabbinate of Israel demonstrated its approval of a flat 
EEG when it approved heart transplantation, since the test “guarantees that a 
patient can no longer independently breath or produce a heartbeat.” 275  Elliot 
Dorff, commenting on the use of brain death for the procurement of organs says, 
“If a flat electroencephalogram is confirmed, the donor is officially dead within 
the terms of Jewish law as now interpreted, and the transplantation is 
permissible.”276        
 In summary, it may be noted that dominant pro-life religious groups share 
a number of concerns and agreements regarding brain death and organ donation.  
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All three groups recognize the life-saving potential of donation and, to varying 
degrees, endorse organ donation as an act of heroism, charity, and in some cases a 
legal obligation.  Also noteworthy is the fact that, despite the claims of Singer that 
pro-life groups have abandoned their traditional sanctity of life ethic, all groups 
surveyed share a uniform concern over the criterion of death, founded upon the 
sanctity of life.  What Singer seems to overlook is that pro-life thinkers are 
dependent upon the medical community for providing a biologically coherent 
model reflective of their theologically (and to some degree, philosophically) 
informed anthropology.  Now that more investigators are recognizing the faulty 
foundation upon which brain death rests, it remains to be seen whether pro-life 
groups will continue to support a criterion that fails to represent the death of the 
organism as a whole.277  Legislation is based on public policy, and the next 
section will consider the UDDA’s success in ‘standardizing’ death.   
     
3.4 Statutory Irregularities 
Death marks the end of bodily life, a curiosity shrouded in mystery.  On an 
individual level, it represents the end of a person’s temporal existence in human 
society.  As such, the moment death occurs is of profound importance to the 
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lifers is growing.  See: Michael Potts, Paul A. Bryne, and Richard G. Nilges, 
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individual.278  Moreover, on a social level, “death represents a tearing of a large 
web of social relationships.”279  In both representations, society has an interest in 
protecting the rights of individuals to pursue life as far as possible, and to ensure 
that the social fabric is protected from great harm when death severs social ties.  It 
is on this point that the law has profound interests in protecting human life and 
ensuring that the societal web of relationships is safeguarded.  Social policy, 
therefore, must attempt balance between the interests of the individual and society 
in such a way that ensures the least amount of harm to the security of all citizens.   
 While the law’s role in standardizing death principally involves the task of 
framing a legal rule, the procedure is dependent upon the nodes of interaction 
between various disciplines which inform the direction of social policy.280  
Defining death is, by all accounts, multi-disciplinary.  Laypersons and experts 
alike rely on religion, philosophy, medicine, law, and everything in between, to 
reflect on the meaning of death.281  The law’s interest in framing social policy 
concerning death utilizes the disciplines of medicine and philosophy to a large 
degree.  If ambiguity exists in medicine and philosophy with regard to the 
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diagnosis and definition of death, legal framers have little hope of capturing the 
level of coherence necessary for a uniform policy. 
The Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA) issued by the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws states: 
Any individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation 
of circulatory and respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible 
cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain 
stem, is dead.  A determination of death must be made in 
accordance with accepted medical standards.282 
 
It is important to note that the uniform act not only codified the common law 
standard but also extended it to address the problem of brain death.  Though some 
states directly employ the language of the UDDA, others have opted to utilize it 
as a framework leading to some inconsistencies in how states allow for a 
determination of death.  In states like Nebraska and South Carolina the UDDA 
standard is specifically applied.  In South Carolina, Article 6, section 44-43-460 
of the Uniform Determination of Death Act, states:  
An individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of 
circulatory and respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation 
of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem, is 
dead.  A determination of death must be made in accordance with 
accepted medical standards.283  
  
From here states deviate from the UDDA in at least four different ways.   
First, some states have crafted death statues that fail to address any 
situation other than those with patients on artificial life support.  For instance, the 
Florida statute provides: 
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For legal and medical purposes, where respiratory and circulatory 
functions are maintained by artificial means of support so as to 
preclude a determination that these functions have ceased, the 
occurrence of death may be determined where there is the 
irreversible cessation of the functioning of the entire brain, 
including the brain stem, determined in accordance with this 
section.284 
 
As Menikoff observes, “The statute does not purport to codify the common law 
standard applied to other jurisdictions, as does the uniform act.”285  Although the 
statutory framers expressly limit the statute to those cases in which “respiratory 
and circulatory functions are maintained by artificial means of support,” Menikoff 
further notes, that “the use of the permissive ‘may’ in the statute” suggests that 
the legislature envisioned other ways to diagnose death.  This is made evident in a 
later subsection which declares: 
Except for a diagnosis of brain death, the standard set forth in this 
section is not the exclusive standard for determining death or the 
withdrawal of life-support.286 
  
Thus, the Florida legislature appears to have struck out on its own in its departure 
from the bifurcated language of the UDDA.   
A second way that states have deviated from the UDDA is by employing 
language more closely resembling the brain-stem criterion.  For example, the 
Iowa statute 702.8 titled Death includes this provision:  
In the event that artificial means of support preclude a 
determination that these functions have ceased, a person will be 
considered dead if in the announced opinion of two physicians, 
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based on ordinary standards of medical practice, that person has 
experienced an irreversible cessation of spontaneous brain 
functions.  Death will have occurred at the time when the relevant 
functions ceased.287   
 
Similarly the Texas death statute states:  
If artificial means of support preclude a determination that a 
person’s spontaneous respiratory and circulatory functions have 
ceased, the person is dead when, in the announced opinion of a 
physician, according to ordinary standards of medical practice, 
there is irreversible cessation of all spontaneous brain function.  
Death occurs when the relevant functions cease. (c) Death must be 
pronounced before artificial means supporting a person’s 
respiratory and circulatory functions are terminated.288  
  
These provisions suggest that the determination of death rests solely on the 
irreversible cessation of brain-stem functions.  As such, they do not reflect the 
“whole-brain” criterion of death specified in the UDDA by the phrase, 
“irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain 
stem.” 
The third way in which states deviate from the UDDA concerns how states 
incorporate clinical criteria into their statues in place of the UDDA’s somewhat 
ambiguous phrase, “A determination of death must be made in accordance with 
accepted medical standards.”   The difficulty posed by the lack of specificity as to 
what constitutes “accepted medical standards” has caused some legislatures to 
incorporate their own clinical criteria into their death statutes.    Several examples 
are worth noting.  In Delaware, the same bifurcated approach is applied but with 
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some qualification regarding the details of diagnosis.  Section 1760, titled 
Determination of Death says:   
A determination of death pursuant to the provisions herein may be 
made, by a physician admitted to practice under this chapter, by 
either: (1) Personal examination, or (2) By the use of information 
provided by an EMT-P (paramedic) using telemetric or 
transtelephonic means in accordance with protocols approved by 
the Board of Medical Practice, following recommendations of its 
Advanced Life Support Committee.289 
   
In Virginia, a registered nurse may pronounce death, if the following criteria are 
satisfied:  
(i) the nurse is employed in this Commonwealth by a home health 
organization, by a hospice, or the department of corrections; (ii) 
the nurse is directly involved in the care of the patient; (iii) the 
patient’s death has occurred; (iv) the patient is under the care of a 
physician when his death occurs; (v) the patient’s death has been 
anticipated; (vi) the physician is unable to be present within a 
reasonable period of time to determine the death; and (vii) there is 
a valid Do Not Resuscitate Order.290  
  
Moreover, Oregon statute 432.300 titled, Determination of Death, carves out 
another difference not seen in other states, when it says: “For the purposes of this 
section as it relates to fetal death, heartbeats shall be distinguished from transient 
cardiac contractions and breathing shall be distinguished from fleeting respiratory 
efforts or gasps.”291   Although these particular differences may seem peripheral 
to the standard, they nevertheless reflect the difficulties law makers face when 
confronted with standards that “vary both geographically and from hospital to 
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hospital.”292   Indeed, many physicians readily acknowledge de facto violations of 
the dead donor rule due to the difficulties in attempting to satisfy a conceptually 
flawed criterion of death.293  Variations in the criteria for determining BD, 
coupled with statutory irregularities, raise doubts about accuracy of the brain-
death standard.       
 However, the most serious challenge to the goal of the UDDA is 
exemplified by the State of New Jersey’s legislative initiative which recognizes a 
personal religious exemption for those objecting to the brain-death criterion.  
Signed into law in 1991, the New Jersey Declaration of Death Act provides a 
statutory exception to the brain-death criterion, specifically for those in the 
Orthodox Jewish, Japanese, and Native American communities, who adhere to a 
belief that life is primarily identified by the circulatory and respiratory activities 
of the body.  The Act provides: 
The death of an individual shall not be declared upon the basis of 
neurological criteria…of this act when the licensed physician 
authorized to declare death, has reason to believe, on the basis of 
information in the individual’s available medical records, or 
information provided by a member of the individual’s family or 
any other person knowledgeable about the individual’s religious 
beliefs that such a declaration would violate the personal religious 
belief of the individual.  In these cases death shall be declared, and 
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the time of death fixed, solely upon the basis of cardio-respiratory 
criteria.294 
 
The rationale for the act rests in the recognition that “when death occurs 
[it] is not solely a medical judgment about a biological fact, it is also a value 
judgment, which for some rests on personal religious beliefs for moral 
convictions.”295  New Jersey’s legislative body reasoned against the “state’s 
general interests in uniform legal recognition of neurological death” as justifying 
the law to “compel those with contrary personal religious beliefs to accept 
neurological criteria for declarations of their own deaths.”296  Instead of 
embodying the position advanced by the President’s Commission, (that societal 
interests in a uniform standard of death precludes a statutory recognition of a 
conscious clause), the State of New Jersey struck out on its own in order to 
accommodate the personal interests of a minority group whose religious beliefs 
and the exercise thereof were being threatened.297  
 While some commentators have seen the New Jersey legislative initiative 
as a model for expanding the law to satisfy the demands of greater pluralism 
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regarding the definition and criterion of death,298 others see it as a threat to the 
judicial stability evinced by a uniform standard.   For example, Capron writes: 
By providing that the neurological standard should not be applied 
when a physician has reason to believe that a brain-based 
declaration of death would “violate the personal religious beliefs” 
of the patient (in which case “death shall be declared, and the time 
of death fixed, solely upon the basis of [the] cardio-pulmonary 
criteria” specified elsewhere in the statute), the New Jersey law 
sows confusion and invites litigation.299     
 
The concern rests on the prospects of a dispute arising due to the religious beliefs 
of a patient whose condition satisfies one set of findings while not another.  The 
situation could produce confusing “oscillating results (alive, not dead, not alive, 
and so forth) depending upon fluctuation in the resolution of the dispute.”300  In 
other words, a policy that fails to provide the uniform stability necessary to 
resolve disputes concerning the timing of death invites greater confusion to an 
already delicate process.   
As the preceding discussion of state statutes demonstrates, though states 
have the ability to draft statutes to better suit their jurisdictions, the purpose of the 
UDDA was to standardize laws.  The two primary elements exist in most of the 
statutes unchanged, but there are clear inconsistencies that challenge the overall 
success of the brain-death standard.   The fact that policy makers struggle to write 
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laws in accordance with a poorly conceived medical condition prone to perpetual 
qualification further substantiates what may be called “the mirage of 
consensus.”301  There should be little expectation that these social policy 
problems will be resolved as long as a technically latent, medically confused
concept continues to be embraced by law and med
 
icine.    
                                                
 
3.5 Applications to Medical Research 
A less publicly known and perhaps portentous application of the brain 
death criterion is its unsettling utilization in certain areas of medical research and 
development.  A little over a decade after the Harvard Committee recommended 
tests for determining the condition known today as brain death, reports of medical 
experimentation on brain dead patients began to emerge.  The first of these reports 
involved the use of children who satisfied the brain death criterion.302  Several 
years later, a report documenting the experimental use of an adult diagnosed as 
brain dead was published.303  While some of these experiments involved the 
administration of certain drugs, other more invasive procedures include: 
endotracheal intubation, central venous catheterization, peripheral venous and 
artery catheterization, thoracentesis, pericardiocentesis, and temporary 
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transvenous pacemaker insertion.304  These reports resulted in a small spate of 
articles evaluating the ethical issues associated with research on the newly 
dead.305  The primary focus centered on the need to secure consent for medical 
experiments on the newly dead either by the deceased prior to death or from the 
deceased’s family after death.  Among these commentators, there was general 
agreement that such experiments are justified if consent is obtained.   
Although a survey of the early literature suggests concord regarding the 
requirement of consent for medical experimentation on the newly dead, Mark R. 
Wicclair notes, “That whatever the merits of their arguments, opponents of 
consent significantly outnumber its proponents among those who practice 
procedures on the newly dead.”306  More recently, Wicclair reports that 
discussions have centered on the issue of whether the standard of consent 
pertaining to research on living patients is applicable to post-mortem research as 
well.  According to some opponents of the consent requirement, the right to make 
decisions concerning one’s bodily integrity is a personal one, which ends with 
death.307  A dead body is no longer a person possessing autonomous rights that 
                                                 
304Berger, 775. 
 
305John A. Robertson, "Research on the Brain-Dead," IRB, (1980). 
 
306Mark R. Wicclair, "Informed Consent and Research Involving the 
Newly Dead," Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 12, no. 4 (2002): 352.  Wicclair 
cites a report in which only 10 percent of all programs that use the newly dead for 
teaching purposes require consent from the families of the deceased. 
 
307Daniel Sperling, "Breaking the Silence: The Illegality of Performing 
Resuscitation Procedures on the Newly Dead," Annals of Health Law 13, no. 2 
(2003-04): 400. 
 
 117
can be violated.308  Moreover, given the irrational reactions to death by the next-
of-kin, presumed consent is preferable in that it eliminates heightened grief or 
anxiety over family members consenting to such practices.   
Recall that one of the advantages of brain death envisioned by Henry 
Beecher was the use of brain dead bodies for research, which could potentially 
eliminate many of the ethical problems associated with the difficulty of obtaining 
informed consent from living patients.  In keeping with this vision, many 
researchers simply do not see how nonautonomous corpses can be abused or 
harmed by experimentation that promises to benefit society as a whole.  Indeed, 
as some opponents of consent suggest, “Patients who die in emergency 
departments have implicitly given at least limited consent to practice and teach 
life-saving techniques by using the services of emergency medical personnel and 
by merely living in modern society which provides everyone a right to this 
care.”309  Hence, it is argued, “The absence of harm to patients in conjunction 
with the benefits from training opportunities support training procedures 
independent of family consent.”310   
Proponents of informed consent for research on the newly dead generally 
focus on the nature of the harm that obtains upon failure to respect pre-mortem 
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preferences and values, even in the absence of advance directives indicating 
personal preferences.  Typically, “harm” refers to the negative effects an action or 
event may have on the well-being of an individual.  Wicclair asks, “Can actions 
and events that occur after a person has died affect that person’s well-being?”311  
Not according to a mental state criterion of well-being.  Since the dead are 
incapable of good and bad experiences, medical experimentation proffers no harm 
to their well-being.  However, according to a desire-based or preference theory,312 
in which well-being is defined exclusively as a function of desire or preference 
satisfaction, a different answer emerges.  Wicclair offers the following 
illustration: 
Professor Perkins, a Constitutional scholar, is dying of cancer.  She 
has spent the last five years writing a book on the Second 
Amendment.  Since she is too frail to read the publisher’s 
response, her husband opens the letter. It states that reviewers 
rejected the manuscript because it was based on claims that have 
been decisively refuted in a soon-to-be published monograph. 
Professor Perkins’ husband cannot bring himself to tell her the 
truth. Instead, he tells her that the manuscript was accepted for 
publication, which causes her to feel very happy. She dies without 
discovering the truth…[A]ccording to a desire-based or preference 
conception, even though she was unaware of the negative 
assessment of her work and felt good about what she falsely 
believed she had accomplished, the fact that she failed to achieve 
her goal of making a significant scholarly contribution had a 
negative effect on her well being.313 
 
The preference theory of well-being accords with many cultural norms, as 
well as ethical principles well established in medical practice.  Central among 
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these principles is that in the absence of pre-mortem consent, the sensibilities and 
preferences of the deceased’s family members ought to be respected.314  Highly 
regarded medical associations, representing the interests of physicians, including 
the AMA, the AHA, and the Report of the President's Commission for the Study 
of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 
support the position that research on the newly dead should proceed only when 
consent has been obtained by a substitute decision maker, next-of-kin, or family 
member.315  Common among health care providers is the concern that public 
awareness of practicing procedures on the newly dead, absent consent, may 
“undermine generally held faith in physician fidelity,”316 eroding public trust of 
the medical profession.317   
 Public trust relies on disclosure, truth-telling, and consent.  Society 
expects the medical profession to respect the values and preferences of patients, 
even after death.  Individuals who agree to be organ donors may not be aware of 
the scope of their “anatomical gifts.”  In some states, the “organ donor” 
designation printed on a driver’s license includes authorization for transplantation, 
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therapy, research, and education.318  Instead of allowing people to restrict the 
scope of their anatomical gift, they are simply asked, “Do you wish to have the 
organ donor designation printed on your driver’s license?”319 without any 
disclosure on all that entails.  Meaningful consent about the scope of “anatomical 
gift” includes informing organ donors and their families that such gifts cover 
therapy, research, and education as well.  Additionally, opportunity should be 
given to limit or restrict an individual’s gift according to his or her preferences.320 
However, it remains unclear as to whether this satisfies consent to the 
degree to which it is informed.  As Wicclair notes, “When the scope of post-
mortem research includes uncommon and potentially controversial activities, it is 
not sufficient to refer generically to ‘research’ in consent instruments.”321  
Moreover, as Susan R. Martyn observes, it is doubtful whether individuals would 
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complaint stating a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty and lack of 
informed consent.  This case is instructive to the issue at hand.  Since patients 
who agree to be organ donors are not informed with regard to the extent of their 
gift, it could be argued that a legal violation of informed consent occurs 
practically every time an individual agrees to be an organ donor.  See: "John 
Moore v. Regents of the University of California," in 51 Cal.3d 120 (Supreme 
Court of California, 1990).   
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conceive of post-mortem research as including mechanically ventilated, heart-
beating corpses.322 Assuring consent is properly informed requires some detail of 
the particulars of the research to be conducted.323 
Some researchers may worry that specific disclosure may have serious 
effects on future research and training efforts deemed invaluable for the progress 
of life-saving intervention techniques in emergency medical situations.  For them, 
disclosure practically ensures the elimination of these vital training and research 
efforts, which society cannot afford to lose.  It is worth noting, however, that 
advances in resuscitative training tools, such as mannequins and computer 
simulators, is increasingly narrowing the advantage of using corpses.324  
Furthermore, as Sperling notes, “It has been indicated that using only mannequins 
and didactic sessions for teaching these skills is not less successful than using 
cadavers.”325  Whatever advantages corpses had in the past is increasingly being 
supplemented by developing technology for research education. 
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3.6 Summary and Assessment 
There is little doubt that the way in which death is managed today differs 
greatly from the past.  Medical practitioners regulate death to the extent that it is 
estimated that the timing of eighty percent of deaths in hospitals is chosen.326  The 
import of public opinion in the debate about brain death remains scant, at best.  
Surveys indicate confusion abounds, even when the attempt is made to disclose 
the meaning of the diagnosis.  Given that life support mechanisms sustain life 
signs in patients who have suffered chronic cognitive and physiological 
impairment, family members are sometimes reluctant to accept that their loved 
one has died.   At other times, people simply cannot understand the complexity of 
terms meant to convey various levels of cognitive impairment, the details of 
which their own physicians may be uncertain.  Indeed, most people simply accept 
their doctors’ assurances that their loved one has died, without knowledge of the 
controversies surrounding brain death and organ donation.  Whatever consensus 
about brain death exists in public opinion rests on an uncertain foundation.   
Various pro-life groups also have helped shape public opinion through 
their acceptance of brain death.  This is significant, given the fact that ongoing 
moral controversies in society (e.g., abortion and euthanasia) are supported by 
these groups’ reliance upon a sanctity-of-life ethic that highly values the lives of 
all human beings, particularly the most vulnerable.  It is evident that while some 
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explanation exists in the efforts of these groups’ authorities to remain relevant and 
mainstream, the most influence comes from reliance upon the medical 
community’s acceptance that brain death is the death of the organism as a whole.  
With this biological basis now in question (see Chapter Two) it remains to be seen 
whether these groups will continue to support a condition that fails to represent 
the death of the organism as a whole.  
Statutory irregularities are an indication of the struggles of law-makers to 
apply a conceptually confused criterion of death.  Variation in the clinical tests for 
determining brain death contributes to the arbitrariness in the way in which states 
determine how brain death should be applied.  Though most states incorporate the 
two main elements provided in the UDDA, variations in the statutes lead to 
inconsistencies between jurisdictions.  This “trickle-down” effect underscores the 
need for a more coherent conceptual foundation that better provides for a legal 
framework that can guarantee the legal protection society depends upon for a web 
of social relationships. 
Finally, the most disconcerting aspect brought out in this chapter is the 
problem of consent with regard to how the brain dead are exploited for medical 
training and research purposes.  It is highly questionable whether consent is 
possible, given that the details of extent of one’s anatomical gift are rarely 
disclosed.  Researchers who propose that corpses have no autonomy and interests, 
fail to appreciate that people in general care deeply about their interests, including 
what happens to their bodies after they die.  As acute as this concern seems to be, 
it is further heightened when consideration is given to the ambiguity regarding the 
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physiological status of the brain dead.  If indeed, as previous chapters maintain, 
the brain dead are not dead, then consent to post-mortem research under the brain-
death criterion is not possible.  These concerns invite a larger conceptual analysis, 
which will include a philosophical investigation of brain death in the following 
two chapters.   
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Chapter Four 
 
 
Philosophical Problems with Brain Death 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
 The “standard paradigm” framing current discussions about death 
represents a multi-level debate concerning: (1) the concept or definition of death; 
(2) the criteria for determining death; and (3) the diagnostic testing for the clinical 
signs of death.327  In previous chapters the medical criteria as well as the clinical 
tests for brain death were discussed in detail.  Chapter One revealed the historical 
development of levels two and three in which a new criterion (brain death), along 
with clinical tests, was adopted in what may be described as a “conceptual 
vacuum.”328  Based on pragmatic concerns, brain death was initially adopted in 
medical practice and social policy, despite having no theoretical basis for 
explaining why it represents human death.   But since the use of particular tests is 
contingent upon particular criteria, and the use of particular criteria rests on a 
particular conception of death, it follows that a constructional definition is central 
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to understanding why a criterion is valid.  Recognition of this is evident in the fact 
that various theorists, since the Harvard Committee, have attempted to construct a 
conceptual basis consistent with the criteria and tests adopted in practice and law.  
Considered this way, it appears that the development of brain death has occurred 
exactly backwards than it should have.  Normally, one starts with a particular 
paradigm and then proceeds to identify corresponding criteria and the various 
tests consistent with the paradigm.  Instead, the Harvard Committee simply 
identified tests for a medical condition and then recommended that condition as a 
criterion for death.  Failure to appreciate the importance of an underlying 
philosophical conception to ground the criterion may be the primary reason for 
the controversy and misunderstanding surrounding the use of brain death.  David 
Lamb expresses the importance of philosophical clarity with regard to defining 
death as follows: 
Clarity concerning the concept of death provides a point of 
reference when deciding upon criteria, but some definitions of 
death are philosophically inadequate despite the fact that criteria 
can be logically derived from them.  Consequently an investigation 
of the philosophical basis of any concept of death is 
important….329   
  
 In a previous chapter, it was suggested that the problems evident in the 
tests-criterion relation would ultimately be found in a faulty relation with the 
definition.  Bernat articulates the definition of death as “the permanent cessation 
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of functioning of the organism as a whole.”330  If this definition is accepted, then 
the definition ought to be sufficiently consistent with its corresponding criteria 
(cardiopulmonary death and brain death).  It has been demonstrated in the 
analysis in Chapter Two that there is plausible evidence that the diagnostic tests 
fail to comport with the brain-death criterion.  This chapter aims to carry the 
analysis further by critiquing the criterion-definition relation in the standard 
paradigm. The purpose of this chapter is to challenge brain death’s veracity with 
respect to its definitional and metaphysical foundation. Accordingly, section 4.2 
addresses the philosophical groundwork and assumptions of the underlying 
metaphysics for the definition of death under the current paradigm.  Section 4.3 
discloses the theoretical inconsistencies between the organism/substance view and 
brain death based on the empirical evidence, and section 4.4 discusses particular 
instances of inconsistencies among advocates of the substantial view.  Finally, 
section 4.5 presents several important objections to the substance view.   
  
4.2 Philosophical Groundwork and Assumptions 
 Philosophical notions of personal identity, though notoriously 
controversial, are essential for laying the groundwork for thinking about many 
important biomedical issues.  Exactly how one thinks about what constitutes 
being human in general and being a person in particular directly translates into 
how one formulates positions on issues such as abortion, embryonic stem cell 
research, and defining death.  Indeed, many of the issues currently under 
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discussion among bioethicists today hinge on the underlying metaphysical 
assumptions regarding the constitution of human persons.  As J. P. Moreland and 
Scott B. Rae note: “Philosophical clarity and, especially, careful metaphysical 
distinctions are crucially relevant to the task of assessing various views of human 
persons and the ethical positions that follow from those views.”331  Failure to 
recognize the importance of metaphysical starting points with regard to defining 
death leaves out the philosophical scaffolding necessary for constructing medical 
criteria and tests consistent with the death of human persons.  In short, failure to 
adequately address the philosophical underpinnings in the debate about death 
would amount to, at best, the establishment of criteria and tests on petitio principii 
grounds. 
 Among many theorists, there tends to be a generally accepted distinction 
between psychological-based criteria and organism-based criteria for death.  If 
one adopts and defends a higher-brain model, then one has adopted a 
psychological-oriented conception of human death.  If, on the other hand, one 
adopts and defends something beyond the higher-brain model, (i.e., the whole 
brain model) then one is usually characterized as having an organism-oriented 
conception.332  So, the two models evidently depend on two conceptions of 
“person.”  The former asserts that persons come to be when certain properties or 
functions emerge associated with a human organism, and with the permanent loss 
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of those properties or functions, the person ceases to be.  The latter, however, 
asserts that personal identity is congruent with the life of the organism as a whole, 
from its coming to be as a human organism to its ceasing to be as such.  Hence, 
the question ultimately is one that concerns the ontological status of the brain-
dead individual.  Put differently, the question concerns whether it is correct to 
think that human persons are human organisms who cease to be when the 
organism ceases to be, or are persons who are something different than the human 
organisms with which they are associated. 
 When the President’s Commission defined death as “that moment at which 
the body's physiological system ceases to constitute an integrated whole,”333 the 
Commission unambiguously adopted an organism-based conception of human 
persons.   The Commission was deliberately conservative in their deliberations 
and chose to base them on the idea that humans have been traditionally viewed as 
organisms belonging to a substantial kind.  This is evident in the parts to whole 
relation in the Commission’s rationale for opting to an organism-oriented view of 
death.  The Commission’s report states: 
The functioning of many organs—such as the liver, kidneys, and 
skin—and their integration are "vital" to individual health in the 
sense that if any one ceases and that function is not restored or 
artificially re-placed, the organism as a whole cannot long survive. 
All elements in the system are mutually interdependent, so that the 
loss of any part leads to the breakdown of the whole and, 
eventually, to the cessation of functions in every part.334  
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Desiring to maintain constancy with a more traditional view of life and death, and 
to avoid the perception of a radical shift in the definition of death, the 
Commission recognized that “the adoption of a higher brain ‘definition’ would 
depart radically from the traditional standards” implying “that the existing 
cardiopulmonary definition had been in error all along.”335  Thus, the President’s 
Commission was deliberate in opting away from a psychological-oriented view 
and instead chose a definition of death consistent with the idea that humans are 
organisms of a substantial kind.  The question of conceptual continuity between 
the definition and the proposed criterion depends on whether brain death is 
consistent with the metaphysical theory that avers human persons to be essentially 
physical organisms.   
 An organism-based conception of human persons is indicative of a 
substance view of human persons, the metaphysics of which requires some 
explication.   As in any philosophical discussion, the level of coherence will 
depend on the clarity of the terms employed.  Imprecision undoubtedly leads to 
confusion about how data is incorporated into the philosophical framework.  
While a detailed explication and defense of the metaphysics of substances is 
beyond the scope and purpose of this dissertation, it is nevertheless necessary to 
carefully define the relevant terms employed by contemporary proponents of the 
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substance view in order to assess the coherence of brain death with the 
metaphysics implicitly adopted by the President’s Commission.336   
The traditional view of a substance (in accordance with Aristotle and 
Thomas Aquinas) suggests several features indicative of the core of substantial 
identity.   Norris Clarke sets forth four characteristics of a substance: 
(1)it has the aptitude to exist in itself and not as a part of any other 
being; (2) it is the unifying center of all the various attributes and 
properties that belong to it at any one moment; (3) if the being 
persists as the same individual throughout a process of change, it is 
the substance which is the abiding, unifying center of the being 
across time; (4) it has an intrinsic dynamic orientation toward self-
expressive action, toward self-communication with others, as the 
crown of its perfection, as its very raison d’etre . . . . 337 
 
Substances, therefore, are basic individual wholes or unities of properties, parts, 
and capacities and are capable of maintaining absolute identity or sameness 
through change.  The idea of change indicates sameness.  If something has 
undergone a change, then something has to remain the same, otherwise nothing 
has changed.  Human persons, for instance, undergo various changes throughout 
their existence, such as gaining consciousness and growing in rationality, but 
nevertheless remain the same thing, the same substance, throughout these 
changes.   
Unlike the weak unity a pile of junk on the curb might have, substances 
possess a deeper unity of parts.  Indeed, the parts of a substance obtain their 
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identity with respect to their connection to the substance as a whole.  As 
Moreland explains: 
The parts of a substance are united in such a way that the whole is 
ontologically prior to its parts in this sense: the unity of a substance 
is basic and primitive, it is not derived after its parts come together, 
and the parts of a substance are what they are in virtue of the role 
they play in the substance as a whole.338 
 
To illustrate, the parts of a human heart are what they are by virtue of the role 
they play in relation to the heart as a whole; the heart is what it is by virtue of the 
role it plays in relation to the circulatory system; and the circulatory system is 
what it is by virtue of the role it plays in relation to the organism as a whole.  If a 
part is removed, then the relation is severed, thus effecting a relational change in 
the identity of the part.339  
  Important to substantial unity is the way in which capacities (sometimes 
called potentialities, tendencies, or predispositions) adhere in a substance.  
Among different substances are natural groupings of capacities, with each natural 
group containing a hierarchical ordering of capacities.  The human substance has 
various capacities that other substances do not possess.  For instance, humans 
have the capacity to believe and think certain things, as well as to feel and to 
choose in ways other beings do not.  Humans are of a particular identifiable 
substance by virtue of their natural grouping of capacities such as intellectual, 
emotional, and volitional.   
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 In addition to natural groupings, capacities also come in hierarchies.  
Hierarchies may be divided into first-order, second-order, and so on until ultimate 
capacities are obtained.  Moreland explains: 
…if Sue can speak English but not Russian, then she has the first-
order capacity for English as well as the second-order capacity to 
have this first-order capacity (which she has already developed).  
Sue also has the second-order capacity to speak Russian, but lacks 
the first-order capacity to do so.340 
 
In other words, second-order capacities are realized only when first-order 
capacities are first developed.  A tomato seed has the ultimate capacity to produce 
tomatoes, but this ultimate capacity cannot be actualized until lower-order 
capacities are developed first, such as developing a root system.  The only things 
preventing the natural development of the lower-order capacities necessary for the 
substance to realize its ultimate capacities are a suitable environment and possible 
defects in lower order capacities.  Consequently, when a substance fails to 
develop its ultimate capacities due to some defect or some other factor that 
prevents the development of a lower-order capacity, the substance cannot be said 
to lose its ultimate capacity, but rather “lacks some lower-order capacity it needs 
for the ultimate capacity to be developed.”341   
Hence, all the capacities of a substance find their culmination in a set of 
ultimate capacities which are possessed by a particular thing by virtue of its 
belonging to a natural kind.  It is the inner structure or nature of a substance that 
orders and directs the development of lower-order capacities necessary for the 
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realization of its ultimate capacities.  Failure to fully develop ultimate capacities, 
or lose the capacity to exhibit them once obtained, is not necessarily tantamount 
to a substantial loss or change in identity.  As long as the substance remains a 
member of its natural kind, at whatever level of development or diminished 
capacity, it retains its substantial identity. 
Important to advocates of the metaphysics of substances is the contrast 
made with artifacts (sometimes referred to as property-things.)  Unlike 
substances, which are internally structured according to a set of internal relations, 
artifacts are structured entirely by a set of external relations.   While a pile of junk 
on the curb contains a weak unity of sorts, artifacts represent a deeper unity in that 
the parts constitute a whole by virtue of their ordered relations.  The kind of order 
or unity obtained by an artifact is imposed on its pre-existing parts.  For example 
several parts, such as four legs and a top, compose a table.  The external relation 
imposed upon the parts makes it a structured thing.  But the parts, legs and top, 
are what they are by virtue of their ordered relations.  Metaphysically speaking, 
unlike substances whose unity is prior to its parts, the parts of artifacts are prior to 
the whole.  Clearly, the unity of parts is not derived and ordered according to an 
internal nature within the being of the table.  Rather, the table is structured 
completely by a design previously conceived in the mind of a designer.  Hence 
the unity of the table does not “spring from within the parts…or within the [table] 
taken as a whole: it resides merely in the designer’s mind.”342 
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Moreover, an artifact has no capacity to realize “new kinds of properties 
not already resident in [its] parts.”343  For instance, tables cannot actualize new 
parts latent in their previously existing parts.  At best, new spatial relations may 
be imposed on tables which rearrange their parts in different locations.  But this 
new arrangement is not due to an internal agency directing from within.  Rather it 
is due to an external imposition of spatial relations already existing in the parts 
prior to its existence as a whole.   
Finally, artifacts also are subject to a change of identity in ways that 
substances are not.  Recall that for a substance, events such as losing or gaining a 
part do not constitute a change in identity.  However, when an artifact loses or 
gains a property (or part) something about its identity changes.  As new parts 
replace the old parts of a table, the table itself would undergo a change in identity 
and literally become a different table.  This is due to the idea that “[artifacts] are 
mereological compounds, systems constituted by separable parts standing in 
external relations.”344  In other words, the individual parts are essential to its 
identity; and thus with respect to an artifact’s loss or gain in its network of parts, a 
new entity emerges.   
 Another way to understand the nuances of the substantial view is by 
considering its philosophical roots in the metaphysics of Aristotle and Thomas 
Aquinas.  Through the philosophical literature of Aristotle, Aquinas develops a 
composite view of living organisms.  For Aquinas, “Every natural body which has 
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life in it is a substance in the sense of a composite.”345  That is to say, every living 
being is composed of two metaphysical components: form and shape.  As Ric 
Machuga explains: 
“Form” is that which makes something what it is.  “Shape”…refers 
to the totality of a thing’s physically quantifiable properties, i.e., its 
physical shape, size, height, weight, chemical composition, etc., in 
its most complete description.346  
   
For Aristotle and Aquinas, the study of shape belongs to the physical sciences, 
such as chemistry, biology, and physics.  Form, however, belongs to the category 
of ontology and hence takes on a more abstract point of view.  While chemists, 
biologists, and physicists concern themselves with questions of how physical, 
bodily processes work, the ontologist takes up the question, “What sorts of things 
exist?”  To further elaborate, when one asks a question such as, “What is a 
table?”, for Aquinas, an adequate answer requires delineating between whether 
the question concerns the physical properties of the particular table in question (its 
shape), or the nature or essence of a table in general (its form.)  The latter is an 
ontological question concerning “what is” a table.  The answer to the question that 
limits itself to physical descriptions of the table’s shape is insufficient to convey 
fully what is a table.  To answer that question fully one needs to address the 
nature of tableness in general, (i.e., its form or essence). 
 A living thing is a composite of substantial form (called a thing’s soul), 
and body (the shape or expression of substantial form.)  Regarding the former, 
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soul is the metaphysical principle of identification for living organisms belonging 
to a universal kind (their whatness).  Concerning the latter, body represents a 
particular instance of the universal form (its thisness).  More than that, soul 
represents the vital activity of body.  Since matter qua matter is itself lifeless, that 
is, life is not intrinsic to body as body, Aquinas contends that soul is the 
animating principle or source of life for the body.  He writes: 
For it is clear that to be a source of life, or to be a living thing, does 
not belong to body as a body, since, if that were the case, every 
body would be a living thing, or even a source of life, as a certain 
kind of body. . . Therefore, the soul, which is the source of life, is 
not a body, but the actuating form of a body.347 
 
For biological organisms, soul is the organizing principle which brings all the 
parts of an organism into a unitive expression of its substantial form.  As such, 
organizational life is a feature of soul that cannot be reduced to the “stuff” of 
physics or chemistry.  M. Green writes, “Organized systems cannot be understood 
in terms of their least parts alone, but only in terms of those parts as organized in 
such systems.”348  Rather, soul is that which organizes and directs bodily parts 
and systems into an organized whole.  As such, the soul is the organized organizer 
of the body.    
  These distinctions represent a minimal set of characteristics necessary for 
understanding the metaphysical foundation for human persons as organisms of a 
substantial kind.  The next section undertakes assessing the substance view of 
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human persons (human persons as organisms of a specific kind) in relation to the 
current evidence regarding the brain-death criterion.  The measure of success for 
this chapter will be whether the conceptual resources for the substance view, as 
represented in the current paradigm, are consistent with the brain-death criterion 
as proposed by its advocates.   
 
4.3 Brain Death and Substantial Identity 
Though the definition of death under the current paradigm is the death of 
the organism as a whole, brain-death defenders, such as James Bernat, clarify that 
it is the critical functions necessary for the continued health and life of the 
organism as a whole that represent the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
human life.  Thus, in the assessment of a human organism’s functional capacity, 
only certain requisite functions count in the determination of whether an organism 
has sustained irreversible functional loss.  These functions fall into three 
biological categories, all of which must be irretrievably lost in order to constitute 
the death of the organism as a whole.  Bernat cites these as: 1) vital functions of 
spontaneous breathing and autonomic control of circulation; 2) integrating 
functions that assure homeostasis of the organism . . . and 3) consciousness . . . .”  
Bernat further explains, “The presence of any of the three elements constitutes 
sufficient evidence for life.”349  
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  Crucial to a proper understanding of what constitutes the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for life is the underlying distinction between “whole 
organism” and “organism as a whole.”  In an attempt to maintain consistency with 
an organism-based definition, Bernat explains:  
‘The organism as a whole’ is an old biological concept that refers 
not to the whole organism (the sum of its parts) but to that set of 
vital functions of integration, control, and behavior that are greater 
than the sum of the parts of the organism, and that operate in 
response to demands from the organism’s internal and external 
milieu to support its life and to maintain its health. Implicit in the 
concept is the primacy of the functional unity of the organism.350 
    
It should be clear that Bernat’s rejection of the former category (whole organism) 
is an implicit rejection of an artifactual (property-thing or functional) view of 
human persons.  Hence, by accepting the latter category, Bernat has, in some 
sense, embraced a substance view, since substantial identity is rooted in the idea 
that persons are greater than the sum of their parts.  At least this much is 
consistent with the substance view as delineated earlier in this chapter.   
However, the manifest difficulties of reconciling brain death with the 
death of the organism as a whole (as detailed in Chapter Two) suggest that brain 
death does not mark the end of human integrated functioning.  Indeed, many of 
the functions necessary for maintaining organic integration can be supplemented 
by medical technology.  For instance, with the use of a ventilator the diaphragmic 
muscles can operate to provide oxygenated air allowing for the respiratory system 
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to maintain its continued functional capacity for O2 and CO2 exchange.351  In this 
sense, respiratory function has not been destroyed.  Moreover, artificial 
maintenance of other critical functions, such as the regulation of blood pressure 
through vassopressors, the maintenance of body temperature, and the suspension 
of rapid asystole through “synthetic arginine vassopressin (ADH) and 
epinephrine,” suggest that the idea that brain death inevitably leads to bodily 
disintegration is overstated.   
Additional evidence concerns the dozen or more documented brain-dead 
pregnant women who, with the aid of medical support, retained integrated organic 
functioning and were able, in many cases, to gestate fetuses to near full term.  
Mark Siegler and Daniel Wikler note that these sorts of cases contribute to the 
ambivalence associated with “corpses” that exhibit functions indicative of living 
patients. They write: 
It has been known for some time that brain-dead patients, suitably 
maintained, can breathe, circulate blood, digest food, filter wastes, 
maintain body temperature, generate new functions, and fulfill other 
functions as well.  All of this is remarkable in a “corpse.”  Granted, these 
functions could not be maintained without artificial aid and, even so, will 
cease within a few weeks.  However, many living patients depend on 
machines and will not live long; they are not thereby classified as 
(already) dead.352  
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Perhaps the most devastating critique of brain death, as highlighted in Chapter 
Two, concerns the work of Alan Shewmon.  Recall that Shewmon, a pediatric 
neurologist, has advanced considerable empirical evidence in direct opposition to 
the idea that the brain is the organ of somatic integration, a necessary condition 
for the viability of the criterion.  If the brain serves as the integrator of the 
organism as a whole, then the integrated unity of the organism as a whole is 
sustained and directed primarily by a functioning brain.  When the brain loses its 
functional capacity, cardiac arrest will follow shortly.   
However, observations made by Shewmon demonstrate that “if ‘brain-
dead’ patients are supported during the acute phase of their illness, cardiac arrest 
is now not certain.”353  As the number of counter examples grows (Shewmon 
alone documents some 175), there no longer remains any reason under the current 
paradigm to accept the claim that brain death marks the end of bodily 
integration.354  As a case in point, Shewmon has carefully documented a 
noteworthy example of prolonged somatic survival for a patient who survived 
more than fourteen years after a brain-death diagnosis.  Despite claims of 
misdiagnosis by critics, the autopsy showed a completely destroyed brain.355  As 
one neurologist confirms, “Recent evidence shows that survival is possible in the 
                                                 
353K. G. Karakatsanis, "'Brain Death': Should it be Reconsidered?," Spinal 
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354D. Alan Shewmon, "'Brainstem Death,' 'Brain Death' and Death: A 
Critical Re-Evaluation of the Purported Evidence," Issues in Law and Medicine 
14, no. 2 (1998). 
 
355S. Repertinger and others, "Long Survival Following Bacterial 
Meningitis-Associated Brain Destruction," Journal of Child Neurology 21 (2006). 
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environment of modern Intensive Care Units—and even out of these—despite the 
fact that the whole brain seems destroyed, as happened with a series of patients 
reported by Shewmon.”356     
The substance view is capable of accounting for the organizational unity 
present in medically supported brain-dead patients.  The distinction between 
lower-order and higher-order capacities is crucial on this point.  With respect to 
the loss of lower-order capacities, supplementation through external means makes 
little difference with respect to the life of the organism as a whole.  Many higher-
order capacities indicative of organizational life continue despite the fact that 
some lower-order capacities are derived through means external to the patient.  
Thus, brain-dead patients may lack some lower-order capacities, but still retain 
higher-order capacities indicative of living persons.  In this sense, the external 
agencies of lower-order capacities are, as Tom Tomlinson notes, “The functional 
equivalent of the destroyed brain stem.”357  As far as the substance view is 
concerned, continued organizational unity is indicative of the continued presence 
of the inner nature, which is constituent of human persons.   
 The fundamental inconsistency in the standard paradigm concerns the 
insistence of internally based functions as necessary conditions for organizational 
unity.358  However, if patients who are not brain dead are dependent on external 
                                                 
356Karakatsanis, 398.  
 
357Tom Tomlinson, "The Conservative Use of the Brain-Death 
Criterion: A Critique," Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 9 (1984). 
  
358Recall that the bedside testing procedures for brain death focus on 
automated reflexes, including spontaneous breathing..  
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sources for lower-order capacities (or functions), then by that criterion they lack 
the necessary conditions for organizational unity as well.  Two counter examples 
from Robert Truog and J. T. Fletcher highlight the problem.  They are: 1) 
individuals who, due to spinal cord injuries, rely on mechanical ventilation for 
support; and 2) patients who rely on pacemakers for effective heart 
functioning.359 Withdrawal or removal of these external agencies of support 
would quickly result in the lack of “integrated organic functioning,” and yet no
one would consider th
 
ese patients dead.   
                                                
 Stuart Younger and E. T. Bartlett provide a hypothetical situation that 
bears further consideration.   They ask us to imagine a case in which “someone 
has suffered neo-cortical (‘higher brain’) death, and is no longer conscious.”360  If 
the patient retains the capacity for temperature regulation, then according to the 
brain-death criterion, he would still be alive.  Suppose that this same patient 
suffers a stroke in the area of the brain stem that controls temperature regulation; 
nevertheless, temperature is maintained through medical support.  They ask, “Is 
he still functioning as a whole?”361  Suppose further that the patient suffers 
another stroke affecting his respiratory and circulatory centers.  Added supportive 
measures are taken, such as placing him on a ventilator and regulating his blood 
gases.  If we continue to imagine further compromises, with each function 
 
359Robert D. Truog and J. T. Fletcher, "Brain Death and the Anencephalic 
Newborn," Bioethics 4 (1990). 
  
360Stuart J. Youngner and E. T. Bartlett, "Human Death and High 
Technology: The Failure of the Whole Brain Formulations," Annals of Internal 
Medicine 99 (1983). 
 
361 Ibid. 
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supplemented by ICU staff, at what point should we conclude that organizational 
unity has sufficiently ceased?  The evidence suggests that integrated organic 
functioning remains at all stages of lower-order functional loss.  According to the 
substance view, as long as organizational unity is present, despite the loss of 
lower-order capacities, the brain-dead patient retains his or her higher-order 
capacities for bodily integration.  Thus, the substance-view advocate, if he or she 
is to be consistent, must maintain that brain-dead patients do not lose their 
substantial identity.  They neither “become members of another species” by virtue 
of severe brain damage, nor are they mere aggregates of persons who were once 
associated with bodies.362    
Since physical organisms undergo constant change throughout their lives, 
constancy is explained at the level of substantial form.  As an organism gains new 
parts or loses old ones, it is its substantial form (as the organized organizer) that 
directs these changes according to its essence, or natural kind.  In the case of 
brain-dead patients, certain physical parts become damaged (constituting a loss of 
parts) which results in the loss of certain lower-order capacities.  However, since 
these lower-order capacities are supplemented through artificial support 
mechanisms, the substance retains the capacity for many of its higher-order 
capacities.  The inability of a particular substance/organism to actualize all its 
capacities at a given time is irrelevant as long as the organism as a whole 
                                                 
362D. A. Jones, “Metaphysical Misgivings About 'Brain Death',” in Beyond 
Brain Death: The Case Against Brain Based Criteria for Human Death, ed. 
Michael Potts, Paul A. Byrne, and Richard G. Nilges (Dordrecht, The 
Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000), 108.  
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continues to exhibit organizational capacities.  As one substance advocate notes, 
“A substance has a set of capacities that are true of it even though they are not 
actualized.”363   
   These considerations lead to the conclusion that since brain-dead patients 
retain integrated organizational unity, these individuals, at least under the 
substance view, are living human beings.  While it is true that such individuals 
have experienced the loss of certain capacities, because these capacities are 
supplemented by medical support, what remains under this view is not the mere 
“residual countenance of a person.”364  Rather, the brain dead, at least from a 
substantial perspective, remain persons, albeit severely disabled.  In the next 
section, consideration is given to particular instances of inconsistency among 
proponents of the substance view.   
 
4.4 Inconsistencies Among Substance Advocates 
Among substance-view advocates, the majority embraces the reasoning set 
forth in the President’s Commission report as consistent with their view that death 
should be declared only when organic unity in the body breaks down.   They 
argue, in conjunction with the Commission’s report, that without the unique 
integrated functions of the entire brain, organic functioning of the body is lost.  
Typically, substance advocates argue that a human person comes to be when the 
                                                 
363Garett J. DeWeese and J. P. Moreland, Philosophy Made Slightly Less 
Difficult (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2005), 44-45.  
 
364Hans Jonas, Philosophical Essays: From Ancient Creed to 
Technological Man (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974). 
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human organism comes to be (at conception) and ceases to be when the organism 
as a whole dies.  The question of whether these advocates can maintain 
consistency based on their claims about the status of the human organism at the 
beginning of life with the empirical evidence now uncovered regarding the human 
organism who has been declared brain dead is worth considering. 
The substance view is most often offered as a means to assess the abortion 
debate.365  Proponents present the view as an attempt to argue that a “human 
being is intrinsically valuable because of the sort of thing it is, and the human 
being remains that sort of thing as long as it exists.”366  According to the 
substance view, a human being throughout its development and decline does not 
undergo any substantial changes that alter its identity until the organism as whole 
dies.  Indeed, it remains numerically identical to itself as long as it exists even 
when it is unable to exhibit those functions normally associated with healthy adult 
human beings.  Hence, mere membership in the species homo sapiens is sufficient 
reason to attribute intrinsic value and rights to any human individual in 
recognition that it is “one of us.” 
Patrick Lee, an advocate for the substance view, presents a form of the 
argument in five steps: 
1. You and I are intrinsically valuable (in the sense that makes us 
subjects of rights). 
                                                 
365Patrick Lee, Abortion and Unborn Human Life (Washington DC: 
Catholic University of America Press, 1996). 
 
366Francis J. Beckwith, "The Explanatory Power of the Substance View 
of Persons," Christian Bioethics 10 (2004). 
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2. We are intrinsically valuable because of what we are (what we 
are essentially). 
3. What we are, is each a human, physical organism. 
4. Human physical organisms come to be at conception (a 
biological proposition: a new and distinct human organism is 
generated by the fusion of a spermatozoon and an oocyte). 
5. Therefore, what is intrinsically valuable (as a subject of rights) 
comes to be at conception.367 
 
Lee, et al note three important points regarding the substantial identity of 
the human embryo.368  First, they note an embryo is from the start distinct from 
any cell of the father and mother.  This is due to its internal, directed, and distinct 
growth toward maturation.  Second, the embryo is human with a genetic make-up 
characteristic of humans.  Third, the embryo, though immature, is a complete or 
whole organism that will, barring disease, violence, or variation in environment, 
direct itself toward full expression of its essence.  All of these features are present 
in the embryo and none of the changes it undergoes during its development 
generates a new direction of growth.369    
 Of specific note is the fact that for those thinkers who employ these sorts 
of arguments, the necessity of a functioning brain to denote the presence of a 
person is not required.  For them, a proper view is one in which personhood is 
defined in biological but not necessarily strictly neurological terms.  As John S. 
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Contemporary Deabtes in Applied Ethics, ed. Andrew I.  Cohen and 
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Feinberg and Paul D. Feinberg note, “Whatever is or potentially is genetically a 
person counts as a person and has a person’s rights.”370  Yet the necessity of 
having a partially functioning brain as a condition for personhood in parallel cases 
with the life of the fetus is deemed unnecessary by many defenders of the 
substance view, this despite the fact that many of these same thinkers consider 
having a (partially) functioning brain necessary at later stages of the human 
being’s life.   Consider Lee’s comments on the matter:  
The reason why irreparable cessation of brain functions constitutes 
death is not because having a brain is at all stages of the human 
being’s life a necessary property, but because in the mature human 
being the brain is the organ which organizes all the systems of the 
human organism.  So when the brain ceases to function (totally and 
irreparably) in a mature human being, the various tissues and 
organs cease to form an organism.  Now a human being is 
essentially an organism (a specific type of organism), and so if the 
tissues and organs cease to constitute an organism, then the human 
being has ceased to be.371 
 
Similarly, in an effort to distance their view from a higher-brain formulation of 
death, Moreland and Rae state, “Biological functioning is important to a 
substance view since it holds that the human person is an organic unity grounded 
in an individual essence.”372  Yet, a few sentences later they state, “The whole 
brain definition is consistent with a substance view of the person since once the 
entire brain ceases to function, heartbeat and respiration will cease as well.”373  
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Consistent (in their view) with their claim that human persons are organisms (or 
substances) of a specific kind, they write: “Whole brain definitions of death are 
most consistent with a substance view of a person, in which the person is a unity 
of biological, mental, and spiritual components, grounded in an individuated 
essence—one’s human nature.”374 
 A final example is from Elio Sgreccia, a proponent of the 
Aristotelian/Thomistic substance view articulated earlier in this chapter.  He 
argues that the mental and spiritual components of persons belong to the 
substantial character of the human organism.  In contrast to the dualism implicit in 
higher-brain death, he contends, “The body does not have its own private 
existence aside from the spiritual soul.  The unity of the person lies in this fact: 
there is a single existence for these two components.”375  Attempting to maintain 
distance from the higher-brain criterion, he further maintains that the brain-death 
criterion must not be understood “in the sense that one wants to identify the part 
(the encephalon) with the whole (the body separate from the soul).”  Rather, he 
argues, the brain-death criterion is commensurate with the death of the organism 
as a whole since “once the functions of the entire encephalon have been 
irreversibly lost, including those of the encephalic trunk, which governs the 
cardio-respiratory function, the organism loses the unifying principle of life that 
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defines it as a living organism.”376  He goes on to note that this is true regardless 
of the use of mechanical ventilation, serving merely as a substitute for 
spontaneous breathing, which permits the heart to continue to beat for the 
maintenance of organs to be retrieved for transplantation.     
 What all these substance advocates have in common is their acceptance of 
organizational unity as the defining feature of the presence of the human person 
from conception to the death of the organism as a whole.  Though at earlier stages 
of development the human organism does not require a functioning brain, at later 
stages the unifying principle of life is present only in those organisms with lower-
brain function intact.  As noted in the last section, the discrepancy lies on the 
insistence that internally based integrated functions are a necessary condition for 
the life of the organism as a whole.  Patients who rely on artificial or external 
means for these same lower-brain functions maintain unified organic function, as 
exemplified in cases of brain-dead pregnant women.  Given the empirical 
evidence to the contrary, substance advocates like those highlighted above can no 
longer maintain that their acceptance of brain death is consistence with the death 
of the organism as a whole.   
 Though these problems are indicative of the substance view as articulated 
by those holding to an organism view of human persons, other thinkers have 
criticized the metaphysical foundation upon which the organism view is 
grounded.   These critics, most of whom embrace a dualism of one kind or 
another, generally approach the issue from a psychological-oriented view of 
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personhood.  They maintain that the problem with the current paradigm lies not in 
the brain-death criterion, but rather in the definition of the death of the organism 
as a whole.  In the following section, several objections to the substance/organism 
view are presented.     
 
 
4.5 Some Objections to the Organism/Substance View 
 As previously noted, psychological-oriented conceptions of human 
persons tend to be dualistic—often distinguishing between the psychological self 
which comes to be and may cease to be at times other than the organism with 
which it is associated.  Advocates of the psychological ilk often criticize the 
organism view on the basis of its inability to satisfy contemporary emphases and 
advances in metaphysics and biology.  While variations at the theoretical level are 
wide, a few instances should suffice to illustrate the challenges leveled against the 
substance/organism view. 
The question raised by some current thinkers regarding the traditional 
substance view pertains to its inadequacy in accounting for both biological and 
mental structures.  William Hasker, a prominent emergentist proposes a dualism 
based on the idea that the conscious mind, which constitutes psychological 
identity, emerges at a time different than that of the organism itself.  Representing 
a growing trend among some philosophers of mind, his dualism rests on the 
recognition that the unity of conscious experience cannot be accounted for by 
virtue of its relation to physical properties and parts.  He argues that if it is taken 
seriously the vast amount of data coming out of neuroscience, as well as that of 
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the phenomena of the mind itself, it is clear that a mechanistic/reductionistic view 
is unable to supply an adequate accounting of both fields of data.  On the 
mechanistic view, mental properties are properties of brain.  Although the brain is 
an extremely complex organ consisting of identifiable sub-organs, which in turn 
consist of billions of neurons, the brain nonetheless consists of these parts.  So 
whatever is done by the brain must also consist of “the properties of, and relations 
between the parts of the brain.”377  However, when the application of this is made 
to conscious experience, a certain incongruity results.  When one views a complex 
scene, such as a landscape interplayed with multiple objects, colors, and depths, 
the image is experienced by the person as a unity, not a cacophony of fragmented 
parts.  As Hasker notes, “It is simply unintelligible how this experience can 
consist of activities of and relations between parts of the brain each of which does 
not have the experience in question.”378  Something over and above the parts must 
be posited in order to account for the unity in question.379  This is best explained 
by a substantial form that organizes the complexity of the parts and their 
operations into a unified conscious experience.   This view is dualistic in that it 
distinguishes between the bodily substance and the mental substance, the latter of 
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which has some reliance for its emergence and operation on the brain and is 
indicative of the conscious self.  
Hasker objects to the Aristotelian/Thomistic substance view by noting that 
current biology has done away with the need for postulating form as the 
organizing and life-giving principle of body.  Reflecting on what he considers an 
untenable metaphysics, he notes: “Aristotelian souls are responsible for 
energizing bodily functions such as digestion, growth, and reproduction as well as 
for consciousness, sensation, and reasoning: this runs head-on into the 
commitment of contemporary biology to mechanistic explanations of such 
biological processes.”380  Hasker is suggesting that current biological 
explanations are capable of adequately accounting for the biological process
formerly attributed to form by Aristotle and Aquinas.  Implicitly, he suggests that
notions of an immaterial form responsible for bodily integrity are outmoded in 
light of contemporary biolo
es 
 
gy.381  
                                                 
380William Hasker, The Emergent Self (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 
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381Advocates of the substance view may respond in two ways to this sort 
of objection.  First, they might respond by claiming that it is a mistake to assume 
that scientific descriptions of biological processes constitute a complete 
explanatory account of life.  While the sciences can describe to us which 
arrangements are associated with certain functions, they are nonetheless inept to 
explain why the mere arrangement of material parts generates the kinds of effects 
observed in various organisms (much more why these parts should arrange in the 
way they do in the first place.)  Rich Machuga explains: “There is absolutely no 
good reason why nerve cells attached to a central nervous system should be able 
to feel, whereas cambium layers attached to roots and leaves should not be able to 
feel.  It is no use saying that nerve cells are necessary conditions for the ability to 
feel and since trees lack nerve cells they can’t feel.  The problem is that “nervous 
system” means a system which is able to feel.  Or as a mocking Moliere might 
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Other dualists, particularly those of a materialistic bent, consider the 
notion of a substantial form (or soul) an obstacle for the intelligibility of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
say, the reason animals are able to feel is because of their sentient powers!”  See: 
Machuga. 
Applied to other bodily functions, including digestion and growth, 
organization and causation are irreducible to physics and chemistry.  Indeed, these 
functions are only properly understood with respect to their functional roles in the 
organism as a whole.  Meaning, therefore, resides in the parts only in terms of 
their relation to the whole.     
A second, though related point, concerns the need for a unifying principle 
to account for holistic integration.  One view, sometimes called the genocentric 
view, attempts to explain organizational unity and causation through the encoded 
DNA, which serves as the ordering principle of aggregated parts into a whole.  
This view depicts a mechanistic and hence, a property-thing view of human 
organisms in which a single aggregate part orders and directs other aggregate 
parts to form a living whole.  Problematic to this view is that it assumes DNA 
molecules are self-actualizing.  That is, it assumes that since DNA contains the 
fundamental building blocks of life, which constitute the core elements of human 
persons, then DNA must also possess the capacity “to initiate the complex set of 
chemical reactions necessary for cellular growth and development.”  See: 
Moreland and Rae.  However, current genetic science reveals that this form of 
genetic reductionism lacks explanatory power to account for how the genetic 
program can carry out its plans.  Geneticist Francois Jacob comments: “[O]utside 
the cell, without the means to carry out the plans, without the apparatus necessary 
for copying or transmitting, [the DNA program] remains inert.  No more than 
memory of a computer can the memory of heredity act in isolation.  Able to 
function only within the cell, the genetic message can do nothing by itself.  It can 
only guide what is being done.”  See: Evelyne Shuster, “Determinism and 
Reductionism,” in Gene Mapping: Using Law and Ethics as Guides, ed. George J. 
& Sherman Elias Annas (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).  
 Additionally, Barbara McClintock realizes the shortcomings of the 
reductionist view when she writes: “[T]he genome is a highly sensitive organ of 
the cell that monitors genomic activities and corrects common errors, senses 
unusual and unexpected events, and responds to them often by restructuring the 
genome.  We know about the components of genomes that could be made 
available for such restructuring.  We know nothing, however, about how the cell 
senses danger and instigates responses to it that often are truly remarkable.”  See: 
Barbara McClintock, "The Significance of the Genome to Challenge," Science 
226 (1984). 
In other words, the mechanistic/reductionist view is unable to provide an 
account for how DNA is able to accomplish its organizational role.  Put simply, 
DNA needs a driver.   
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organism view.  John Lizza, for example, criticises Alan Shewmon’s position 
along these lines.  Recognizing that Shewmon evokes the notion of “a spiritual 
soul as what gives life to a body,” Lizza suggests that the idea of a soul containing 
in itself the capacities for intellect and will is conceptually problematic.  For 
Lizza, intellect and will are the defining features of human persons and in the 
absence of any physical conditions there is “no rational basis for determining 
when such a radical power or potency for intellect and will is present in a 
thing.”382  He suggests further why mere membership in the human species is 
insufficient to signify the presence of a human person.  For example, if all 
members of the human species have the potential for intellect and will, then it 
follows that one would be committed to count “Jeremy Bentham and the pharaohs 
(perhaps more completely preserved) as human beings with the potential for 
intellect and will.”383  These inadequacies, according to Lizza, render the 
organism/substance view lacking in its intelligibility.384   
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384A thorough critique of Lizza’s view, along with other consciousness-
based definitions of death, will be provided in Chapter Five.  Nonetheless, two 
responses are in order. First, the proponent of the substance view could agree with 
Lizza that intellect and will represent defining features of human persons.  
However, where they part company is with regard to what grounds a certain 
organism as presently having these person-making capacities.  Under the 
substance view, as presented above, the physical conditions in the organism (a 
properly functioning brain) are a necessary condition only regarding the present 
exhibition of certain higher-order capacities, such as consciousness.  Since 
substantial form is the organizing principle of the material components of body, it 
is also the locus of the ultimate capacities of personhood.  Thus, PVS and brain-
dead patients may lack the necessary lower-order capacities for the actualization 
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Two other arguments employed by J. McMahan demonstrate the difficulty 
of postulating organizational numerical identity as intuitively preferred to 
psychological continuity.385   The first involves cases of diacephalus (two-headed) 
twinning, in which the zygote does not divide completely resulting in twins 
conjoined below the neck.  McMahan employs the case of Abigail and Brittany 
Hensel, each having “her own private mental life and her own character, each 
[feeling] sensations only on her own side of the body, and each [having] exclusive 
control over the limbs on her side.”386  Although there are two distinct persons, 
McMahan argues, there seems to be only one organism shared between them.  
This suggests that, since the two persons, Abigail and Brittany, share the same 
organism, then there can be no numerical identity between them and the 
organism.  Additionally, since there seems to be no reason to think that 
                                                                                                                                                 
of higher-order capacities, but by virtue of their continued organic functional 
unity, higher-order capacities remain intact due to the continued presence of their 
inner nature, which is what makes them persons.  Contrary to Lizza, the rational 
basis for determining personhood under the substance view rests on the 
persistence of organizational unity.   
The second response segues from the claim that mere membership in the 
human species is sufficient reason to ascribe personhood under the substance 
view.  The implication given by Lizza is that dead specimens would also have to 
be considered belonging to the natural kind, hence possessing the real potential 
for intellect and will.  But clearly this is a straw man.  Recall that for Aristotle, a 
dead body is no longer a human organism, since it lacks substantial soul to inform 
its parts into an organized whole.  Hence, a dead organism is no organism at all, 
but merely the remains of parts, which naturally disintegrate into smaller 
compounds because they lack the organizing principle that once gave them 
direction and identity. 
 
385J. McMahan, The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
  
386Ibid. , 35.  
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diacephalus twins are different types of beings from persons in general, then this 
suggests that no person is essentially an organism. 
 A second argument employed by McMahan is derived from the example 
of hemispheric commissurotomy.  Hemispheric commissurotomy is a procedure 
in which the corpus callosum, which is responsible for communication between 
the two cerebral hemispheres of the brain, is severed usually to alleviate epileptic 
seizures.  Some studies on hemispheric commissurotomy indicate that when each 
hemisphere is presented with different stimuli, each can be unaware of what the 
other is experiencing.387  This suggests that a person’s consciousness could be 
divided.388 
 Based on this idea, McMahan suggests that if hemispheric 
commissurotomy were performed on an individual at birth with each hemisphere 
presented with different stimuli over the course of many years, this procedure 
would produce two different minds with different sets of experiences, memories, 
dispositions and beliefs.389  If this happens, McMahan argues, there would be two 
persons co-existing in the same organism.  As in the first example, since there is 
no fundamental reason to think these two individuals would be any different from 
any other human person, then there is good reason to think human persons are not 
essentially organisms.   
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  It is beyond the scope of this chapter to offer a thorough critique of these 
arguments.390  Most of these objections are given by those who advocate 
alternative definitions of death to the standard paradigm as advanced by the 
President’s Commission.  In the chapter that follows, attention will be given to 
some of these alternatives.    
 
4.6 Summary and Assessment 
 The focus of Chapter Four was on the definitional challenge to brain 
death.  Specifically, the overall challenge concerned the relation between the 
implications of the definition of death advanced by the President’s Commission 
and the brain-death criterion.  This chapter began by disclosing that both Bernat 
and the President’s Commission opted for a definition that centers on an 
organism-oriented view of human persons.  For them, loss of integrated 
functioning of the organism as a whole constitutes the death of the person.  The 
line of reasoning employed by brain-death advocates who focus on organizational 
unity typically represents a traditional, substance metaphysics.  The substance 
                                                 
390Specific to McMahan’s arguments, several critiques appear in the 
literature.  See, for example: Robert P. George and Christopher Tollefsen, 
Embryo: A Defense of Human Life (New York: Doubleday, 2008).  Patrick Lee 
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(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).  Matthew Liao, "The Organism 
View Defended," The Monist 89, no. 3 (2006).  Liao argues that with respect to 
the dicephalus case, that there are in fact two organisms though not completely 
independent.  In McMahan’s example, Abigail and Brittany each have her own 
stomach, heart, brainstem and spine.  Moreover, regarding the modified 
commissurotomy case, in somewhat parallel cases, such as Dissociative Identity 
Disorder (DID), just because someone has two sets of experiences does not mean 
that there are two distinct persons.   
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view represents a long and respected tradition that can be traced back to the 
philosophical anthropology of Aristotle and Aquinas.  It provides an account of 
the human person based on the notion that humans are valuable because of the 
sort of things they are, (i.e., organisms of a substantial kind).  
Further analysis suggests a lack of conceptual consistency of brain death 
with the substance view.  If humans are by nature, as substance advocates suggest, 
“rational moral agents” associated with a particular sort of organism, then as long 
as this organism exists, it remains identical to itself, despite its failure to fully 
express functions and activities normally associated with fully developed, healthy 
adult humans.  Rather than discriminate the self from the organism based on the 
present exhibition of certain favorable functions or activities, the substance view 
advocate asks, “What sort of thing is it that exists?”  Once that question can be 
answered, it is argued, one has sufficient grounds for establishing whether the 
thing in question is deserving of the respect due to persons.  In other words, even 
if a person lacks the ability to think rationally, due to lack of development or a 
disability, a person remains a person because of his or her inner nature.  It is the 
inner nature, or the substantial form, that constitutes the continued presence of its 
ultimate capacities. 
 If, as substance advocates suggest, a distinct human organism comes to be 
at conception, the substantial person comes to be, and through an internally 
structured unity develops herself to be the thing she is by virtue of her inner 
essence.  In other words, persons are what they are prior to the expression of all 
their ultimate capacities.  The process by which these capacities are actualized is 
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characterized by an internally driven orientation toward self-organization, self-
expression, and self-communication with others.   
 The substance view represents a claim of broad inclusiveness for the 
human community391 and achieves symmetry when carefully applied to brain-
dead persons by virtue of their continued organizational unity despite medical 
interventions to supplement functional loss.  Mechanical ventilation, the 
administration of vassopressors, and a host of other life-sustaining interventions, 
may portray dependency for life, but if the life of the organism as a whole is 
sustained, then dependency becomes irrelevant.  As Potts notes, “[A] ‘whole brain 
dead’ individual can continue to function as a unified organism, although she is 
dependent on machines…The brain dead patient’s dependence on machines, even 
permanent dependence on machines, for continued organic functioning is 
irrelevant to whether or not he or she is alive.”392   
 Advocates argue that the explanatory power of the substance view lies in 
its ability to account for the continued life and existence of the organism when 
technological support seemingly blurs access to the status of the life of the 
organism through the window of traditional life signs.   Because the substance 
view recognizes a distinction between lower-order and higher-order capacities, 
supplementation of lower-order capacities fails to constitute loss of organizational 
unity.  As long as higher-order capacities for organizational life continue, the 
organism remains the same thing it was prior to lower functional loss.  Since the 
                                                 
391Courtney S. Campbell, "A No-Brainer: Criticisms of Brain-Based 
Standards of Death," Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 26, no. 5 (2001). 
 
392Potts, 133. 
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substantial person is identical to a physical organism belonging to a natural kind, 
as long as that organism continues to exist, the substance-view advocate has 
sufficient grounds for maintaining the continued existence of the person under the 
brain-death criterion.  Thus, substance advocates who embrace brain death do so 
on grounds inconsistent with their own metaphysical categories.   
 Critics of the substance/organism view approach the issue from an entirely 
different metaphysical viewpoint.  Based on a body-self dualism, Hasker, Lizza, 
and McMahan maintain that the organism view fails to correspond to basic 
intuitions about what it means to be a person.  Whether these criticisms are 
successful remains to be seen, as there is considerable ongoing debate on these 
issues.  What is clear, however, is that the definition of death, along with the 
metaphysical foundation upon which it is based, is inconsistent with the brain-
death criterion. 
This analysis falls short in assessing various alternatives to the standard 
paradigm dominating the discussion over the past thirty or so years.  The 
following chapter will consider alternatives to, as well as modifications of brain 
death.  Particular attention will be given to the higher-brain model of death 
proposed by various prominent thinkers.  These models will be evaluated for their 
conceptual coherence.  In addition, attention will be devoted to suggestions 
regarding donation apart from the dead-donor rule, particularly their potential 
effects on the medical community and society in general.  Other proposals 
involving the adoption of conscience clauses for those who oppose the legal 
standard of death will be examined as well. 
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Chapter 5 
 
 
Advancing Alternatives to Brain Death 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The well-publicized “acute shortage of organs for transplantation”393 has 
led to numerous suggestions designed to increase the pool of organ donors.  At 
the heart of these suggestions is the idea that the current standard of death is in 
need of refinement either by way of extension or modification.  The fact that 
advances in technology have allowed for the creation of patients in suspended 
states has given rise to questions about previous conceptions of life and death.  At 
the same time, some thinkers recognize that certain of these patients are ideal 
candidates for organ procurement, given their greatly diminished physiological 
and cognitive capacities.  They suggest that an expansion of death criteria to 
include higher-brain death is better capable of meeting the challenges presented 
by patients in these slippery states, while at the same time furthering the prospects 
for increasing organ supply. 
  Others have gone further suggesting that death is indefinable on a social 
level and that social policy should allow for reasoned diversity on issues as 
                                                 
393Robert M.  Veatch and J. B. Pitt, "The Myth of Presumed Consent: 
Ethical Problems in New Organ Procurement Strategies," Transplantation 
Proceedings 27, no. 2 (1995): 1888. 
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personal as death and donation.  Although varying in detail, the common thread 
among these proposals, whether a motivating factor or logical corollary, is the 
idea that organ procurement ought to proceed apart from the dead donor rule, 
which according to the standard paradigm is necessarily connected to the 
definition of death. 
  However, some thinkers argue that society can better tolerate individual 
freedom at the definitional level.  They suggest the implementation of conscience 
clauses allowing for personal choice with regard to death criteria. 
  This chapter assesses various alternatives and modifications to death 
criteria put forward for the purpose of expanding the pool of potential organ 
donors.   In section 5.2, particular attention is given to higher-brain models of 
death.  These models will be evaluated for their philosophical coherence and with 
current neurological evidence.  Section 5.3 explores suggestions regarding 
donation apart from the dead donor rule, particularly with respect to their 
potential effects on the medical community and society in general.  Section 5.4 
considers proposals involving the adoption of conscience clauses for those who 
oppose the legal standard of death.  Finally, an overall assessment and summary 
will be provided. 
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5.2 Higher-Brain Models 
  Higher-brain models of death began to gain support following a 
landmark Lancet article published in 1971.394  J.D. Brierly and colleagues 
affirmed that neocortical death could be accurately diagnosed, and that 
neocortical death represents a sufficient condition for diagnosing permanent 
unconsciousness.  Since that time, several theorists have attempted to justify a 
conceptual basis for human death that centers on the permanent loss of certain 
functions associated with the higher regions of the brain.395  Though there is 
considerable debate as to what those functions are, higher brain advocates are, as 
Michael B. Green and Daniel Wikler note:  
“…united on the point that our decision about what constitutes the 
death of the human being must reflect what is essentially 
significant to human nature, and that the permanent cessation of 
(embodied) consciousness qualifies, since it is a necessary 
condition for any of the uniquely human capacities individuals 
possess in different measure.”396   
 
Since humans have much in common with other species, particularly with regard 
to organismic functions, the focus should be placed on functions pertaining to our 
ontological distinctiveness, including the capacity for consciousness, thinking, 
reasoning, feeling, and awareness.  And since these capacities are attributable to 
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the higher portions of the brain, it is argued, one need not assess the integrative 
lower functions of the brain stem. 
  Though higher-brain advocates insist that the mind must be present for 
the human person to be considered alive, they vary in focus on the required 
conditions necessary for personhood.  Some thinkers, such as Green and 
Wikler,397 focus on personal identity, which is sustained only in virtue of 
psychological continuity.  For them, the central issue is whether the conscious 
self, which includes a set of mental qualities such as consciousness, memory, 
character, and intentions, is sufficiently intact that one is justified in saying that 
the same person exists over time.  It is important to note that for Green and 
Wikler, it is not the brain tissue per se that is sufficient in establishing personal 
identity, but rather the “brain processes, carried out through microstructural and 
microfunctional registrations in the brain tissue.”398  Patients suffering from 
neocortical death have suffered permanent loss of personal identity since they 
lack the necessary qualities or functions to sustain their psychological identity.  
Hence, such patients are properly considered dead. 
  Respondents to this position cite numerous counter-intuitive arguments 
demonstrating its insufficiency for grounding personal identity.  The problem 
seems to be the difficulty of defining death in terms of the loss of personal 
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identity.399  Francis Beckwith provides a counter example to illustrate the 
problem.400  Beckwith suggests imagining that one’s uncle, call him Uncle Jed, is 
in a terrible care accident that results in him being in a coma from which he may 
or may not awake.  Suppose, however, that after two years he awakens.  Beckwith 
queries, “Could the physicians have killed Uncle Jed—the living organism we 
refer to as ‘Uncle Jed’—during that time because he did not exhibit certain 
functions or have certain present capacities?”401  If one holds that personal 
identity is contingent upon certain mental qualities or functions, then it is difficult 
to say why it would be wrong to end the life of Uncle Jed while he was in a coma.  
Since Uncle Jed, while in a coma, lacked the necessary functions for personal 
identity, ending the life of the organism associated with Uncle Jed constitutes no 
harm to him.  But suppose the personal identity advocate claims that what makes 
it wrong to kill Uncle Jed while in a coma is the psychological continuity between 
his past functioning and the probability that he will do so in the future.  However, 
pushing the illustration further reveals a difficulty.  Beckwith writes: 
For imagine that while in the coma Uncle Jed’s physician tells you 
that your uncle will come out of the coma, but when he comes out 
he will not have any of the memories, beliefs, or knowledge that he 
once possessed, though he will be able to regain his prior abilities 
and accumulate new memories and experiences over the years 
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following his recovery through the normal process of learning and 
development.402 
 
Now it is obvious that the psychological disconnect between Uncle Jed’s pre-
coma, coma, and post-coma conditions forces the personal identity advocate to 
accept the permissibility of ending the life of the organism associated with Uncle 
Jed despite the fact that he will retain his basic capacities as a human being. 
 Robert M. Veatch403 and Karen Grandstrand Gervais404 also criticize the 
view of Green and Wikler as insufficient to conceptualize human death.  Veatch 
suggests that some cases of dementia and amnesia pose serious problems for the 
personal identity view of Green and Wikler.  Under their view, psychological 
continuity would cease to exist in patients who suffered from these conditions, 
and by implication such patients have died.  Gervais agrees, arguing that as long 
as the biological substrate for conscious experience remains intact, despite the 
loss of past experiences in the form of memories, death has not occurred.  Veatch 
and Gervais both propose that designating such individuals as dead poses counter-
intuitive problems for the personal identity proponent thereby suggesting that the 
conceptual criteria for determining human death lies elsewhere. 
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403Robert M. Veatch, "The Impending Collapse of the Whole-Brain 
Definition of Death," Hasting Center Report 23, no. 4 (1993). 
 
404K. G. Gervais, Redefining Death (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1986). 
 168
 Veatch is well known for his advocacy of a consciousness related model 
of death.  As early as 1975405, he challenged the whole brain concept of death 
advocating in its place a form of higher brain death consistent, in his view, with 
the Judeo-Christian tradition.  For Veatch, human life, in the morally significant 
sense, is characteristic of “humans with ‘embodied capacity for 
consciousness.’”406   A human being, therefore, is an essential union of body and 
mind.  When the capacity for consciousness is permanently lost, as in cases of 
patients in a permanent vegetative state, the essential union is lost.  Veatch 
contends, “[A] functional body without any capacity for mental function lacks the 
essential integration of body and mind.”407  Hence, death in the morally 
significant sense has occurred.   
 Veatch’s model stands out as one that is less concerned about the loss of 
some mental function, such as consciousness or personhood, and more concerned 
about the integration of bodily and mental function, which he considers the 
critical feature of human life.  Given the fact that the term personhood is so 
ambiguous, disputes about personhood are irrelevant to the definition of death 
debate.  For some the term refers to all living humans, even if they have lost all 
brain function.  More controversial are those definitions that limit personhood to 
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humans who possess some key mental capacity, such as the ability to have a self-
concept or possess self-awareness.  Hence, some biologically integrating and even 
some conscious humans, such as newborns and some of the senile, would be non-
persons by this conceptualization.  Moreover, the term is sometimes applied to 
non-embodied entities, “such as the being that would exist if one could download 
an individual’s memories into a sophisticated computer.”408  Still others apply it 
to departed human souls, angels, and divine persons.  To the extent that the term 
can be applied in so many ways, analytically the question of whether one is a 
person or not has nothing to do with whether one is a human being, at least in the 
moral sense.  Thus, “Being a living human,” writes Veatch, “is totally 
independent of possessing either personhood or continuity of personal 
identity.”409  
  What this means, more concisely, is that for Veatch the definition of 
death debate should be understood as a moral or policy controversy about when 
certain death behaviors are appropriate.410  These could include, stopping life-
supporting treatment, reading the will, initiating life insurance payment, procuring 
organs for transplantation, etc., all of which were in the past triggered by an event 
called death.  Unbundling these death behaviors may be appropriate at certain 
times prior to the moment of death.  Indeed, as medicine advanced in its ability to 
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slow down the dying process, society recognized that certain of these behaviors 
are more appropriately triggered at different stages in a series of dying events.   
 What is at issue, then, is not merely whether all biological human life has 
ceased; rather, whether one has lost the “full moral standing” society affords 
equally to all members of the human moral community.411   Included in the 
concept of possessing full moral standing is a set of rights designating the duties 
certain other humans have toward these individuals.  Death in this sense occurs 
when an individual has lost his or her moral standing, and this is best 
characterized when the essential union of mind and body is permanently severed. 
Some have characterized Veatch’s model as a “functionalist” view,412 a 
charge that Veatch vehemently denies.413  Unlike Veatch who eschews any 
interest in the personhood debate, John Lizza argues that how one conceptualizes 
persons and personal identity directly affects “the evaluation of issues in 
bioethics, particularly the problem of defining death.”414  For him, higher-brain 
advocates like Veatch, Green, and Wikler rely on a problematic way of 
understanding the relation between person and organism.  Instead of focusing on 
persons as substantive entities or subjects, these thinkers identify “the person with 
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certain abilities and qualities of awareness.”415  This “qualitative” or 
“functionalist” approach treats the person as a set of mental qualities and has its 
origins in the thinking of John Locke and David Hume.  To illustrate this point, 
Lizza recalls the hypothetical case presented by Locke of the prince and cobbler 
who swap bodies.  Since personal identity is constitutive of psychological states 
and memories, if the bodies of the prince and cobbler woke up one day with the 
psychological states and memories of each having been exchanged, Locke 
concludes that the prince and cobbler would have swapped bodies.416   Hence, for 
Locke personal identity consists of psychological continuity over time 
irrespective of the biological substrate underlying the psychological states at any 
given time.   
Locke’s view finds contemporary expression in functionalist theories of 
mind.417  For the functionalist, mind is a set of mental states defined “in terms of 
causal relationships between a system’s external input, causal output, and internal 
causal relations.”418  In this sense, mind is similar to a computer program.  And 
since computer programs are capable of functioning in a variety of intrinsically 
different hardware platforms, minds, at least in the functionalist sense, are also 
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capable of being realized in multiple physical systems.  It is not hard to imagine, 
therefore, “downloading” the mind of an individual from one biological substrate, 
into a new physical support system without losing the essential features of 
consciousness that ground personal identity.   
Although Veatch acknowledges that a “disembodied mind that has been 
downloaded from a previous embodiment but remains capable of thinking, 
feeling, remembering, and so forth, would surely have some important moral 
standing,”419 he denies that his view entails that one must say it is the same 
human being as it was when embodied.  According to Veatch, it is the functional 
relation of mind and body that constitutes a human being.   Thus, the suggestion
that a disembodied mind is just as much a living human being as an embodied 
mind would be, is a conclusion that Veatch, “and most scholars within the Ju
Christian tradition, must reject.”
 
deo-
                                                
420  Moreover, since the hallmark of his view is 
“embodied consciousness,” a “body-swap” would entail a recombination of the 
two essential features of the previous people resulting in the creation of two new 
individuals.  Yet the creation of these new individuals would involve the killing of 
the two previous individuals, which Veatch construes as a terrible immoral thing 
to do.421  
 
419Veatch, "The Death of Whole-Brain Death: The Plague of the 
Disaggregators, Somaticists, and Mentalists": 371. 
 
420Ibid. 
  
421It should be noted, as Veatch does, that the idea of a disembodied mind 
is totally hypothetical, and until computerization becomes sufficiently 
sophisticated (if ever) such that a mind can be downloaded into a memory bank 
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Attempting to frame the issue in personalistic terms, Lizza422 contrasts the 
views of Veatch with that of Gervais, the latter of whom he argues invokes a more 
conceptually coherent substantive account of personhood.  Gervais argues that an 
intact biological substrate for consciousness is a sufficient condition for saying 
that a person continues to exist, despite the loss of all memories.423  In this way, 
argues Lizza, Gervais rejects the functionalist view, which she attributes to Green 
and Wikler, and embraces a substantive view that recognizes persons as the kind 
of things that can literally die.  Gervais reinterprets Veatch in such a way that 
enables her to equate his notion of human being with her notion of person—a 
substantial entity composed of mind and body.  Under this conception, person 
refers not to some qualitative or functional specification, but rather to “a primitive 
substance that necessarily has psychological and corporeal characteristics.”424   
Individuals who lack the capacity or real potential for psychological functions, 
e.g., corpses, anencephalics and individuals in a permanent vegetative state, are 
no longer persons, and hence are dead.  In cases of neocortical and brain death, 
Lizza suggests that what remains is no longer a person, but rather a “humanoid” 
or “biological artifact.”  Lizza explains: 
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By “humanoid” or “biological artifact,” I mean a living being that 
has human characteristics but falls short of being human, a form of 
life created by medical technology.  Indeed, this may be the most 
sensible thing to say about such a living being.  Whereas a person 
is normally transformed into a corpse at his or her death, 
technology has intervened in this natural process and has made it 
possible for a person to die in new ways.  Instead of a person’s 
death being followed by remains in the form of an inanimate 
corpse, it is now possible for a person’s remains to take the form of 
an artificially sustained, living organism devoid of the capacity for 
consciousness and any other mental functions.425  
 
Lizza further suggests that this conceptual framework comports more closely with 
the way many people would identify themselves.  Rather than identifying persons 
with their bodies, one’s common expressions and linguistic categories, such as 
“people die every day,” indicate one means more than “just our bodies or qualities 
of them.”426  Moreover, many would find it unacceptable, argues Lizza, to 
identify themselves with artificially sustained brain dead bodies.  While people 
would recognize the continuation of organizational life in these bodies, most 
would not view this life as the continuation of the person.  In the absence of a real 
capacity for consciousness, one’s intuitions would incline one to view oneself as 
having died. 
Relying on an Aristotelian notion of potentiality, Lizza argues that the 
sense in which potentiality is relevant to the definition of death debate concerns a 
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more proximate and realistic meaning of potentiality.  By this he means, “that the 
potential will be actualized in the ‘natural or normal course of events,’ or that 
unusual circumstances will not intervene to prevent the potential from being 
realized.”427  Not only will brain-dead humans certainly not regain consciousness 
in the natural course of events, the brain-dead body is not disposed to regain 
consciousness.  And in the absence of a particular functioning biological 
substrate, the potential for consciousness, argues Lizza, is extremely remote.  
In an attempt to contribute to “a much more robust discussion within the 
Catholic tradition,” Lizza suggests that the consciousness-related substantive 
account given above finds consistency with the thinking of some Catholic 
scholars.  He cites William Wallace, O.P.,428 as well as an earlier work by 
Shewmon429 as examples of those holding to a view that embraces the necessity 
of an intact biological substrate for the potential for consciousness.  These 
thinkers rely on Aquinas’s notion of “delayed hominization” which views the 
infusion of the rational soul as occurring at some point in the body’s process of 
development other than at conception.  Wallace suggests that “little attention has 
been paid to the obverse of that process” which might be termed “early 
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dehominization” wherein the soul departs from the body prior to the cessation of 
all bodily functions.430   Quoting Aquinas, Wallace writes,  
For it is obvious that in the generation of an individual human 
being one finds in the material subject first existence, then the 
living thing and after that a human; for it is an animal before it is a 
man…And in the process of corruption, first [the individual] loses 
the use of reason and remains alive and breathing, then it loses life 
and remains a being, because it does not corrupt into 
nothingness.431  
 
Lizza invites not only Catholic thinkers, but also members from all religious and 
philosophical persuasions to examine their traditions in light of the challenges 
posed by advancing medical technologies. 
To briefly summarize thus far, higher-brain advocates consider 
consciousness a necessary condition for a human to be considered alive.  For 
Veatch, the personhood question is moot, given the insurmountable difficulties of 
defining personhood in any satisfactory way.  Human beings are fundamentally a 
unity of mind and body, and when that unity is lost, death in the morally relevant 
sense has occurred.  However, for Gervais and Lizza, the question “What is a 
person?” is fundamental to answering many of the difficult questions in bioethics, 
especially in the definition of death debate.  For them, persons are human beings 
who have the real capacity for consciousness, a necessary condition of which is an 
intact cerebral cortex.  In the permanent absence of consciousness, despite the 
continuation of other integrative bodily functions through artificial means, the 
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person has died.  What is left is nothing more than a humanoid body, resembling 
the person with which it was once associated. 
Despite attempts to cast their position in substantive terms, Gervais and 
Lizza present a model more in common with a property-thing view of persons 
rather than a substance view.  Recall that the substance view maintains that 
substances are ontologically prior to and greater than the sum of their parts.  And 
while a substance can gain new parts and lose old ones, it maintains its absolute 
identity through change by virtue of its substantial form.  This is in contrast to a 
thing that is not ontologically prior to or greater than the sum of its parts—
examples of which include an automobile, a sporting event, or a computer.  None 
of these things is capable of subsisting through time by virtue of gaining or losing 
parts.  This view is called mereological essentialism, derived from the Greek 
meros, meaning “part.”  As J. P. Moreland explains, “Mereological essentialism 
means that the parts of a thing are essential to it as a whole; if the object gains or 
loses parts, it is a different object.”432  According to Lizza, when a human person 
suffers irreparable damage to his or her cerebral cortex (loss of a part), the person 
has lost the “realistic potential for psychological functions.”433  All that remains is 
a “humanoid” or “biological artifact.” In a similar way, when a computer suffers 
irreparable damage to a component of its hardware, it can no longer carry out all 
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the operations of its software.  What remains is nothing more than the 
disaggregated parts of what was once a functioning computer.   
While Lizza attempts to offer a non-reductive substantive account of 
human persons, a careful analysis of the terms he employs exhibits a position 
much more consistent with a reductive/functionalist view. On the one hand, he 
goes to great lengths to distance his approach from those faulty lines of reasoning 
typical of functionalist and reductive views of personhood.  On the other, he 
continuously employs the same criteria typical of those functionalist views he 
criticizes.  For instance, to assert that those who have lost neo-cortical function 
are “merely breathing bodies,” “not human but mere humanoids,” or are of the 
status of “biological artifact” portends of the very sort of reductionism he 
endeavors to avoid.  As one commentator has observed, “The semantic 
gymnastics that are employed in the argument…only seem plausible by the 
recurrent resort to criteria of a functionist nature.”434  This kind of “philosophical 
sleight-of-hand” is indicative of an attempt to sneak through the back door what is 
denied entrance in the front.  If human persons are substances who are greater 
than the sum of their parts, as Gervais and Lizza claim, their account falls short in 
remaining conceptually consistent with this claim.    
Another way to understand this problem is to consider the essential unity 
belonging to substances.  Recall that Veatch understands the essential unity of 
human beings to be that of mind and body.  In the event that no such unity 
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obtains, as in cases of brain death, permanent vegetative state, and anencephaly, a 
declaration of death is appropriate.  He also asserts that this view comports 
closely with the Judeo-Christian tradition.  The problem with this view is that it 
fails to appreciate the remaining unity, which is most evidently displayed in the 
organisms’ capacity for internal self-direction.  More consistent with the Judeo-
Christian tradition is the view that human organisms are substances by virtue of 
the internal relation of the parts to the whole.  Each part receives its identity by 
virtue of its irreducible function and internal relatedness to the organism taken as 
a whole.  This is why the organism is said to be ontologically prior to its parts.  
The functions of the parts reflect “the internal structure of capacities in the 
essence of the soul.”435  If one understands “soul” as the organizing life principle 
of the body, then the soul is “the efficient cause of the characteristics of the 
human body.”436  Various bodily parts are best understood as instrumental causes 
that the soul utilizes to actualize its various capacities and traits.  It therefore 
follows that as long as organizational unity obtains, despite physiological or 
cognitive impairment attributable to a lack in some part, the organizational 
principle, or soul, remains intact.    
Lizza claims conceptual space for his view in the metaphysics of Aristotle 
and Aquinas.  Recall that the argument involves a reversal of the ‘succession of 
souls’ in the Aristotelian/Thomistic notion of embryogenesis.  A necessary 
condition for the receiving of a rational soul (or ensoulment) is a sufficiently 
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developed body to enable its proper operations.  Similarly, when the body loses 
necessary structural integrity to support the operations of the rational soul, a 
substantial change has occurred.  Hence, permanently unconscious patients 
manifest only the operations (and presence) of either a sensitive or a vegetative 
soul lacking any capacity indicative of the presence of a rational soul.  The 
remaining body is nothing more than a “humanoid animal” or a mere “vegetable.”   
However, this view rests on dubious interpretive grounds.  First, the ancient and 
medieval understanding of human embryology, which is the basis for this view, 
was seriously lacking in development.  As some Thomistic scholars contend, “If 
Aquinas had known the facts of embryology he would have held that the human 
soul is present from conception.”437  Divorced from erroneous embryonic 
assumptions, the metaphysics of Aristotle and Aquinas, coupled with the facts of 
modern embryology, simply fail to support the idea of de hominization.438   
                                                 
437John  Haldane and Patrick Lee, "Aquinas on Human Ensoulment, 
Abortion and the Value of Life," Philosophy 78 (2003).  Also see: Stephen 
Heaney, "Aquinas and the Presence of the Human Rational Soul," The Thomist 56 
(1992).  John Finnis, Aquinas: Moral, Political, and Legal Theory (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1998).  Haldane and Lee observe, “The reasons which 
led Aquinas to hold late human ensoulment are basically four, three 
embryological points and one metaphysical. First, on his Aristotelian view, the 
male is the sole active cause; second, the material (the menstrual blood) upon 
which the semen (as instrument of the male) works has only a very low degree of 
perfection or organization, not even possessing vegetative life; third, as a 
consequence, the distance between the initial point (menstrual blood) and the end 
point (a body sufficiently organized to receive a human soul) is quite long.” 
  
438Haldane and Lee observe, “Modern embryology shows that the female 
provides a gamete (the ovum) which is already a highly organized living cell, 
containing highly complex, specific information, in the genetic structure of the 
nuclear chromosomes. This information (together with that provided by the 
genetic structure in the chromosomes of the male sperm) helps guide the 
development of the new living organism formed by the fusion of the sperm and 
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A second interpretive problem lies in the failure to recognize logical 
distinctions from ontological ones.  Jason Eberl notes that while Aquinas [and by 
implication, Aristotle] observe that when one “mentally abstracts the concept of 
rationality from the definition of a human being, the concept of animality will yet 
remain,” he in no way implies “that this is what happens in the process of human 
death.”439  A careful assessment of Aquinas’s entire treatment of the issue reveals 
a strong contention for the unicity of a human being’s vegetative, sensitive, and 
rational capacities residing in one substantial form; namely, a rational soul.  Thus 
the higher brain interpretation invokes an unnecessarily complex metaphysical 
explanation.  As Eberl explains: 
Accepting the higher-brain interpretation entails the following 
metaphysical description of how human death occurs: there exists 
first a rational substance informed by a rational soul, and then 
possibly a non-rational animal substance informed by a sensitive 
soul, and finally a merely living substance informed by a 
vegetative soul before its final transformation into a lifeless corpse. 
This description violates Ockham’s Razor, which states that ceteris 
paribus the simplest explanation of a given phenomenon – i.e., the 
explanation that is the least metaphysically complex by requiring 
the postulation of the least number of entities – is the explanation 
to which one ought to give assent.440 
                                                                                                                                                 
the ovum.  Hence the ovum is actually very close to readiness for rapid 
embryological development; it only requires fusion with the sperm and the 
activation that occurs with that fusion. To a certain extent the gradual transition 
from the simple to the complex that Aquinas sought actually occurs during 
gametogenesis (of which, of course, he was unaware).  Thus, applying Aquinas’s 
metaphysical principles to the embryological facts uncovered since his time leads 
to the conclusion that the human being is present from fertilisation on.  Haldane 
and Lee. 
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It is worth observing that higher-brain models of death depend on a body-self (or 
body-person) dualism that supposes the human person ceasing to be at one time 
and the human organism at another.  According to this view, permanent loss of 
consciousness renders the person dead, and the relevance of the remaining 
organism is contingent on the prior wishes of the person with which it was 
formerly associated.  A logical corollary of this dualistic view is the problem of 
accounting for the wrongness of intentionally creating unconscious cloned 
humans whose healthy organs can be used for transplant purposes or spare parts 
for the person from which the organism was cloned.441  Given that these 
organisms lack the potential for consciousness, and hence the usual rights 
afforded persons, it is not clear how the creation and use of such organisms for 
morally good reasons is morally wrong.  Dan Brock acknowledges this reality and 
argues that these body-clones could not be harmed since they “lack the capacity 
for consciousness.”442  Yet, he acknowledges, “most people would likely find” 
the intentional creation of permanently unconscious cloned humans “appalling 
and immoral.”  It is not clear, on Lizza’s account, how the moral repugnance 
many people would feel about this could be accounted for, given that his view is 
open to the moral warrant for these gruesome activities.  Alternatively, un
traditional substance view, not only is the moral warrant for the creation and use 
der the 
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of these organisms removed, but also an explanation for the moral repugnance felt 
by most people is more easily identified (see Chapter Four.)443   
  Finally, notwithstanding the metaphysical problems of determining when 
death occurs, higher brain death also engenders epistemic uncertainties.  
Typically, higher brain death relies on the accuracy of diagnosis of the condition 
known as persistent vegetative state.  The persistent vegetative state (PVS) 
diagnosis predicts a relatively poor prognosis for most patients.  However, there is 
a small fraction of PVS patients who do make subsequent cognitive gains over 
time.  In an effort to avoid prognostic error, some physicians make a distinction 
between a persistent vegetative state and a permanent vegetative state, a condition 
much more tricky to diagnose.444  It is described as a probabilistic diagnosis 
regarding the future and requires a substantially longer period of time to diagnose, 
depending on patient age and the nature of brain damage.   
  Recent reports of some PVS patients awakening years after diagnosis 
raises questions about whether society would be willing to accept a higher-brain 
death criterion.445  A report in the journal Neurorehabilitation, which documents 
                                                 
443While some might find counter-intuitive arguments of this sort 
unconvincing, they are nonetheless a valuable and common form of 
argumentation.  The point of this type of reasoning is not to offer a knock-down 
argument, such as would be the case with a reductio ad absurdum, but rather to 
appeal to as wide a range of intuitions as possible. 
  
444Fred Plum, “Clinical Standards and Technological Confirmatory Tests 
in Diagnosing Brain Death,” in The Definition of Death, ed. Stuart J. Youngner, 
R. M. Arnold, & Renie Schapiro (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1999). 
 
445Lauri  Martin and David Nancarrow, "Woman Who Woke up after 6 
Years Relapses," http://www.kktv.com/home/headlines/6347997,html 2007.  Peter 
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the arousal of PVS patients through medication, proposes further complexities 
surrounding the potential cognitive status of these patients.446  Moreover, 
neuroscience is changing previous conceptions that the grounding of 
consciousness is exclusively in the neocortex.  As Stephen Miles points out, 
“Consciousness requires neocortical activation by lower brain structures, although 
there is no clear understanding of the status of consciousness when the activation 
of the neocortex is destroyed but neocortical activity remains, as is evidenced by 
neurophysiological studies.”447  Indeed, some cases of persistent vegetative state 
may be a higher form of the condition known as “locked-in state” in which the 
neocortex is completely isolated.   
Complicating matters further is the cognitive state of patients with severe 
brain injury resulting in a minimally conscious state (MCS).  Distinguished from 
PVS and coma, the MCS “is characterized by inconsistent but clearly discernable 
behavioral evidence of consciousness” clearly differentiated from reflex 
behavior.448  Recently published data in the journal Neurology indicates that 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) can be a very powerful tool in the 
                                                                                                                                                 
J. Smith, "Coma Recovery after 19 Years Poses Questions About Terri Schiavo," 
http://www.lifesite.net/ldn/2006/jul/06070409.html 2006. 
 
446Ralf Clauss and Wally Nel, "Drug Induced Arousal from the Permanent 
Vegetative State," Neurorehabilitation 21, no. 1 (2006). 
 
447Stephen Miles, “Death in a Technological and Pluralistic Culture,” in 
The Definition of Death, ed. Stuart J. Youngner, R. M. Arnold, & Renie Schapiro 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 312. 
 
448J. T. Giacino, S. Ashwal, N. Childs, R. Cranford, B. Jennett, D. I. Katz, J. 
P. Kelly, J. H. Rosenberg, J. White, R. D. Zafonte, N. D. Zasler, “The minimally 
conscious state: definition and diagnostic criteria,” Neurology 58 (2002): 349-353. 
 
 185
evaluation of “awareness” of patients in this state.  The findings were so 
remarkable that Dr. Joy Hirsch, director of the Functional MRI Research Center at 
Columbia University Medical School and an author of the study, said, 
The most consequential thing about this is that we have opened a 
door, we have found an objective voice for these patients, which 
tells us they have some cognitive ability in a way they cannot tell 
us themselves. The patients are more human than we imagined in 
the past, and it is unconscionable not to aggressively pursue 
research efforts to evaluate them and develop therapeutic 
techniques.449  
 
One therapeutic technique, still in its experimental stage, is deep brain stimulation 
(DBS).450  Although some patients may emerge from a MCS and regain a greater 
degree of consciousness without intervention, others may regain cognitive and 
physical abilities through DBS, which involves the electrical stimulation of the 
thalamus.  Because of the extensive connections between the thalamus and the 
cortex, activating the thalamus may in turn reactivate the cortical functions 
resulting in an increased awareness of self, others, and the environment for these 
patients.  Though multiple questions remain as to the therapeutic potential of 
DBS, recent findings “suggest that patients in MCS retain the physiological 
substrate necessary for cognitive tasks at much higher levels than might be 
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450N. D. Schiff, J. T. Giacino, J. J. Fins, “Deep brain stimulation, 
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principle,”  Archives of  Neurology 66 (2009):697-702.  W. Glannon, 
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demonstrated by overt behaviors on clinical examination.”451    DBS provides 
these patients with an expressive vector to the outside world that otherwise would 
render them cognitively isolated.  These new technologies are challenging the 
degree to which our ability in the past to detect consciousness in many cognitively 
impaired patients is definitive.       
Recognizing the uncertainty of the capacity for consciousness in many of 
these patients, some higher brain proponents recommend that organ donation 
from the “permanently unconscious” be limited to those patients declared brain 
dead under the current standard.452  Since the likelihood of these patients 
regaining consciousness is nil, brain death is the minimal threshold under which 
donation should be permitted for the permanently unconscious. 
Despite attempts to maintain a consciousness-based definition of death 
mediated through brain death, the epistemic quandary remains a serious challenge 
for all neurologically based criteria.  Sometimes overlooked in the West, the 
public debate about brain death in the country of Japan evidences the relevance of 
the phenomenological perspective of family members.  Several reflective reports 
by writers who witnessed the brain death of their relatives document the personal 
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experiences between family members and their brain-dead loved ones.453  These 
reports evidence a kind of intercorporeal communication, in the form of 
stabilization of heart rate and blood pressure, suggesting the felt presence of 
relatives by brain-dead patients.  Another overlooked area relevant to the issue 
concerns the growing body of literature documenting the extraordinary reports of 
near-death experiences among patients in critical medical situations.  Reports of 
heightened, lucid conscious experiences of patients with flat EEG readings, lack 
of cerebral blood flow, and no clinical life signs are suggestive of an 
epistemological gap in the understanding of the nature of consciousness.454  
Indeed, to conclude that a certain capacity, X, is present through the observation 
of its corresponding activity, Y, does not entail that in the absence of activity Y, 
capacity X is no longer present.  It is therefore fallacious to infer that a PVS or 
brain-dead patient lacks any rational capacity on the sole basis of not having 
observed any rational or neural activity.455  To illustrate the problem further, a 
recent article in the magazine Wired reports that, despite advancements in 
neuroscience, “Almost nothing is known about how the brain produces awareness, 
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and current models of brain function don't accord with the little that is known.”456  
The article goes on to highlight five major problems that are yet to be overcome 
before any model can begin to be constructed for explaining consciousness.457  
These problems are so acute that the prospects of constructing a coherent model 
of consciousness based on the classic physics governing neuroscience today seem 
unlikely.   
In light of these shortcomings, some commentators maintain that the focus 
on defining death is ill conceived.  They contend that a social consensus at the 
definitional level is an unlikely goal, given the various perplexities surrounding 
death and donation.   Rather, it is suggested that social policy should be sensitive 
to reasoned diversity on issues as personal as death and donation.  In the next 
section consideration is given to the proposal that organ procurement ought to 
proceed apart from the dead donor rule, which is necessarily connected to the 
definition of death.   
 
5.3 Changing the Dead Donor Rule 
An important goal of the transplant community is to discover ways to 
increase the pool of organ donors in a manner that respects donor choice.  Given 
                                                 
456Mark Anderson, "Never Mind the Singularity, Here's the Science," 
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457These include: 1) No one knows how the mind is synchronized; 2) 
Current brain maps are of little use in explaining awareness; 3) The brain’s 
computations may be a trillion times faster than previously thought; 4) Our 
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consciousness arises from firing neurons;)5 Understanding consciousness may 
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that the number of patients waiting for transplants continues to rise while the 
number of donors remains unchanged, it is becoming difficult to realize such a 
goal without offering alternatives that challenge current standards governing 
organ donation.  Currently, decisions about organ donation are made in 
accordance with the dead donor rule.  Simply stated, the dead donor rule says that 
a patient must be dead before vital organs can be removed for transplantation.  
The purpose of the rule is to temper the utilitarian goal of increasing organ supply 
with the deontological concern of respecting persons.  In this way, two key 
protections for patients are supported: 1) patient choice, and 2) protection from 
“futile and callous medical intervention.”458  Moreover, the dead donor rule 
provides protection for the medical community in general and the moral ethos of 
the physician in particular by limiting the scope of intrusion into the lives of 
patients.  The practice of medicine is built upon public trust.  If the public 
perceives that medical practitioners are overstepping their boundaries to the point 
of hastening or prematurely ending the lives of patients, this trust is seriously 
compromised.         
Recently, there has been some discussion about whether the dead donor 
rule remains capable of mediating these utilitarian and deontological goals.  Elysa 
R. Koppelman argues that given the lack of consensus on a definition of death, the 
dead donor rule can no longer arbitrate between these moral goals, and in some 
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cases we are right to “sever the connection between determinations of death and 
organ procurement.”459  For those who advocate the dead donor rule, a consensus 
definition of death is necessary in order to determine the moral status of taking 
organs from patients.  However, since the concept of death is elusive, the 
establishment of a consensus turns out to be nothing more than a legal fiction 
created to resolve pragmatic concerns.  Koppelman writes: “The attempt to 
develop a consensus definition of death was unsuccessful largely because this 
effort was entangled with other social and moral agendas.”460  As a result, the 
moral status of removing organs in many cases remains unresolved.  
Accepting the premise that death is an ambiguous concept, Koppelman 
suggests two possible approaches to resolving the policy problem.  First, continue 
to adhere to the dead donor rule, “with its focus on the distinction between life 
and death,” and address how social policy should handle the lack of consensus.  
Second, eliminate the dead donor rule thus severing the connection between 
definitions of death and organ procurement.  Koppelman opts for the second 
approach suggesting that a focus on patient history provides for truer patient 
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respect without undermining efforts to at least sustain the current pool of organ 
donors.461 
Contrasting her view with Veatch’s, who attempts to embrace ambiguity 
and establish social policy respecting pluralism, Koppelman begins by 
maintaining that the rationale of the dead donor rule is to protect potential organ 
donors from a kind of harm, (i.e., the harm of being disrespected).  However, 
respect for persons is not necessarily achieved by distinguishing between life and 
death.  She remarks, “The point of death does not mark the point at which a 
person can no longer be harmed.”462  It is something other than life itself which 
entitles one to respect.  Thus, to focus merely on the line of demarcation between 
life and death fails to adequately ground respect for persons—it must be found 
elsewhere. 
Relying on the Kantian maxim, “Act in such a way that you always treat 
humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, never simply 
as a means but always at the same time as an end,”463 Koppelman argues that to 
treat people as a means is to fail to regard them as subjects, i.e., as persons with 
reason who have established ends or interests.  Disrespecting persons, therefore, 
constitutes violating their abilities to set ends. 
                                                 
461Ibid. 
 
462Ibid. , 5. 
 
463Immanuel Kant, “Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals,” in Kants' 
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (New York: Harper & Row 
Torchbook, 1964), 96. 
 
 192
Some theorists contend that many patients who are not dead would suffer 
no violation of interests “by allowing removal of vital organs before death.”464  In 
particular, patients in a permanent vegetative state, with no prospect of cognitive 
recovery, and patients whose planned death through withdrawal of life-sustaining 
treatment has been chosen as the morally preferred choice are ideal examples.   
Robert Truog and Walter Robinson465 “propose that the ethics of organ 
donation be based on the ethical principles of non-maleficence and respect for 
persons rather than on brain death and the dead donor rule.”  They suggest “that 
sometimes the harm of dying is sufficiently small that patients should be allowed 
to voluntarily accept that harm if it makes organ donation possible.”   To advance 
the case for organ retrieval from still living patients, Truog and Robinson further 
suggest the necessity of “shifting the key ethical question from ‘Is the patient 
dead’ to ‘Are the harms of removing life sustaining organs sufficiently small that 
patients or surrogates should be allowed to consent to donation?’”466  By doing 
so, the prospects of overcoming the problems surrounding the orchestration of 
death in NHBD protocols would be achieved, in addition to “optimizing bot
number and viability of the organs obtained.”
h the 
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procurement of organs, Truog and Robinson contend that the “concept of brain 
death will then disappear from textbooks, illustrating the degree to which the 
concept was never more than a social construction, developed to meet the needs 
of the transplantation enterprise during a crucial phase of its development.”468  
Some theorists have taken this line of reasoning further.  They argue that 
certain patients lack the ability to have any interests, and in such cases the dead 
donor rule need not apply to them.469  Lacking these interests removes not only 
the ethical harm of treating them as a means to an end, but also the ethical or legal 
obligations to continue aggressive care.  
Koppelman finds this line of reasoning misguided.  Relying on Thomas 
Nagel’s analysis, she argues that persons do not lose interests merely by virtue of 
their categorical position.  She writes, “The fact that a patient is brain-dead or in 
PVS does not mean that she has no interests or ends.  Clearly there is a sense in 
which there are still ends in such situations; what is absent is the person’s 
awareness of her own ends.”470   An example by Nagel is helpful here.  He argues 
that a man betrayed and ridiculed by his friends suffers harm even if he never 
finds out about the betrayal.  What makes betrayal bad is not that upon discovery 
it makes one unhappy, but rather it makes one unhappy because it is bad.  The fact 
that one may be unaware of the harm being done to him or her has no bearing on 
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our obligation to treat an individual as an end.  Indeed, argues Nagel, one often 
considers a person whose reputation has been ruined or whose will is ignored 
after he or she has died a victim of harm.471  He concludes, “And if people who 
have already died can be harmed, then people who are unaware of having any 
ends can be harmed too.”472 
Transferring this to the issue at hand, society’s obligation to treat someone 
as a subject of respect, as an end and not merely as a means to an end, is achieved 
neither by a focus on life and death distinctions nor by focusing on a particular 
moment in time.  Rather, the focus should be on a patient’s history in which 
personal ends in the form of interests and values are discoverable.  A person who 
has expressed the desire to donate organs and has an advance directive indicating 
the desire to forego life-sustaining treatment while in a PVS or if brain dead is 
harmed when he or she is denied “the opportunity to donate in a way that has the 
best chance for success.”473  In such cases, the application of the dead donor rule 
fails to help the patient achieve the fate he or she has chosen. 
For Truog and Robinson, the issue is framed a bit differently.  
Recognizing that brain-dead individuals are alive, in the interest of patient 
respect, they find it morally acceptable to remove their organs for transplantation, 
provided prior consent has been obtained.  To avoid the charge of promoting 
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homicide in order to obtain organs, they attempt to collapse the distinction 
between killing and allowing to die, a distinction well established in legal 
precedence and traditional morality.  They argue:  
In both ventilator withdrawal and organ procurement, the 
physician acts, and this act is the most proximate cause of the 
patient’s death.  In both cases, the physician is not morally 
responsible for the patient’s death—the morally relevant cause of 
death is the patient’s disease.  In both cases, the physician is acting 
with the patient’s consent in ways that respect the wishes of the 
patient and that are in the pursuit of morally worthwhile ends.474  
       
One might claim that the position advocated above would lead us down a slippery 
slope.  Once we accept that patients in these states can donate organs apart from a 
declaration of death, what’s to stop individuals who are perfectly healthy from 
donating vital organs?  Koppelman believes the answer to this question lies with 
Kant.   She writes, “Kant holds that treating people as ends is an obligation only if 
their goals or projects are rational or moral.”475  Hence, donating one’s organs 
when not in a suspended state is an end that is almost always irrational and 
immoral, while donating one’s organs in a suspended state is not.  Although Kant 
thought suicide to relieve one’s sufferings was wrong, he left open the question 
whether suicide to save one’s country or to escape impending madness was 
immoral.  Koppelman suggests that “ending one’s life in a suspended state by 
donating organs seems to be more analogous to committing suicide to save one’s 
country.”  While there seems to be nothing immoral about donating organs in a 
suspended state, donating them when one is not in such a state seems immoral.  
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“Doing so,” she writes, “violates the categorical imperative as it fails to celebrate 
or recognize one’s humanity.”476 
Respondents to the above proposal vary in their criticism.  Mark D. Fox, 
for example, suggests there is less ambiguity surrounding brain death than 
Koppelman suggests.  For him, the ambiguity concerning the criteria for brain 
death is less certain than the manner in which “we talk about states of neurologic 
devastation.”477  People often speak of brain-dead individuals as being “kept 
alive” by machines.  Although life-support machines may maintain their 
physiology, since they lack vital respiratory function, which is a necessary 
criterion for a declaration of brain death, these individuals are easily 
distinguishable from patients in a persistent vegetative state.  “Thus,” writes Fox, 
“our verbiage is more ambiguous than our criteria.”478 
As important as respect for autonomy is, the social context of 
transplantation often goes unrecognized.  The unique nature of the “gift 
exchange” aspect of transplantation cannot be viewed as simply a private act 
between two people.  It involves the entire transplant community, at a minimum, 
whose values matter.  Moreover, because transplantation “requires active societal 
involvement to be complete,” mediation between donor preference and communal 
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values is necessary for its continued success.479  Thus, given that the entire 
transplantation enterprise is dependent upon public trust, Laura A. Siminoff 
suggests the necessity of establishing a stronger societal consensus with regard to 
both the definition of death and the circumstances for organ donation—something 
that the above proposal fails to accomplish.480 
Robert Veatch, who is sympathetic to Koppelman’s (and by default, Truog 
and Robinson’s) proposal that “it is acceptable to take critical organs…from those 
who have irreversibly lost higher-brain function,” wonders why it is necessary to 
abandon the dead donor rule rather than simply defining “the persistently 
vegetative as dead.”481  If the dead donor rule is abandoned, he argues, not only 
would almost every state in the US and most jurisdictions in the world have to 
amend current statutes in order to declassify brain death as death, but “homicide 
laws would also have to be amended to make clear that procuring organs and 
causing death in these humans was not murder.”482  Speaking for the bioethics 
community in general, Veatch asks whether it makes sense after having 
persuaded, with great effort, “many legislators, judges, transplant professionals, 
clergy, and philosophers that these beings are dead…to do an immediate about 
face and retrain these professionals to once again refer to these people as 
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living.”483  And even if one were to retain the brain-death standard, legislatures 
would still have to address the legal status of the physicians who procure organs 
from still living, though permanently unconscious humans beings. 
Michael Potts and David W. Evans, in their response to Truog and 
Robinson’s proposal, offer two criticisms worth noting.  For one thing, the 
argument that organ removal from mechanically ventilated apnoeic comatose 
patients is seriously flawed.  They write, “When a ventilator is removed from an 
apnoeic comatose patient, it is the disease or injury that causes the loss of the 
patient’s ability to breathe spontaneously….The situation is different when vital 
organs are removed from a patient.”  When unpaired vital organs are removed 
from these patients, it directly causes the death of these individuals.  Hence, it is 
the surgery itself that kills the patient, not the illness or disease.  Second, Potts 
and Evans register their concern with the idea of doctors being involved in killing 
patients.  Since abandoning the dead donor rule involves a form of justified 
killing, they charge that such a proposal “fundamentally distorts the nature of 
medicine itself.”484  Given the fact that the practice of medicine primarily 
involves an imbalanced relationship between the health-care provider, empowered 
with knowledge and skill, and the patient, whose characteristic vulnerability is 
exacerbated when ill, the idea of physicians directly ending the lives of patients 
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“involves a dangerous use of medical power.”485  The danger lies in the potential 
for misuse of power, particularly regarding the weakest members of society, who 
depend upon the virtues of medicine for protection.  Additionally, despite 
Koppelman’s reliance upon Kantian rationality as a safeguard, as Fox notes, 
“Taking Koppleman’s proposal to its logical extreme offers no solid basis for 
denying an individual with decision-making capacity the opportunity to commit 
suicide by donation of vital organs.”486 
If abandoning the dead donor rule fails to conceptually satisfy the goals of 
organ procurement and patient respect, further exploration is necessary.  One 
particular avenue of thought suggests that balance is better obtained when patient 
choice is placed at the level of defining death rather than at overturning the dead 
donor rule.  Given the social values of autonomy and pluralism, some thinkers, 
such as Robert Veatch, have suggested social policy “that would permit 
individuals, while competent, to execute documents choosing alternative 
definitions of death that are, within reason, not threatening to significant interests 
of others.”487  Veatch’s policy invites a larger menu of death criteria that includes 
higher-brain death (or neo-cortical death) and cardiopulmonary death with the 
current brain-death criterion serving as the “default definition of death.”  This 
policy purports to protect autonomy in a pluralistic society and expand the pool of 
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possible organ donors under the current dead donor rule.  This approach is the 
subject of discussion in the section that follows. 
 
5.4 Conscience Clauses 
Recognizing the ongoing controversy over the definition of death is 
primarily a religious and philosophical matter, some commentators have 
attempted to restructure the debate by proposing new ideas concerning human 
death and organ donation—ideas that potentially may affect how future social 
policy will be shaped.  At the heart of these ideas is the concern for respect with 
regard to diverse conscientious positions about death, dying, and organ donation 
that conflict with present social policy.  This concern has already found 
expression in New Jersey’s religious exemption “claim” enacted in 1991488 
allowing for religious persons to choose cardiopulmonary death, as opposed to 
brain death, as their personal bottom line standard. The Act seeks to protect the 
religious convictions of its Orthodox Jewish community which opposes a 
neurological criterion for determination of death.  The state of New York also 
provides for some discretion, based on family objections to brain death.489  
However, the discretion is primarily given to the physician contemplating a brain 
death declaration, and dissenting family members are dependent on whether their 
physician will accommodate their wishes.  Until recently, the country of Japan 
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rejected brain death as a legal standard.  After much open public debate, Japanese 
law now permits the use of the brain death criterion, provided that the individual, 
while alive, has clearly expressed consent for both brain death and organ 
procurement, and this only after the family also consents.490   
Given the social values of autonomy and pluralism, some higher brain 
advocates, such as Robert Veatch and John Lizza, have suggested social policy 
conscientious exemptions similar to New Jersey’s religious exemption Act.  
Robert Veatch suggests an inclusion “that would permit individuals, while 
competent, to execute documents choosing alternative definitions of death that 
are, within reason, not threatening to significant interests of others.”491    By way 
of a statutory model, Veatch proposes a policy that allows individuals to select a 
definition of death, provided they choose, based on reasons of personal 
conscience, from a menu of “acceptable” definitions set forth in the policy.  As 
the default definition, Veatch elects brain death.  The policy begins by stating: 
An individual who has sustained irreversible loss of all functions 
of the entire brain (excluding cellular level and hormonal 
regulatory functions) is dead.  This shall be referred to as the 
“default” definition of death.  A determination of death must be 
made in accordance with accepted medical standards. 492 
 
In order to respect individuals who may conscientiously object to brain death, 
Veatch’s policy allows competent individuals to choose from two other 
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acceptable definitions.  The first is higher brain death, which the policy describes 
as “sustained irreversible cessation of all consciousness.”493  The second is the 
traditional cardiopulmonary, which occurs when an individual “has irreversibly 
lost all circulatory and respiratory functions.”494   If an individual, while 
competent, chooses one of the alternative definitions, that definition “shall serve 
as the definition of death for all legal purposes.”495  The policy continues that, 
“unless an individual has, while competent, selected a definition of death to be 
used for his or her own death pronouncement, the legal guardian or next of kin (in 
that order) may so do relying on substituted judgment in so far as that information 
is available about the patient’s wishes.”496  However, when no such information is 
available, decision makers must rely on a “best-interest standard”; otherwise, the 
default definition will be used. 
Veatch’s proposal differs from the New Jersey conscience clause in two 
ways.  First, Veatch expands the choices to include higher brain death, a 
conscious-based definition.  Under this definition, individuals in a persistent 
vegetative state, as well as anencephalic children, could be declared dead, since 
the capacity for consciousness for these individuals is virtually non-existent.  
Second, Veatch expands the conscience clause beyond religious preference.  The 
New Jersey conscience clause was originally crafted for Orthodox Jews who 
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preferred the traditional cardiopulmonary standard for religious reasons.  Veatch’s 
policy favors “variation based on any conscientiously formulated position.”497  In 
other words, individuals may choose alternative definitions of death for reasons 
other than religious.  Hence, the policy recognizes that individuals capable of 
formulating a conscience-based conception of death, for either religious or non-
religious reasons, should be given the opportunity to choose the definition that 
best fits their ideas about death. 
Veatch’s policy recommendation is commendable in its attempt to respect 
personal autonomy through the respect of diverse values as they affect personal 
choices concerning death and organ donation.  Public policy should be crafted in 
the broadest terms possible to respect freedom of choice in a pluralistic society.  
A favorable aspect of his policy is, to be sure, that it allows individuals who 
conscientiously object to brain death to opt out of the standard. Nevertheless, 
there are several problems with Veatch’s proposal that, on balance, outweigh its 
favorable aspects.  First, Veatch’s proposal includes higher brain death as a viable 
option.  This is unacceptable for medical reasons (See section 5.2).  For instance, 
there are reported cases of PVS patients who recover under exceptional conditions 
and develop the capacity to write and speak.498  Moreover, neuroscience is also 
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finding that consciousness may not be entirely dependent on the neo-cortex, 
which suggests the possibility that PVS is “the highest form of locked-in state in 
which the cranial nerve communication that remains possible (e.g. as eye 
blinking) when the brain stem is intact is lost because the neo-cortex is 
completely isolated.”499  Finally, the clinical tests to determine irreversible loss of 
consciousness are not as definitive as those for other death criteria.500  These 
medical facts pose difficult problems for the acceptability of higher brain death 
that by far exceed those of brain death.  In light of these concerns, it would seem 
that even personal autonomy fails to justify its acceptability. 
 Second, Veatch’s policy fails to correct the misgivings concerning the 
acceptability of brain death by reducing it to the default presumption.  Veatch 
attempts to dismiss the inconsistencies of brain death by relegating them to a 
simple exclusionary clause (e.g. “excluding cellular level and hormonal 
regulatory functions”).  However, the degree to which these remaining functions 
contribute to the body as a whole suggests that they ought not be so easily 
dismissed.  As previously noted, there is growing unease from both the medical 
community as well as the general public with respect to brain death as an accurate 
diagnosis concerning the body’s lack of organic integration.  Evident from the 
analysis of brain death in previous chapters of this paper is that the loss of brain 
function is not necessarily indicative of the loss of integrative organic functioning 
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of the organism as a whole.  Indeed, few seem willing to dispute this.501  Yet, 
Veatch’s policy not only catalogues it as an acceptable option, but also places it as 
the default definition of death.  With a growing number of commentators and 
medical practitioners calling into question the legitimacy of brain death, it is 
difficult to imagine how any proposed policy that regards brain death as the 
default definition ought to be considered good social policy. 
 Third, Veatch’s policy implicitly promotes a utilitarian drive to increase 
the pool of potential organ donors.  As previously noted, the primary impetus 
behind the Harvard Committee’s recommendation of brain death was to make it 
possible for physicians to procure organs under the dead donor rule.  Youngner 
and Arnold note that utilitarian appeals “were the only justification given by the 
Harvard Committee for their new definition of death” and “were being accepted 
into law and clinical practice years before Bernat and the President’s Commission 
came up with the first widely circulated, coherent philosophical justification that 
these patients were indeed dead.”502  Now that the conception seems seriously 
flawed, the means for procuring organs for transplantation is equally questionable.  
What is needed is policy that works to correct this problem.  Veatch’s policy 
recommendation fails to offer a corrective alternative, but instead continues to 
advance the problems that many commentators suggest demonstrate the need for 
abandoning brain death. 
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5.5 Summary and Assessment 
A common recognition among those who propose alternatives to the 
standard paradigm is the failure of brain death’s conceptual basis.   Nevertheless, 
as a means of retaining brain death as a feasible criterion, two general suggestions 
are proposed.  First, some higher-brain advocates, working from a consciousness-
based definition of death, suggest amending the dual standard to include a higher-
brain criterion.  The resulting triad (cardiopulmonary, whole-brain, and higher-
brain criteria) is meant to assure the permanent loss of consciousness and thereby 
increase the pool of organ donors.  Second, recognizing the uncertainties about 
the capacity for consciousness under the higher-brain criterion, others suggest a 
more certain way to guarantee that a patient has suffered permanent loss of 
consciousness exists in the current dual standard.  This, it is argued, removes the 
moral hazard of prematurely ending the lives of patients whose cognitive 
capacities are in question. 
Endemic to these proposals are questions regarding the ontological and 
moral status of the permanently unconscious.  Philosophically, consciousness-
based definitions of human life and death lack adequate explanatory power to 
account for society’s moral offence concerning the logical consequences entailed 
by higher-brain conceptions.  There seems to be no reason in principle to object to 
the creation and use of “humanoid bodies” for the purposes of medical 
experimentation or organ harvesting.  The logical entailments of focusing on 
cognitive capacity as a means for determining personhood status are at best, 
disturbing, striking at the heart of our moral intuitions about the value of human 
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life.   Indeed, one embarks on an uncertain path when society accepts certain 
groups of humans as non-persons, partially informed by the need for 
transplantable organs and the cost of continued treatment and care. 
But there remains sufficient warrant for questioning the acceptability of 
any neurologically based criterion for death.  Epistemological gaps regarding the 
status of awareness remains uncertain given the personal experiences reported by 
family members regarding brain-dead loved ones.  Working from a highly 
formalized, impersonal method of ascertaining the presence of a person, modern 
science tends to dismiss as invalid the content of phenomenal cognition family 
members experience with brain dead loved ones as well as the personal 
experiences of those near-death.  The dominant assumption driving most higher-
brain proponents is that consciousness is identical to brain processes, the activity 
of which can be correlated with neural events.  A closer look at recent findings in 
cognitive science, however, suggests that consciousness is not wholly identifiable 
with brain processes and that reductionism lacks the necessary empirical 
moorings many assume it has.503   
Due to the inconsistencies and epistemic problems of neurologically based 
definitions of death, it seems more plausible that death does not occur until the 
human body ceases to function as a unified integrated organism.  More consistent 
is the traditional substance view which maintains that the rational soul is not only 
the seat of a human being’s cognitive and rational capacities, but is also the 
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substantial form of the body and hence the source of its vegetative and sensitive 
capacities. 
Other strategies that emphasize defining death as a purely private matter 
out of respect for autonomy and pluralism must be measured by their potential 
effects upon society as a whole.  While public policy should be crafted in the 
broadest terms possible to respect freedom of choice, the question of whether 
exceptional cases translate into good social policy must not be shortsighted in 
deliberation.  For example, important consideration must be given to the long-
term pedagogical affects of law.  It might be worth asking how sanctioning a 
medical procedure (organ procurement) that directly ends the lives of patients, no 
matter how altruistically conceived, will affect the moral sensibilities of both the 
public and medical community with regard to the value of human life.  More 
specifically, if power is given to medical practitioners to directly end the lives of 
the permanently comatose, how might such a policy affect public trust with regard 
to the practice of medicine?  Or more importantly, would public policy of this sort 
unwittingly desensitize the populace resulting in greater intrusions into the 
prohibitions against killing?  These important considerations reflect the issues 
addressed in the remaining chapters. 
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Chapter Six 
 
 
An Ethical Analysis of Brain Death 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
To this point in this dissertation the analysis has been more descriptive 
than normative.  The task has been to identify the major areas in which 
discussions about brain death have taken place.  These include the historical, 
medical, social, and philosophical domains of inquiry all of which contribute to 
the overall framework and content necessary for an ethical assessment.  It is 
tempting to conclude that the development of medical and social consensus over 
the last thirty years is sufficient to establish the ethical acceptability of brain 
death.  However, this fact alone does not make brain death right from an ethical 
perspective.  What is needed is a careful ethical analysis that takes all the domains 
of ethical assessment into consideration prior to an evaluative deliberation.   
In many ways, this chapter is the most important, in that it attempts to bring all 
the relevant data from the previous chapters together in order to assess the ethical 
viability of brain death as it relates to organ donation.  
The procedure for this chapter is as follows.  Section 6.2 deals with the 
application of traditional medical ethics to problems revealed in previous chapters 
concerning brain death.  In section 6.3, the principles of biomedical ethics and 
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relevant case law are applied to the issue of informed consent for organ donors 
under the brain-death standard.  Section 6.4 considers the ethical feasibility of 
grounding brain death on pragmatism as a sufficient reason for its continued use.   
 
6.2 Traditional Medical Ethics and Brain Death   
It is important to begin by laying out the basic principles and concepts that 
have largely influenced moral reasoning relating to end of life issues.  While a 
thorough discussion of these principles is beyond the scope of this dissertation, a 
synopsis will suffice for the purposes of this ethical analysis.  In American 
bioethics the ethical treatment of patients at the end of life has been informed and 
shaped by two traditions.  The oldest of these is the Hippocratic tradition.  This 
tradition maintains that the primary duty of the physician is to do no harm.504  
This precludes the administration of poisons in order to prematurely end the lives 
of patients.  The Hippocratic ethos conceives the primary practice of medicine as 
the relief of suffering wrought by disease.  When medicine can no longer 
accomplish this end, the physician and patient ought to recognize the futility of 
medicine and withdraw or withhold its use as evidenced in the following two 
passages from Hippocrates: 
First, I will define what I conceive medicine to be.  In general 
terms it is to do away with the sufferings of the sick, to lesson the 
violence of their diseases, and to refuse to treat those who are 
                                                 
504Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical 
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overmastered by their diseases realizing that in such cases 
medicine is powerless. 
 
Whenever therefore when a man suffers from an ill that is too 
strong for the means at the disposal of medicine he surely must not 
expect that it can be overcome by medicine.505 
 
Thus, this tradition asserts that the purpose of medicine is to relieve suffering 
associated with sickness and disease and that when medicine can no longer 
achieve this goal, the physician should no longer employ medicine.  The 
implication is that the extension of medicine beyond its purpose could potentially 
cause greater harm to patients in hopeless medical conditions.   
Another important influence on American medical ethics is the Roman 
Catholic moral tradition.506  In conjunction with the Hippocratic tradition, Roman 
Catholic medical ethics draws out two important distinctions that remain well 
embedded in American law and ethics.  While recognizing an obligation to heal, 
there exists no moral obligation to extend life at all costs.  As the Catechism of the 
Catholic Church says: “Discontinuing medical procedures that are burdensome, 
dangerous, extraordinary, or disproportionate to the expected outcome can be 
legitimate.”507  The traditional means for determining whether care is beneficial 
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Hospitals (Kansas City: Sheed & Ward, 1991).  David F. Kelly, Contemporary 
Catholic Health Care Ethics (Washington, D. C.: Georgetown University Press, 
2004).  
  
507Catechism of the Catholic Church (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1994), 
549, as cited in Kelly, Contemporary Catholic Health Care Ethics, 129. 
 
 212
or not is found in the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary care.50
Ordinary care refers to any treatment modality that has reasonable benefit for the 
patient, as determined by the patient.  According to the Roman Catholic moral 
tradition, foregoing these sorts of treatments is morally prohibited.  Extraordinary 
care refers to any treatment modality that does not provide reasonable benefit to 
the patient, as determined by the patient.  These sorts of treatments may be 
foregone. 
8  
                                                
There is also the distinction between killing and allowing to die.509  While 
the Catholic tradition prohibits the direct killing of an innocent human person, 
allowing someone to die is sometimes morally right.510  For instance, a patient 
may decide not to employ certain medical treatments to prolong his or her life.  
Withholding such treatment, if the treatment is deemed extraordinary by the 
patient, is morally acceptable even though it will result in the death of the patient.  
In another case a patient may decide to stop a medical treatment or procedure that 
has already begun.  In cases of this sort, withdrawing treatment is considered 
morally permissible if such treatment is considered extraordinary by the patient.  
Finally, when the administration of pain medication contributes to a patient's 
death, the general consensus is that in such cases the intention to relieve pain 
 
508Kelly, Critical Care Ethics: Treatment Decisions in American 
Hospitals. 
 
509Ibid. 
 
510Kelly clarifies the issue when he says, “The norm is not that it is always 
wrong to kill and always right to allow people to die; dismissing the norm on the 
basis that it is not always right to allow people to die misses the basic point.  
Clearly, it is sometimes wrong to allow people to die of their illnesses.”  Kelly, 
Contemporary Catholic Health Care Ethics, 134.  
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qualifies the act as an indirect cause or hastening of death.  In these cases, the 
consensus views the underlying condition as the direct cause of death.  This 
distinction has a thorough basis in medical ethics and American jurisprudence.   
Consider, for example, the line of reasoning of the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Vacco v. Quill.511  The question before the Court concerned whether New York’s 
prohibition on assisted suicide violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Quill, et al argued that the refusal of life-sustaining 
treatment is the same thing as physician-assisted suicide, since the effects are 
identical.  Thus, cases in which patients desire to end their lives due to the 
prospects of progressive loss of bodily integrity and increased pain and suffering, 
constitute an equivalency with those cases in which patients refuse treatment in 
order to end their lives.  The Court argued, contrary to the respondents, that the 
distinction between letting a patient die and making a patient die concerns the 
legal principle of causation and intent.  Writing for a unanimous court, Justice 
William H. Rehnquist cited a plethora of legal cases and medical sources 
recognizing that “when a patient refuses life-sustaining treatment, he dies from an 
underlying fatal disease or pathology; but if a patient ingests lethal medication 
prescribed by a physician, he is killed by that medication.”  Furthermore, he 
argued, “A physician who withdraws, or honors a patient’s refusal to begin life-
sustaining medical treatment purposefully intents, or may so intend, only to 
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respect his patient’s wishes”512 to cease from futile and degrading treatment that 
no longer benefits the patient.  Thus, the Court maintained a patient’s right to 
refuse medical treatment and rejected its equivalency with a right to hasten 
death.513   
The application of these principles to brain death is further elucidated by 
the conclusions reached in previous chapters in which a careful consideration of 
the justifications and weaknesses of the brain-death criterion were considered.  In 
the analysis that follows, the basic thrust of these conclusions will be highlighted, 
although the chapters that address the various issues should be consulted for the 
full range of analysis leading to the conclusions.   
Any ethical analysis offered at this point must be based upon the 
consensus governing current practice.  Representative of the consensus, though by 
no means universal, is the current paradigm that includes the brain-death criterion, 
the tests for diagnosing the criterion, and the definition of death as the death of the 
organism as a whole.   The relation between the parts of the paradigm must be 
consistent.  If not, then certain ethical consequences will follow.  For instance, if 
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distinction.  For instance, they write: “Intentional actions and intentional effects 
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1994), 209.  But this is misleading in that it fails to be properly nuanced with 
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not the same thing as directly willing it.  While it is true that physicians are often 
causal agents in bringing about circumstances affecting the timing of a patient’s 
death, unless a physician uses known lethal means to directly affect a patient’s 
death, it is more proper to view the lethal disease as the direct cause of death that 
the physician has no power to prevent. 
 215
the criterion fails to furnish evidence of correspondence with the definition, then 
it follows that brain-dead patients are not dead and organ procurement under this 
criterion is the direct cause of death for these patients.  The argument may be 
summarized as follows: 
1. If brain-dead patients are not dead (i.e., the criterion fails to 
correspond to the definition), then the procurement of their vital 
organs for transplantation is the direct cause of their deaths. 
 
2. Brain-dead patients are not dead. 
 
Therefore, 
 
3. The procurement of their vital organs is the direct cause of their 
deaths. 
 
The second premise is supported by the medical data gathered in Chapter 
2 as follows.  First, it may be noted that the tests do not match the criterion 
(Chapter Two, Sections 2.3 & 2.4).  This is due to the fact that although patients 
may pass the clinical tests for brain death, a litany of non-brain integrative 
functions continues in many of these patients.  Hence, the tests have no 
correspondence to the permanent cessation of all functions of the entire brain, 
including the brain stem.  Second, the criterion lacks correspondence with the 
definition (Chapter Two, Section 2.3).  There is substantial evidence that somatic 
integrative life continues in brain-dead patients.   Although the length of time 
varies, some brain-dead patients have been shown to survive for extended periods 
of time, seriously challenging the somatic integration hypothesis which seats the 
brain as the organ of integration.  As D. Alan Shewmon notes, “Under ordinary 
circumstances the brain participates intimately and importantly in this mutual 
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interaction, but it is not a sine qua non; the body without brain function is surely 
very sick and disabled, but not dead.”514  Thus, it would seem that brain-dead 
individuals are alive since they continue to exhibit at least one integrative bodily 
system (the circulatory system being the key).515   
Ultimately then, the procurement of vital organs from brain-dead patients 
is the direct cause of their deaths.  With regard to the ethical and legal consensus 
detailed at the beginning of this section, it is clear that the procurement process 
constitutes a direct killing.  Since brain-dead patients are mechanically sustained 
for the purpose of organ donation, the surgical procedure is what ends their lives.  
If discontinuing life-support preceded the surgical removal of vital organs, then 
perhaps a different outcome would emerge.516   
Nonetheless, as demonstrated in Chapter One, in medical conditions 
commonly referred to as brain death, many life-sustaining interventions would 
represent extraordinary means.  Patients who have been diagnosed as brain dead, 
although still very much alive, will not long survive in most cases.  This is due 
primarily to damage to other bodily organs and systems prior to the onset of brain 
                                                 
514As Shewmon writes: “Under ordinary circumstances the brain 
participates intimately and importantly in this mutual interaction, but it is not a 
sine qua non; the body without brain function is surely very sick and disabled, but 
not dead.”  D. Alan Shewmon, "The Brain and Somatic Integration," Journal of 
Medicine and Philosophy 26, no. 5 (2001): 473. 
 
515Michael Potts, "A Requiem for Whole Brain Death: A Response to D. 
Alan Shewmon's 'the Brain and Somatic Integration'," Journal of Medicine and 
Philosophy 26, no. 5 (2001). 
 
516I will address this possibility in Chapter Seven as an alternative to 
current practice. 
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death.  As Shewmon once again notes, “The process of brain damage leading up 
to ‘brain death’ frequently induces secondary damage to heart and lungs. 
Therefore, the tendency to early cardiac arrest in the majority of patients is 
attributable more to somatic factors than to mere absence of brain activity per 
se.”517  In Chapter One, Josef Seifert argued that there is no moral obligation to 
continue life-sustaining treatment in such cases, although some may choose to do 
so.  Medicine, in most of these cases, simply prolongs life that may be less than 
meaningful to many patients.  The proposal of the Harvard Committee to expand 
death criteria based partly on the extraordinary and costly care needed to sustain 
brain-dead patients is thus both unnecessary and ethically questionable.  As early 
as 1957 recognition was made regarding the moral permissibility of withdrawing 
extraordinary care measures.518  Since then, legal guidance has been much 
clearer, specifically as exemplified in two landmark cases.     
                                                
The first of these involved a 1975 New Jersey Supreme Court case.519  In 
1975, twenty-one-year-old, Karen Ann Quinlan slipped into a coma and was later 
diagnosed as PVS.  Karen was admitted to an ICU and placed on a vent because 
of her inability to breathe properly.  Her parents were Roman Catholic and 
remained hopeful until a meeting in which Karen’s physicians informed them that 
Karen would not recover.  They understood the Catholic teaching as not requiring 
 
517D. Alan Shewmon, "'Brainstem Death,' 'Brain Death' and Death: A 
Critical Re-Evaluation of the Purported Evidence," Issues in Law and Medicine 
14, no. 2 (1998).  Emphasis in original.  
  
518Pope Pius XII, "The Prolongation of Life: An Address of Pope Pius XII 
to an International Congress of Anesthesiologists," The Pope Speaks 4 (1958). 
 
519In Re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A. 2d 647 (1976). 
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extraordinary means to prolong life and felt they knew their daughter’s wishes.  
With this in mind Karen’s parents asked the physicians to remove the ventilator 
and after signing a release form the physicians at the hospital agreed.  However, 
the next day one of the physicians informed the Quinlans he could not remove the 
vent unless they obtained a court order allowing the action.  Mr. Quinlan then 
launched the battle for guardianship of Karen and the right to remove his daughter 
from the ventilator.  The Quinlans lost their first round in the New Jersey Superior 
Court but they prevailed in the New Jersey Supreme Court and Mr. Quinlan was 
granted guardianship. The Quinlan’s attorney filed for removal of the ventilator 
under: 1. The First amendment: Freedom of Religious Beliefs 2. The Eighth 
amendment: Cruel and Unusual Punishment 3. The Fourteenth amendment: 
liberty principle.  The New Jersey Supreme Court agreed that the case involved 
the liberty principle concerning intimate personal decision-making and the 
ventilator was removed.  To the surprise of many, Karen was able to breathe on 
her own and lived for another nine years.  During the interval, Karen’s father did 
not want to remove her feeding tube, without which Karen would have died in a 
few weeks. 
The second case involved a U.S. Supreme Court case.520  In 1983 a motor 
vehicle crash left twenty-five-year-old Nancy Cruzan in a persistent vegetative 
state, permanently unconscious and without any higher-brain functioning.  She 
was kept alive with a feeding tube.  After seven years in this state, Nancy’s 
parents went to the circuit court on her behalf to ask that the feeding tube be 
                                                 
520 "Cruzan V. Director, Missouri Department of Health," (U.S. Supreme 
Court, 1990). 
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removed.  Nancy’s parents argued that if it was not for the feeding tube she would 
die of her head injury and the circuit court judge agreed.  However, the Missouri 
attorney general appealed to the Missouri Supreme Court and the decision was 
reversed.  The court ruled that ‘the state’s interest in life is unqualified’ and that 
clear and convincing evidence was needed when life was hanging in the balance.  
The Cruzans appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court and with a 5 to 4 vote the U.S. 
Supreme Court ruled that the Cruzans needed to meet that state’s clear and 
convincing evidence standard.  Later, due to the publicity of the case, new 
evidence emerged from some of Nancy’s friends who testified that she had 
mentioned how she would not want useless treatment.  The family then went back 
to the Missouri courts and the courts ruled to remove the feeding tube based on 
the new evidence, since it now rose to the level of “clear and convincing.”   
Nancy died within a few days of having the tube removed.  The case was 
influential in three ways: 1) State courts can decide to require clear and 
convincing evidence when life is hanging in the balance.  2) There is no “right to 
die” but instead a right to liberty, which recognizes the right to refuse any 
treatment, including life-sustaining treatment.  3) The case was instrumental in 
Congress passing the “Patient Self Determination Act.” 
In both cases, the recognition of the right to refuse any treatment was 
upheld as a liberty right based on the Fourteenth Amendment.  While recognizing 
states interests in the preservation of life, the prevention of suicide, third party 
interests, and the furtherance of ethics in the medical profession, these cases 
demonstrate how these interests must be tailored to the unqualified right to refuse 
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treatment.  Moreover, these cases ensure that this right does not diminish when 
patients become incompetent.   When applied to patients in a condition such as 
brain death, the right to refuse treatment allows patients or their surrogates to 
withdraw or refuse life-sustaining treatment they deem extraordinary.  This 
constitutional right also protects physicians from legal reprisals when acting on 
behalf of their patients who want to discontinue life-support.  Thus, it is 
unnecessary to employ the medical and legal fiction of brain death to justify the 
removal of life measures when patients or their surrogates choose to discontinue. 
The preceding discussion suggests several implications.  Specifically, the 
ethical and legal concepts governing end of life matters distinguish between a 
direct killing and the refusal of medical treatment, even when it is life sustaining.  
Regarding the status of brain-dead patients, since the criterion fails to comport 
with the definition, then brain death is not the death of the organism as a whole.  
Thus, to remove organs from brain-dead patients is the direct cause of their deaths 
and is unethical and illegal under the current paradigm.  Moreover, brain death is 
also unnecessary as a means for discontinuing life-support.  The ethical and legal 
parameters discussed above allow for the removal of life-sustaining treatment 
when patients or their surrogates make the decision.   Since in practically all 
cases, brain death is a condition out of which no one recovers, the withdrawal of 
life-support is consistent with the Hippocratic and Catholic moral traditions as 
well as with the ethical and legal principles set forth in court cases concerning end 
of life decision-making.  Nevertheless, the ethical and legal problems surrounding 
brain death do not end here.  They include the difficulty of honoring the informed 
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consent process, which is a hallmark of patient autonomy in medical ethics as set 
forth in American law.  The extent of this difficulty will be discussed in the 
following section. 
 
6.3 Principles of Bioethics and Brain Death 
The current approach in American medical ethics, which in some respects 
is beholding to the Hippocratic and Catholic traditions, is the “principle-to-
problems” approach as represented by Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. 
Childress.  In Principles of Biomedical Ethics521, Beauchamp and Childress 
propose a four-tiered principled bioethics aimed at providing a practical 
methodology for shared decision-making among a diverse people with varying 
views on place of values in medicine, religion, and philosophy.  The proposed 
four-tiered approach sets forth a hierarchy of principle-based rules founded upon 
ethical theories for the purpose of justifying medical decisions.  The theory as a 
whole promises to extend to all people and is not limited to any particular 
community. 
The approach of Beauchamp and Childress yields the following principles:  
autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence, and justice.  The principle of respect for 
autonomy includes respecting the values and actions of patients.  It involves 
disclosing information to competent individuals to enable them to act 
autonomously.  Disrespecting autonomy involves “attitudes and actions that 
ignore, insult or demean others’ autonomy” thus denying “a minimal equality to 
                                                 
521Beauchamp and Childress.   
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persons.”522  Therefore, in the context of organ donation, respect for autonomy 
requires that individuals receive accurate information about the procedure prior to 
signing organ donor cards.  Since the dead donor rule requires that patients must 
neither be alive during organ procurement nor killed by the procedure, relevant 
information pertaining to the current practice of organ procurement is required.  
In the absence of prior consent, it is ethically imperative that next of kin be fully 
informed about the procedure as well. 
According to the second principle of biomedical ethics, the principle of 
non-maleficence, there is an obligation not to inflict harm intentionally.  The 
concept of harm refers to “thwarting, defeating, or setting back some party’s 
interests.”523  More specifically, the concept of harm includes “physical harms, 
including pain, disability, and death” as well as  “mental harms and setbacks to 
one’s interests.”524  While some harmful actions may be justifiable in certain 
social circumstances, the particular emphasis is on “intending, causing, and 
permitting death or risk of death.”525  Thus, if the diagnostic procedure to 
determine brain death, or the process of organ procurement under the brain-death 
criterion causes harm in the above-prescribed manner, an ethical violation occurs. 
While non-maleficence requires the non-infliction of harm, the principle 
of beneficence requires taking positive steps to protect and defend the rights of 
                                                 
522Ibid. , 103. 
 
523Ibid. , 152. 
 
524Ibid. , 152-3. 
 
525Ibid.  
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others.526  There is little doubt that protecting physicians, who act for the good of 
their patients, from undue prosecution and advancing life-saving organ 
transplantation enhances the good of society in general.  Nonetheless, it is still 
necessary to require positive acts that respect the informed consent of the dying or 
newly dead.  By taking steps to ensure disclosure of the relevant details of 
diagnosis, process, and controversy regarding a medical modality is to act in 
accordance with the principle of beneficence.  When beneficence is pursued in 
this way, not only do patients benefit, but the practice of medicine benefits as 
well. 
Finally, the last principle to be considered is justice. Justice is generally 
understood as “fair, equitable, and appropriate treatment in light of what is due or 
owed to persons.”527   In the interest of justice thus construed, failure to disclose 
information necessary for informed decision-making is an omission of respect, 
which is owed to persons.  Equitable treatment requires that respect for patients 
and their families include the obligations of veracity, fidelity, and 
confidentiality.528  To dismiss the responsibility to disclose information for fear of 
an undesirable outcome is to fail to act with respect.  Furthermore, to deny 
vulnerable individuals respectful treatment just because they hold the potential 
means to alleviate other burdens is to act unjustly. 
                                                 
526Ibid. , 197. 
 
527Ibid. , 241. 
 
528Ibid. , 289. 
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The way in which these principles apply to the issue at hand will be the 
subject matter for the discussion that follows.  Since law, medicine, and ethics 
play significant roles in shaping social perspectives, it will be necessary to 
disclose how each has contributed to society’s understanding of values, rights, 
and justice as it pertains to healthcare in general and death and donation in 
particular. 
The place where these four principles coalesce, at least for the purposes of 
this ethical analysis, is in the area of informed consent.  The doctrine of informed 
consent has assumed a prominent place in healthcare due to several factors.  
Among these are the growing emphases on personal autonomy, the importance of 
biomedicine in people’s lives, and skepticism over “expertise” in many 
spheres.529  Medical ethics today has been largely shaped by the influence of 
these c
to 
 
 
n 
important case that was instrumental in bringing out the legal concepts for the 
                                                
oncerns. 
Over the last thirty years, a patient’s right to give informed consent 
medical treatment has been well established in law and medical ethics.  In
particular, the courts have come to recognize the following: the unequal 
relationship between doctor and patient, that patients have autonomous rights, and
that it is incumbent upon physicians not to deal with patients at arms length.  A
 
529President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine 
and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Making Health Care Decisions: The 
Ethical and Legal Implications of Informed Consent in the Patient-Practitioner 
Relationship, 3 vols. (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1982). 
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doctrine is Canterbury v. Spence.530  In this case a physician failed to disclose a 
one percent risk of paralysis to his patient, Jerry Canterbury, following back 
surgery.  A day after the surgery, Canterbury fell from his bed and the lower half 
of his body was paralyzed.  This court set precedence regarding a physician’s duty 
of care to inform his or her patient “of any risks to his well being” of material 
consequence (would make a difference) to the decision of the patient.  The duty 
itself is based upon the concept that “every human being of adult years and sound 
mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body…”531 and 
this includes the disclosure of information material to the decision-making 
process. The court further reasoned that “True informed consent to what happens 
to one’s self is the informed exercise of a choice….”532 Failure on the part of 
Canterbury’s physician to disclose a risk, no matter how small, or for fear that the 
patient might forego a beneficial therapy, nonetheless constitutes a breach of duty 
to infor
search and 
                                                
m. 
Further development of the doctrine is exemplified in Moore v. Regents of 
the University of California.533  John Moore, who had been undergoing treatment 
for leukemia, was unaware that his physician was using his cells for re
 
530 "Jerry W. Canterbury, Appellant, V. William Thornton Spence and the 
Washington Hospital Center, a Body Corporate, Appellees," in 150 U.S. App. 
D.C. 263 (United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 
1972). 
 
531Ibid. 
 
532Ibid. 
 
533"John Moore V. Regents of the University of California," in 51 Cal.3d 
120 (Supreme Court of California, 1990). 
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profit.  The plaintiff attempted to state 13 causes of action against the 
defendants.534   The superior court only considered conversion as the cause of 
action.  However, the Supreme Court of California, while not applying conversio
liability, struck a balance between a competent patient’s right to make informed 
autonomous decisions, based on the longstanding principles of fiduciary duty an
informed consent, and the need to avoid threatening potentially useful research 
with civil liability.  The court ruled in favor of Moore in regard to his comp
stating a c
n 
d 
laint 
ause of action for breach of fiduciary duty and lack of informed 
consen
 
 
 box on 
ute for the dignity of a conversation necessary for true 
informe
 the 
                                                
t. 
From these two cases a framework consisting of a duty of care to inform
and a duty to obtain consent emerges.  The duty to inform includes disclosing 
risks (including side effects), benefits, and options.  The duty to obtain consent 
includes ensuring that patient choice is made competently, voluntarily and with
understanding.  These duties necessitate a meaningful conversation between a 
physician and his or her patient.  Obtaining a quick signature or checking a
a form is no substit
d consent. 
There are several factors relevant to the ethical and legal principles 
discussed above that allow for an ethical analysis of brain-dead organ donors.  In 
particular, organ donors in most cases simply check a box on a form or answer a 
simple “yes” or “no” question given by an individual at a driver’s license office 
who, more than likely, knows little about the extent of one’s anatomical gift or
 
534These include: 1) conversion; 2) lack of informed consent; 3) breach of 
fiduciary duty; 4) fraud and deceit; 5) unjust enrichment; 6) quasi contract; etc. 
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retrieval procedures involved.  As discussed in Chapter Three, ambiguities in 
consent instruments concerning uncommon or controversial research on brain-
dead “corpses” constitute insufficient disclosure, particularly when public trust in 
the medical profession is at stake.535  To make matters worse, if the brain-dead
are not dead, then how are potential donors consenting to post-mortem researc
Given that the medical profession potentially receives multiple benefits from 
donors, disclosure is required under the legal concepts of fiduciary duty and 
 
h?  
inform
 
t 
tedly 
                                                
ed consent, consistent with the court’s reasoning in the Moore case.536 
In addition, material to the consent process is the fact that, should donation
occur under the brain-death criterion, donors’ vital organs will be procured while 
their heart-beating bodies are still warm, pink, and pulsating with life to the exten
that muscle-paralyzing agents will have to be used in the surgical procedure.537  
Additionally, donors should be made aware of the controversy surrounding the 
criterion, (i.e., that the criterion is based on an unproven theory).538  Undoub
this raises the related question of the extent to which donors are capable of 
 
535Mark R. Wicclair, "Informed Consent and Research Involving the 
Newly Dead," Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 12, no. 4 (2002). 
 
536Allowing donors to limit the scope of their anatomical gifts is one way 
to increase awareness, in that further disclosure would be necessary to satisfy the 
requirements of informed consent. 
 
537Typical anaesthetic protocol for the procurement surgery for brain-dead 
donors is anticipatory in regard to haemodynamic and hypotension responses, 
indicating the frequency of their occurrences.  See: Adrian W. Gelb and Kerri M. 
Robertson, "Anaesthetic Management of the Brain Dead for Organ Donation," 
Canadian Journal for Anaesthesia 37, no. 1 (1990).   
 
538K. G. Karakatsanis, "'Brain Death': Should it be Reconsidered?," Spinal 
Cord 46 (2008). 
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understanding the theory behind brain death.  As noted in Chapter Three, it is 
questionable whether patients or their families can understand the complexity
terms meant to convey various levels of cognitive impairment, the details 
which their own physicians may be uncertain.  Statistically, there is great 
confusion.  In survey after survey misunderstanding and doubt exist in both 
general population, and medical professi
 of 
of 
the 
on, an indication of which implies 
informe
 
it possible for potential 
donors 
y.  
 
ure 
                                                
d consent is seriously deficient. 
A lack of universal testing criteria for brain death (see Chapter Two) and
statutory irregularities (see Chapter Three) highlight the problem further.   The 
degree to which there is no agreed upon testing criteria gives the impression that 
the application of any set of testing criteria is arbitrary.539  Advancing the 
problem further are the statutory inconsistencies between jurisdictions, implying 
that the difference between being alive and being dead is geographically 
determined.  If medical professionals and law makers vary in the way they 
understand the criterion and its clinical application, how is 
and their families to know that to which they are consenting?   
Given these stark realities, it is unlikely that the principles of autonomy, 
beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice, can be followed with any consistenc
Although Chapter Seven will propose policy suggestions to attempt to rectify 
these problems, some of the groundwork is already being laid.  Respect for patient
autonomy requires that patients receive accurate information about the proced
prior to signing organ donor cards.  While there may be no intention to cause 
 
539E. F. Wijdicks, "The Diagnosis of Brain Death," New England Journal 
of Medicine 344 (2001). 
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harm (nonmaleficence) in withholding such information, certain non-intention
harms, such as the bodily interests of patients and the veracity of the medical
profession, both of which concern states’ interests, are compromised.   Both 
beneficence and justice require taking steps to ensure disclosure of the relevant 
details of diagnosis, process, and controversy regarding a medical modality.  To 
fail to do so is to fail to act equitably for patients and their families in a way th
is reflective of the obligations of veracity, fidelity, and confidentiality.  As is 
evident from this discussion, it is qu
al 
 
at 
estionable whether these principles can be 
followe
rn 
 
y 
t 
ical 
ng to a 
patient’
d under the current system. 
Some might argue that donation would be seriously compromised should 
disclosure to the extent as suggested above is implemented—a legitimate conce
echoed in the Moore case regarding the need to avoid undermining potentially
useful research and life-saving therapy.  Closer examination from previousl
discussed case law is helpful here.  As the court reasoned in Canterbury v. 
Spence, a physician’s duty of care to inform his or her patient “of any risks to his 
well being” is predicated on the well-established concept that all competent adul
persons have bodily rights determined solely by the individual, not the med
profession.  Withholding any information material to the decision-making 
progress constitutes a breach of duty to inform, even if such disclosure may 
diminish the willingness of a patient to consent.  Thus, failure to inform, even 
when a physician judges the information irrelevant or potentially threateni
s consenting to a medical procedure is both unethical and illegal.  
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As the preceding discussion demonstrates, it is unlikely that informed 
consent for organ donors under the brain-death criterion is obtainable.  
Consideration of the medical and social reality of brain death as applied to the 
principles of biomedical ethics and case law renders the process of informed 
consent practically impossible to achieve.  This calls into question the ethical an
legal veracity of organ donation under the brain-death standard.  Nonetheless, 
some brain death advocates continue to suppo
d 
rt its application based primarily 
pon its pragmatic benefits.  Whether these justifications are ethically feasible 
ows. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
u
will be discussed in the section that foll
6.4 Pragmatism and Brain Death 
As the historical analysis in Chapter One discloses, it is evident that
supporters of brain death have assumed, either implicitly or explicitly, the 
sufficiency of a pragmatic basis for justifying its use in medical practice.  
Pragmatism is the idea that truth or value is determined by practical results that 
further specific aims.  It is an “empirically based philosophy that defines 
knowledge and truth in terms of practical consequences.”540  Although there are
differing forms of pragmatism,541 the best known of the so-called neo-pragmatists
is Richard Rorty.  According to Rorty, the longstanding traditional view (from 
 
540Douglas J. Soccio, Archetypes of Wisdom: An Introduction to 
Philosophy (Belmont: Wadsworth, 2001), 550. 
 
541Early pragmatists include William James (1842-1910), Charles Sanders 
Price (1839-1914), and Johen Dewey (1859-1952).  More recently, the following 
thinkers are considered pragmatic philosophers: Hilary Putnam, Nochols Rescher, 
Jurgen Habermas, Susan Haack, Robert Brandom, and Cornel West. 
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Plato to present day) that truth is correspondence to reality is positively mistaken 
and should be abandoned.  Consequently, writes Rorty, “For the pragmatist, true 
sentences are not true because they correspond to reality, and so there is no need 
to worry what sort of reality, if any, a given sentence corresponds to—no nee
worry about what ‘makes’ it true.”
d to 
ntialist 
 to 
t, it 
s, and, 
definition of death” and “were being accepted into law and clinical practice years 
before Bernat and the President’s Commission came up with the first widely 
                                                
542  Pragmatism, therefore, is anti-esse
and anti-foundationalist.  Notions of progress toward an objective reality or 
internal coherence are illusory.  Simply put, truth is not something to be 
discovered, but rather is constructed by the vocabulary or concepts one brings
the world in efforts to effect desired results.543  Commenting along these lines, 
Youngner and Arnold observe how the Harvard Committee justified its new 
criterion on what it could accomplish for the medical field.  They write: “Firs
allowed physicians to turn off respirators without fear of legal consequence
second, it allowed organ procurement without violating the dead donor rule 
(patients must neither be alive when organs are removed nor killed by the 
process.)”544  They further observe that these pragmatic and utilitarian appeals 
“were the only justification given by the Harvard Committee for their new 
 
542Richard Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1982), 16. 
 
543Noteworthy is the fact that some pragmatists, including Rorty, do not 
see coherence as a necessary condition for the truth either. 
 
544Stuart J. Youngner and Robert M. Arnold, "Philosophical Debates 
About the Definition of Death: Who Cares?" Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 
26, no. 5 (2001): 533. 
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circulated, coherent philosophical justification that these patients were indeed 
dead.”545   
Those who maintain that the current legal standard on death has worked 
and does not require that society should “rethink brain death,” do so largely on the 
basis of its pragmatic success.  The means for measuring success is determined 
exclusively on its social acceptance, its avoidance of legal challenges and its 
success in procuring organs for transplantation, not on whether it is theoretically 
coherent and understandable for satisfying informed consent.546   
In arguing against the conceptual and medical coherence of brain death, 
some critics nonetheless promote organ donation on pragmatic grounds.  
Capitalizing on surveys of an (arguably) uninformed public, Truog suggests that 
society no longer needs the legal fiction of brain death to retrieve organs for 
donation.547  Since both brain death and the dead donor rule no longer represent 
the views of the public, then the door to organ retrieval from consenting patients 
prior to a diagnosis of death becomes a viable alternative.  
Along similar lines, other thinkers propose that “death is ultimately a 
social construct” that can be altered in accordance with desired outcomes or 
                                                 
545Ibid.  
 
546Alexander Morgan Capron, “The Bifurcated Legal Standard for 
Determining Death: Does It Work?,” in The Definition of Death, ed. Stuart J. 
Youngner, Robert M. Arnold, and Renie Schapiro (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1999). D. Wikler, "Brain Death: A Durable Consensus," 
Bioethics 7 (1993). 
 
547Robert D. Truog, "Is It Time to Abandon Brain Death?," Hasting 
Center Report 27, no. 1 (1997).  Robert D. Truog, "Organ Donation without Brain 
Death?," Hasting Center Report 35, no. 6 (2005). 
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goals.548  Those who view death in this way often do so on the basis that notions 
of personhood are socially constructed as well.  Lizza, for example, suggests, 
“Personhood is a dynamic concept that is subject to change in light of new 
knowledge and possibilities.”549   Thus, personhood and definitions of death are 
subject to changing paradigms as “new knowledge and possibilities” construct 
new social norms.  
Several points can be made, however, that call into question the 
sufficiency of such reasoning.  One concerns the argument from consensus.  
Although brain death is accepted by many religions and is legal in many 
countries, there is something deceiving about the way in which such a consensus 
has been achieved.  As Ari R. Joffe remarks: 
This general acceptance of BD [brain death] by non-medical 
society suggests the concept is sound.  However, this is a circular 
argument.  A primary reason law and religion have accepted BD is 
that the medical profession informed the public that BD is the 
irreversible loss of integration of the organism as a whole, and of 
all brain (including brain stem) functions…these are now known to 
be mistaken facts.550 
 
Added to this problem is the fact that the legal and social acceptance of brain 
death is not a philosophical argument as much as a locus for philosophical 
investigation.  As Joseph Koterski remarks, “Neither legal nor social reception of 
                                                 
548Youngner and Arnold, 532. 
 
549John P. Lizza, Persons, Humanity, and the Definition of Death 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 49. 
 
550Ari R. Joffe, "The Neurological Determination of Death: What Does it 
Really Mean?" Issues in Law and Medicine 32, no. 2 (2007): 17-18. 
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a definition can make something to be the case if the reality is otherwise.”551  To 
suggest, as the pragmatist does, that our notions of death and personhood are 
temporally relative to the changing paradigms of societal norms apart from any 
objective standard invites the possibilities of gross injustices.  Koterski notes how 
the same culture that “tolerated slavery and allowed some human beings to be 
treated as if they were property rather than persons with unalienable rights has 
sometimes later come to recognize the gross injustice of such a practice.”552  The 
shift in understanding, however, if it is not one that is guided by a clearer picture 
of the ontological status of the beings in question, can just as likely be reversed, 
or worse, lead to a slippery slope in which other beings are devalued resulting in 
further injustices.  Koterski contends the central problem is that the pragmatist 
“Confuses the cultural question of our social esteem for persons with the 
ontological question of the presence or absence of personhood.”  Continuing, he 
writes, “…The shift that one witnesses in any such change in social awareness 
and moral understanding ‘in light of new knowledge and possibilities’ in no way 
changes the ontological status of the beings in question—either they were already 
persons or they were not.”553  
Aside from the metaphysical problems this objection raises, the slippery 
slope argument is worth exploring in some detail.  There are those who fear that if 
                                                 
551Joseph Koterski, "Book Review of John Lizza's Persons, Humanity, and 
the Definition of Death.," International Philosophical Quarterly 47, no. 3 (2007): 
387. 
 
552Ibid. , 386. 
 
553Ibid. , 386. 
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concessions are made with regard to the moral or ontological status of certain 
cognitively impaired human beings, the path to devaluing other less impaired 
individuals becomes dangerously more probable.554  In other words, even those 
who are severely mentally ill and unable to interact with others or their 
environment might be considered dead.  However, others retort that the likelihood 
of “a public that is quite accepting of whole-brain death would ever come to 
believe that the profoundly retarded or senile are dead” is highly improbable.555  
But given the social realities of the past, the slippery slope argument cannot be 
ignored.  Edmund Pellegrino warns against ignoring the past with respect to the 
potential of failing to appreciate the consequences of moral compromise 
indicative of pragmatic concessions when he remarks: 
In any case, the slippery slope is not a myth.  Historically it has 
been a reality in world affairs.  Once a moral precept is breached a 
psychological and logical process is set in motion which follows 
what I would call the law of infinite regress of moral exceptions.  
One exception leads logically and psychologically to another.  In 
small increments a moral norm eventually obliterates itself.  The 
process always begins with some putative reason, like compassion, 
freedom of choice, or liberty.  By small increments it overwhelms 
its own justifications.  The histories of the French Revolution, the 
Holocaust, and partial birth abortion are representative 
examples.556 
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In addition, the slippery slope may be aided by the use of euphemisms, which 
have the potential to shape the way society thinks about issues in healthcare.557  
The steady use of reductive terminology of the brain dead such as, “humanoids,” 
“merely breathing bodies,” “remains,” “biological artifacts”, and “biomorts”558 
has over time weakened previous resistance to accept that the brain-dead patient is 
dead.559  Furthering the slippery slope of social acceptance is the influence of 
physicians on their patients and the influence of law on both.  Law does have 
pedagogical and psychological effects on behavior and opinion.560  Once a 
standard of behavior is either embraced or rejected by law, the potential for 
societal desensitization (or sensitization) of certain behaviors and thought patterns 
is present.  Great care must be taken in contemplating the influence the change in 
longstanding proscriptions might entail.  While the pragmatist might intend to 
satisfy an important goal, shortsightedness may entail non-intended consequences.  
As the old adage reminds, “Before you tear down a fence, pause long enough to 
find out why it was put up in the first place.” 
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Perhaps the most fatal challenge to the sufficiency of a pragmatic moral 
justification lies in its own self-stultification.  In recent years several leading 
philosophers are now endorsing their contentions that the prospects of a moral 
system built upon pragmatic principles is bleak, if not impossible.561  The 
problem resides in the wholesale rejection of metaphysical realism without w
no standards of objectivity exist.  In the course of denying any objective standard, 
the pragmatist, in sense, has cut off the branch upon which he or she stands.  In 
his noteworthy volume entitled, The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy, 
Hilary Putnam takes Rorty to task for failing to inquire into the unintelligibility 
the sort of metaphysical realism he rejects.  Such a failure is endemic to Rorty
consideration of other sorts of realism, and more importantly, undermines the 
intelligibility of his own position.   As Putnam remarks, “…if it is unintelligible to 
say that we sometimes succeed in representing things as they are in themselves, 
then it is equally unintelligible to say that we never succeed in representing things 
as they are in themselves.”
hich 
of 
’s 
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application.  Thus, pragmatism can offer no compelling reason as to why it should 
be accepted as a viable theory. 
All this is brought out more fully, however, in the deleterious logical 
consequences of a society that embraces unstintingly the principles of 
pragmatism.  Commenting along these lines, Leszek Kolakowski notes that when 
a real distinction between good and evil, independent of our decisions is 
renounced, “then no moral boundary prevents us from engaging in any action for 
no better reason than that it promotes the success of a tendency which, by 
definition, will be legitimate if it succeeds, even if it carries the name of Hitler or 
Stalin.”563  Documenting the real-world consequences of a worldview divested of 
any a priori moral principles, Edward A. Purcell in his noteworthy volume, The 
Crisis of Democratic Theory564, traces the surrogation of traditional legal theory 
with legal realism.  Like pragmatism, legal realism divests the world of all 
absolute structures thereby reducing all economic, political, ethical, and 
theological systems to “symbols of government” conjured by men to “explain the 
world in terms that pleased them.” 565  While useful, these symbols are false and 
contradictory.  Thus the only real laws were the completed actions of government 
officials.  Such notions remained unchallenged until the totalitarian regimes of the 
Second World War posed a serious threat to neighboring nations.  Yet the position 
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of the legal realists not only deprived them of any standard by which to criticize 
or condemn Nazi terror, but actually sanctioned as law the horrific acts of the 
Nazis.  In short, the denial of any referential standards outside, as it were, of all 
cultures and systems of government undermines any inducements of avoidance or 
condemnation.  Once a system is criticized or condemned, it may be taken as an 
explicit admission of an external order.  Chantal Delsol poignantly expresses this 
point on an individual level when she writes: 
The identification of an absolute evil forces us to believe that an 
order exists beyond our will, beyond our capacity as creators of 
order.  This identification puts into doubt not only the subjective 
morality of our times, but the very possibility if its being.  We 
cannot decree that each individual has the sovereignty to invent his 
own values and at the same time point our finger at an intolerable 
and permanent universal.  We cannot proclaim, “To each his own 
morality,” and at the same time decry racism and apartheid.566  
 
The central point this discussion discloses is that of the inability of 
pragmatism to provide a sufficient basis for moral justification.567  Not only is 
pragmatism self-refuting, it also is inept to foment any standard to safeguard 
individuals from social injustices.   While pragmatic appeals may be instructive 
and perhaps necessary starting points in the deliberation process, by themselves 
they reveal little beyond what is desirable.  By relying solely on pragmatic 
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justifications, the Harvard Committee, although seeking admirable goals opened 
the door to many unaccountable circumstances, not the least of which are those 
surrounding the issue of informed consent. 
 
6.5 Summary and Assessment 
The conclusions in this chapter build upon conclusions developed 
throughout the dissertation.  The ethical assessment provided in this chapter 
discloses several important implications.  Specifically, the ethical and legal 
concepts governing end of life matters are unsustainable under the current 
paradigm.  If medical practice and statutory law continue to sanction the use of 
the brain death criterion (which does not comport with the death of the organism 
as a whole), then the removal of vital organs for transplantation violates the dead 
donor rule.  This net result constitutes a direct killing violating the traditional 
distinction between killing and allowing to die.   Consequently, the continued use 
of brain death as a means to remove organs from brain-dead patients is the direct 
cause of their deaths and is unethical and illegal under the current paradigm.   
A related though distinct point is that despite the rationale of the Harvard 
Committee, brain death is an unnecessary medical and legal construct for 
discontinuing life-support in hopeless cases.  Traditional ethics and case law 
allow for the removal of life-support for patients who consent.   Brain death is 
representative of a condition many would consider requiring extraordinary care, 
and hence not morally required.  Additionally, the law recognizes the unqualified 
right of patients to refuse medical treatment of any kind.  No legal barriers exist 
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for discontinuing treatment when requested by patients or their surrogates.  Thus, 
physicians who follow the directives of patients under these circumstances are 
immune from legal reprisals.    
It is also highly questionable that informed consent for organ donors under 
the brain-death criterion is obtainable.  When consideration of the medical and 
social reality of brain death is applied to the principles of bioethics and case law, 
the process of informed consent is seriously compromised.  Confusion and 
uncertainty of the meaning of diagnosis and testing for the condition exists 
universally, and it is doubtful that under the current modus operandi any 
resolution is possible.    
Those who wish to justify the use of brain death on purely pragmatic 
grounds also face difficult ethical obstacles.  Pragmatism, in principle lacks the 
facility to provide a sufficient basis for establishing ethical direction and thus is 
open to abuse.  In addition, pragmatism also lacks intellectual and practical 
coherence.  In the attempt to utilize brain death in medical practice on a pragmatic 
basis, the Harvard Committee seemingly paved the way to the furtherance of 
problems elucidated throughout this chapter. 
 In the chapter that follows, attention will be given to alternatives to the 
way in which organ donation is conducted under the brain-death criterion.  
Specifically, the chapter will highlight current research that promises to advance 
organ transplantation apart from cadaver donation under the current system.  
Moreover, attention will be given to how donation might proceed apart from the 
brain-death criterion within the confines of law and ethics as currently conceived.  
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Finally, some policy guidelines will be proposed as an attempt to encapsulate how 
such a practice might be worked into social policy. 
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Chapter Seven 
 
 
Proposing a New Model for Death and Donation 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The scope of this investigation has come full circle.  This dissertation 
explored the major areas of discussion concerning the distinct though interrelated 
issues of brain death and organ donation.  Each chapter provided a detailed 
disclosure and analysis of a segment of the ethical issues surrounding death and 
donation as construed today, which taken together furnishes a sufficient basis for 
assessing the central thesis of this dissertation.  
This dissertation began with the proposal that brain death, under the 
current paradigm is problematic to the point that it cannot be sustained on ethical 
grounds as a means for procuring transplantable organs.  In an effort to sustain 
this notion, it was necessary to investigate the historical, medical, legal, 
philosophical, and ethical spheres of influence that have contributed to the vast 
complexity of the issues surrounding death and donation.  Section 7.2 will 
summarize the findings of previous chapters in order to demonstrate how this 
investigation proffers support for the central thesis of this dissertation.  
Consequently, sustaining this thesis leaves a significant gap in a longstanding life-
saving practice that could have enormous ramifications in both the medical 
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community and society at large.  For this reason, section 7.3 will investigate some 
of the emerging technologies that may eliminate the need for heart-beating 
cadaveric organ and tissue donors.   Taking into consideration the fact that many 
of these technologies are nascent in their development, section 7.4 will furnish a 
possible means of organ procurement consistent with the general consensus 
currently embraced in health care law and ethics.  Specifically, this section will 
provide a tentative suggestion for organ procurement apart from brain death that 
is consistent with the ethical consensus governing the practice of health care 
today.  Finally, in conjunction with the provisionary evocation in section 7.4, 
section 7.5 will propose a new standard of death and donation for policy 
consideration. 
 
7.2 Affirmation of the Thesis 
As the analyses in the previous chapters illustrate, difficulties exist that 
call into question the ethical sustainability of brain death as a means for organ 
procurement.  The summary that follows indicates the force of these problems as 
discussed in detail in each chapter.  The following summary statements are 
offered in support of the thesis of this dissertation.   
 From its inception, some thinkers have criticized brain death as an 
arbitrary and ad hoc criterion.  It is ad hoc because it was created as a solution to 
the problem of obtaining viable transplantable organs.  Historically brain death 
emerged in close proximity to organ transplantation (see Chapter One).  Less than 
a year after the first publicized heart transplant in 1967, an Ad Hoc Committee 
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from the Harvard Medical School recommended brain death as a criterion for 
death for the purpose of turning off ventilators and retrieving organs for 
transplantation.  A closer look into the rationale of the committee indicates that 
transplantation was the primary motive.  The problem with the Harvard 
Committee’s recommendation is that it provided no biological or philosophical 
conceptual basis that supported the idea that brain death is death.  Instead, the 
Committee justified brain death on pragmatic grounds.  As Chapter Six indicated, 
pragmatic reasons alone are insufficient to justify its use. 
It is arbitrary because there are no good reasons to think that the 
diagnostic tests conform to the criterion.  In the decade that followed the Harvard 
Committee’s recommendation, numerous sets of diagnostic criteria and state 
statutes were constructed in an attempt to advance brain death into policy and 
practice.  Lack of a conceptual foundation, however, resulted in confusion and 
inconsistency in its application in law and medical practice.  Attempting to solve 
these problems, the President’s Commission issued a report in 1981 that provided 
a conceptual basis and model statute in an effort to make death uniform.  Despite 
this attempt, the next two and a half decades proved to be challenging for the new 
criterion as new physiologically enlightened research revealed that the conceptual 
basis is flawed (see Chapters Two & Three).  In short, since the diagnostic criteria 
disregard certain neurological activity, the tests fail to conform to the criterion.  
Presently, the data indicates that brain death cannot be confirmed prior to autopsy 
following cardiopulmonary death.  Furthermore, the diagnostic sets vary so 
widely that the same individual who is declared brain dead in the emergency 
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room could still be alive in the intensive care unit, depending on which diagnostic 
set is chosen.   
Compounding these problems is the fact that the brain-death criterion fails 
to conform to the definition (see Chapter Four).  If one maintains that human 
persons are essentially physical organisms of a substantial kind, then as long as 
the organism as a whole is functioning, despite mechanical ventilation, the 
administration of vassopressors, and a host of other life-sustaining interventions 
to supplement a diffused brain, then death has not occurred.  Those who attempt 
to either maintain brain death or further advance death criteria to increase the pool 
of organ donors do so on dubious grounds (see Chapter Five).  The 
inconsistencies and epistemological gaps endemic to all neurologically based 
criteria render them suspect in light of advancing cognitive science.  Moreover, 
given that death is not a purely private matter, the expansion of death criteria on 
the basis of autonomy and pluralism needs to be carefully measured in light of the 
unintended pedagogical effects on society a move of this sort might have.   
The aim of this dissertation was to investigate brain death as a criterion of 
death for the procurement of transplantable organs.  Ultimately, an ethical 
assessment informed by the historical, medical, legal, and philosophical data 
renders brain death as a means for organ procurement so problematic that it ought 
to be abandoned as a viable criterion for determining death (see Chapter Six).    
Not only is informed consent unobtainable under the current paradigm, but the 
rationale for its utilization is unsustainable as well.  Thus, this investigation 
confirms the thesis of this dissertation. 
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The consequence of this conclusion suggests that the already short supply 
of transplantable organs will further deteriorate.  While it is not the primary focus 
of this dissertation, in the sections that follow, consideration of various 
alternatives to brain death will be briefly discussed as a means to suggest possible 
ways to move forward in order to preserve the life-saving practice of organ 
transplantation.  It is not the purpose of these sections to provide a detailed 
analysis of the alternatives presented, but rather to set the direction for further 
exploration and development in the inseparable matters of death and donation. 
 
7.3 Possible Alternatives to Brain Death 
In recent years, discussion concerning alternatives to organ procurement 
under the current paradigm has been on the increase.  While some of these 
discussions emanate from the reports of popular news agencies, not all do.  For 
this reason a degree of caution regarding the conclusions that can be drawn from 
some of these reports should be maintained.  Nevertheless, the most interesting 
component of these potential alternatives pertains to the irrelevance of brain death 
as a factor in their implementation.  Specifically, not only do many of these 
alternatives eliminate the need for brain death as a means for securing donatable 
organs, they also purport to remove many of the ethical and medical hazards 
concurrent in the bifurcated standard. 
For example, advances in pharmacology and technology may eventually 
supplement the current need for organ donors.  Some reports suggest that 
improved diagnostic and surgical procedures are beginning to show promise in 
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reducing the need for many organ transplants.  AV Magazine, published under the 
auspices of the American Anti-Vivisection Society, reports that, “a simple 
surgical technique, ventricular remodeling, has removed a significant number of 
patients from heart transplant waiting lists.”568  The article goes on to report that 
physicians at Columbia Presbyterian Medical Center have used positron emission 
tomography (PET) machines to discover that approximately forty percent of 
patients waiting for heart transplants needed only bypass surgery.  Supporting 
similar alternatives is Japanese cardiologist Yoshio Watanabe who suggests 
concentrating on the development of “a more effective pharmacological regimen 
and new therapeutic modalities.”569   With newly devised drugs, he contends, 
heart-patients on waiting lists “are now surviving as long as those who received 
heart transplants.”570  This is significant, given that under the current system 
many recipients of donor hearts do not survive any longer than those left on 
waiting lists.571  This is due primarily to the fact that the pre-existing weakened 
condition of heart patients is further compromised by the surgical procedure and 
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the ensuing immune-suppressant diseases characteristic of organ recipients. 
Watanabe suggests efforts be made to develop a totally transplantable heart as
final solution to donor heart shortage
 
 the 
s.    
                                                
As far back as 1982, cardiologist David Evans suggested, “The 
development of the mechanical heart offers a much better prospect for the 
future.”572   Today, many patients who suffer from severe heart failure do benefit 
from the use of artificial hearts.  However, the limitations of these devices provide 
impetus for further development.  Nature Medicine reports on the prospects of a 
new biologic heart in which blood is pumped by actual heart muscle rather than 
by metal and plastic.573  Though there are still many hurdles to overcome, one 
such hurdle was breached when researchers demonstrated that a bioartificial heart 
could be created using a matrix platform composed of immuno-compatible 
cardiac cells. 
Other high-tech solutions to donor organ "shortage" include the creation of 
tissues and organs without donors.  In August of 2005, a study funded by the UK 
Government, and led by researchers from Kingston University’s School of Life 
Sciences, disclosed that the research team had grown an artificial liver from 
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umbilical cord stem cells.574  Hailed as the first step in creating a fully artificial 
liver for transplantation, researcher Dr. Colin McGuckin said, “The transplant of a 
section of liver grown from cord blood could be possible within the next ten to 
fifteen years.”575   
Other sources in the popular media report that a breakthrough in the 
growth of transplantable human bladders from tissue taken from recipients’ own 
defective bladders.576  The bladder cells were cultured in a nutrient bath in a 
laboratory, and after two months, new bladders were fully grown. Not only were 
the transplants successful, but the recipients were free of side effects, including 
tissue rejection.  The Wake Forest University team of scientists is currently 
working on ways to grow twenty different tissues and organs. 
Additionally, another news source reports that, “US scientists have coaxed 
recycled hearts taken from animal cadavers into beating in the laboratory after 
reseeding them with live cells.”577 If this procedure is extended to humans, the 
potential “for almost limitless supply of hearts, and possibly other organs” could 
diminish the need for heart-beating cadaver organ donors. The theory behind the 
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procedure involves developing “transplantable blood vessels or whole organs that 
are made from your own cells” thus eliminating the need for immunosuppressive 
drugs.  Dr. Richard Horton, editor of The Lancet, the journal that reported the new 
research, comments, “A lot more work needs to go into this, but over the next ten 
years or so, we are going to see a revolution in transplantation.”578  The prospects 
of transplantable organs derived from recipients’ own cells are clearly preferable 
to the current organ and tissue procurement system.  Not only would it eliminate 
much of the controversy that surrounds the means of procurement for 
transplantation under the bifurcated standard, but it also would advance survival 
rates for recipients.579 
Another approach that could significantly reduce the demand for organ 
transplants would be the sustained, committed, long-term emphasis on disease and 
injury prevention.580  John McArdle suggests that if health-care industries, 
government agencies, and individuals seriously enacted such measures, it would 
not only  “eliminate the need for all but a small fraction of current transplantation 
procedures,” but also  “provide additional benefits in all areas of medicine and 
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public health.”581   Wolfgang Bünnagel, a heart transplant survivor, notes how 
many sufferers owe their conditions to unhealthy lifestyles due in large measure 
to excessive consumption of fat, alcohol, and tobacco.582   He suggests that 
improved care of organs while still healthy is a better solution to organ disease 
than transplants.  Noting that the “majority of patients for liver transplants 
are...suffering from liver disease due to alcohol consumption,” he advocates that, 
“we change our ways of working, living and eating... and find daily routines that 
better fit our bodies.”583   Perhaps if incentives were offered to physicians and 
patients, many people would be more prone to adopt healthier lifestyles.584  
However, while some human suffering is self-inflicted, one cannot wholly ascribe 
all organ disease to lifestyle choices.  Nonetheless, preventative medicine could 
help reduce the need for organ donors.   
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, some experimental alternatives 
to brain death may lie just over the horizon.  Although most are in the beginning 
stages of development, given the rapid advancement of recent biotechnologies in 
medicine in the last decade, it is possible that some of these alternatives could be 
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realized in the near future.  On the whole, a multi-pronged approach to the organ 
donor shortage, in which several possible alternatives to organ donation are 
pursued, is advantageous for at least two significant reasons.  First, these 
alternatives promise to relieve many of the ethical concerns endemic to current 
social policy and medical practice for procuring organs for transplantation.  
Second, these alternatives promise greater health benefits and survival rates for 
patients.  Nonetheless, many of these alternatives are experimental and may never 
be realized.  During the interval, some mediating alternative is required to fill the 
gap left by the abandonment of brain death as a means for organ procurement.  In 
the next section, some tentative considerations for organ procurement during the 
latter stages of the dying process will be presented.  It is necessary that such 
considerations remain consistent with the ethical consensus governing the practice 
of health care as discussed in the previous chapter.   
 
7.4 Tentative Considerations for a New Standard 
The implication of the discussion to this point suggests that there is no 
immediate alternative to brain death as means for procuring unpaired viable 
organs for transplantation.  Indeed, some may worry that returning to a single 
criterion of death would be to turn back time and thus undermine the progress that 
has been made during the last thirty-five years in transplantation efforts.585  
However, as previous chapters have demonstrated, this “progress” has been at a 
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cost.  Nothing less than the public trust and the integrity of the medical profession 
are at stake.  Modesty in the claims of medical experts is required, particularly in 
the light of the history of medical practice in which ethical violations were 
justified for the purported benefits that would be reaped by society as a whole (see 
Chapter 1).  Any proposal, therefore, must be in accord with the ethical and legal 
principles outlined in Chapter 6.  Otherwise, the proposal will be no better than 
what it purports to replace. 
At first blush, the suggestion may sound overly ambitious.  To begin with, 
the idea of returning to a qualified form of the cardiopulmonary single standard of 
death suggests that society might well find itself back in a 1960’s era of medical 
practice, once again plagued by the attendant problems that were overcome 
through the introduction of brain death.  Moreover, to suggest that organ 
donation, in particular heart donation, can proceed apart from brain death seems 
to push the ethical boundaries beyond acceptable limits.  This rationale does not 
promise to solve all difficulties surrounding death and donation.  No policy 
proposal is without its problems.  Rather, this rationale paves the way for the 
implementation of social policy with the aim of accomplishing that for which the 
brain-death criterion was created, apart from the vast majority of ethical problems 
with which it is associated.   
There are several reasons why the cardiopulmonary single standard 
criterion is preferred.  First, the cardiopulmonary criterion provides an ethically 
safer environment for determining death.  As previous chapters indicate, 
neurological criteria for determining death rest on uncertain and unproven 
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grounds.  Commenting on the Italian legislation on brain death and capturing the 
essence of the problem in general, Massimo Bondi writes, 
It is well-known that our knowledge of the brain functions only 
cover a bare 10% of their spectrum; therefore art.1 of law 578/93 
(of the Italian legislation) stating that "death is the irreversible 
cessation of all functions of the entire brain" is scientifically an 
absurdity, because it is not possible to declare an unknown 
function to be "ceased.”586 
 
The uncertainty surrounding the moment of death lingers in the minds of many, 
despite technological advances.  Because of this, Hans Jonas’ suggestion that, 
“Since we do not know the exact borderline between life and death, nothing less 
than the maximal definition of death will do,”587 remains relevant.  The criteria 
for death primarily should be based on patient care, and secondarily on the 
economic and pragmatic interests of others.  As Barry Bostrom observes, 
…law, medicine and health care should be designed to err, if at all, 
on the side of the preservation of life and the establishment of 
rational principles for the protection of the most vulnerable persons 
in society—those who are medically dependent and disabled.588  
  
Second, it is easier to satisfy informed consent under the cardiopulmonary 
criterion.  As previous chapters indicate, satisfying the demands of the doctrine of 
informed consent under the brain-death criterion is, for all practical purposes, 
impossible.  David Price, commenting on the Danish Council on Ethics’ Report 
                                                 
586Massimo Bondi, J'accuse: Against the Heart-Beating Brain Death 
(Canonici Lateranensi: Universita' di Roma, 2006), Press Release, 8:1. 
 
587Hans Jonas, Philosophical Essays: From Ancient Creed to 
Technological Man (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), 130. 
 
588Barry A. Bostrom. "Euthanasia in the Netherlands: A Model for the 
United States?" Issues in Law and Medicine 4 (1989). 
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on Death notes the importance of the establishment of a concept of death that 
relates to the common person’s every day experience:   
In 1988, the Danish Council on Ethics, in a Report on Death, drew 
attention to a perceived divide on ‘scientific’ (unseen) and 
‘ordinary’ (seen) views of death.   It stated that ‘The concept of 
death must relate to the everyday experience’, according to which 
‘the identity of the person relates no less to the body than to the 
mind’, and recommended that the standard of death should be 
cessation of respiration and cardiac activity.589  
 
Commenting on her personal experiences with family members of brain dead 
patients, researcher Michi Nakajima observes: 
During my five-month visit to the ICU, I felt one thing as most 
peculiar in the beginning.  None of the family members would take 
the hand of the patient, nor shed a single tear at the news that their 
husband, wife, or a beloved child was brain death.  At first, I 
thought I accidentally came across people who were cold-hearted 
or logical-minded.  However, I soon understood that no one really 
felt that the brain dead person was truly dead. 
 
Later, the same researcher notes: 
But the same people, without exception, burst into tears or wiped 
their eyes when the brain dead person’s heart ceased beating and 
the respirator was removed.  At this point, they truly realized their 
relative’s death.590 
 
As noted in Chapter Three, it is unlikely that informed consent for organ donation 
under the brain-death criterion is obtainable.  The central problem emanates from 
the complexity of the condition and the uncertainty of the diagnosis.  However, 
most people would have little difficulty accepting death as occurring at the 
                                                 
589David Price, Legal and Ethical Aspects of Organ Transplantation 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
 
590Michi Nakajima, Invisible Death (Mienai Shi: Bungei Shunju, 1985), 
12-13. 
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permanent cessation of heart and respiratory functions.591  What remains at this 
point is some qualification on the particulars.  
Finally, cardiopulmonary death, which is the most consistent criterion 
under the current definition, enjoys an already established consensus.  As Josef 
Seifert contends, “Everyone will agree that after the end of the biological life of 
the human organism as a whole there is no human life present in the body.”  He 
continues noting that, “A complete consensus is possible with regard to the thesis 
that no human life is present before the beginning or after the end of the 
biological life of the human organism.”  Since no consensus can be established 
regarding any other limit, he concludes that the “most natural, unambiguous 
definition and criterion of human death…is preferable to any other criterion or 
definition of death.” 592    
Taken as a whole, the cardiopulmonary criterion can provide an ethically 
safer environment for determining death, can more readily satisfy the demands of 
informed consent, and has an already established consensus.  Exactly how organ 
                                                 
591Veatch objects to the idea that cardiopulmonary death can be a criterion 
for heart donors.  He writes, “One cannot say a heart is irreversibly stopped, if, in 
fact, it will be restarted.”  Kevin O'Reilly, Redefining Death: A New Ethical 
Dilemma (American Medical News, 2009, accessed 22 January 2009); available 
from http://www.amednews.com.  This is precisely why we are concerned not 
with mere heart stoppage but with the permanent cessation of the 
cardiopulmonary functions.  In this sense we are concerned with the entire system 
that is responsible for fluid flow of oxygenated blood necessary for the life of the 
organism as a whole.   
 
592Josef Seifert, “Brain Death and Euthanasia,” in Beyond Brain Death: 
The Case Against Brain Based Criteria for Human Death, ed. Michael Potts, Paul 
A. Byrne and Richard G. Nilges (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000), 
224. 
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donation may proceed that respects the principles and distinctions embedded in 
American law and ethics will be discussed next.   
Based on discussions in previous chapters, at least three alternatives 
emerge, each of which has major problems.  In Section 5.3 of Chapter Five, a 
proposal, with varying rationales, was offered by Koppelman, Truog, and 
Robinson.  Recognizing that brain death is not death, they suggest that while 
cardiopulmonary death should be the default criterion of death, excepting the dead 
donor rule for organ donation in cases where the patient is dying is acceptable 
provided prior consent is obtained.  However, as the critique in Chapter Five 
demonstrates, this proposal would necessarily involve the collapse of the 
traditional distinction between killing and allowing to die, thereby inviting a new 
direction in how the practice of medicine is conceived.  Not only would it involve 
a dangerous use of medical power, it also would provide no basis against the use 
of the practice of organ donation as a means of suicide by individuals with 
decision-making capacity.  In short, this proposal, while recognizing the problems 
of organ donation under brain death, fails to maintain consistency with the ethical 
consensus governing the practice of medicine today. 
Another possibility is the suggestion made by D. Alan Shewmon which 
was briefly alluded to in Chapter One.593  Shewmon proposes a form of controlled 
Non-Heart Beating Organ Donation (NHBD), with a short asystole time, as a 
means for procuring organs for transplantation.  Further elucidation of this 
                                                 
593D. Alan Shewmon, "'Brainstem Death,' 'Brain Death' and Death: A 
Critical Re-Evaluation of the Purported Evidence," Issues in Law and Medicine 
14, no. 2 (1998). 
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proposal shows promise in satisfying the ethical demands as discussed in Chapter 
Six.  As Shewmon reminds, successful heart transplants in the 1960s were carried 
out without the need for the brain-death criterion.  Similar to the procedure used 
by Christiaan Barnard, the process of removing hearts and lungs can be carried 
out after discontinuation of ventilator support and circulatory standstill.  After a 
latency of sufficient time to ensure moral certainty that spontaneous resuscitation 
will not occur, the removal process may begin.  During the interval, preserving 
medications can be delivered to select organs to ensure their viability.  As 
Margaret Lock notes, “If a patient is perfused with specially prepared cold fluids 
immediately prior to or after cardiac arrest, then the organs remain in reasonably 
good condition even after cardiopulmonary death and can be removed for 
transplant.”594   This elaborate procedure is needed, writes Shewmon, due to the 
fact that “transplant surgeons never developed a technique for heart-lung retrieval, 
primarily because the ‘brain-death’ fiction convinced them that there was no need 
to do so.”  For the sake of everyone’s consciences, he writes, “I believe that a 
historically honest and physiologically enlightened appraisal of ‘brain death’ 
makes it an ethical requisite.”595 
There are a number of favorable characteristics in this proposed 
procedure.  First, it satisfies the ethical distinctions addressed in Chapter Six.  The 
                                                 
594Margaret Lock, Twice Dead: Organ Transplants and the Reinvention of 
Death (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 357.  It is also important 
to note that the use of preserving fluids removes the problem of organ 
deterioration with which transplant surgeons in the 1960s had to contend.   
 
595Alan D. Shewmon, "The Dead Donor Rule: Lessons from Linguistics," 
Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 292 (2004): 293-296. 
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distinction between killing and allowing-to-die, upheld in both law and ethics, 
permits patients or their surrogates to choose to withhold or withdraw life-
sustaining measures that they deem extraordinary.  This policy closely adheres to 
this moral distinction by recognizing a patient’s right to refuse medical treatment.  
Since organ procurement does not proceed until cardiopulmonary death is 
determined, then there is no reason to extend donation beyond the dead donor 
rule.  Moreover, even if successful cardiopulmonary resuscitation is technically 
possible, the decision to forego the ventilator “all the more so would be the 
foregoing of resuscitation immediately thereafter.”596  Second, informed consent 
can be respected in a more meaningful way.  Under the current paradigm, 
informed consent is not achievable.  The complexity of the issues surrounding 
brain death and its diagnosis renders it practically impossible for patients to 
understand.  However, these problems are greatly lessened in light of the fact that 
a consensus regarding cardiopulmonary death already exists.  Most people accept 
that when cardiopulmonary functions permanently cease, death has occurred.  
Third, it could potentially increase the number of organ donors.  Many more 
patients who request to withdraw life-support are potential donors.  This includes 
neurologically devastated patients on life-support.  By relieving the decades-old 
                                                 
596Shewmon, "'Brainstem Death,' 'Brain Death' and Death: A Critical Re-
Evaluation of the Purported Evidence."  It is noteworthy that the first justification 
in the Harvard Committee’s report can be satisfied without the need of the brain-
death criterion.  Some question remains as to the possibility of auto-resuscitation.  
Whetstine suggests, for example, that insufficient research has been done to 
ascertain the likelihood of its occurrence.  See: Leslie Mary Whetstine, “An 
Examination of the Bio-Philosophical Literature on the Definition and Criteria of 
Death: When is Dead Dead and Why Some Donation after Cardiac Death Donors 
Are Not” (Dissertation, Duquesne University, 2006), 206-207.    
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suspicion surrounding brain death that some suggest has been counterproductive 
to organ procurement, many individuals may be more inclined to become organ 
donors.597   
Despite these favorable characteristics, some important problems remain.  
First, critics of NHBD note that while an asystolic heart can be used as a means 
for determining death, it is unclear whether heart stoppage is actually reversible if 
it could be restarted but is not due to a decision to forego resuscitation measures.  
Robert Veatch explains:  
Death requires irreversible stoppage, yet it is unclear whether that 
means the heart could not be started again or merely will not be.  
Even more perplexing is whether an individual should be 
considered dead during the period when a heart could be restarted 
by people with expert skills and sophisticated equipment if those 
people and equipment are not available.  The concept of 
irreversibility has become much more complex.598 
 
In the analysis of some, ensuring that spontaneous resuscitation will not occur is 
unsatisfactory.599  Given the possibility that if a patient is removed from life-
support, and resuscitation efforts are successful in restoring circulation, the patient 
cannot be said to have been dead when life support was removed.  Simply 
                                                 
597Shewmon, "'Brainstem Death,' 'Brain Death' and Death: A Critical Re-
Evaluation of the Purported Evidence,".  As Shewmon reminds, “There is good 
reason to believe that a significant factor contributing to the low rate of signing of 
organ donor cards has been a widespread instinctive suspicion that  ‘brain dead’ 
donors are really still alive (though fatally injured), and that historically the ‘brain 
death’ concept was manufactured through ‘conceptual gerrymandering’ for purely 
utilitarian purposes.” 
 
598Robert M. Veatch, Transplantation Ethics (Washington, DC: 
Georgetown University Press, 2000), 209. 
 
599Whetstine. Stuart J. Youngner, R. M. Arnold, and M. A. DeVita, "When 
Is Dead?," Hasting Center Report 29, no. 6 (1999). 
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deciding not to resuscitate does not constitute “irreversibility” but rather conflates 
a prognosis of death with a diagnosis of death.600 
A second problem concerning the meaning of irreversibility involves 
whether brain tissue is dead at the point when heart stoppage is determined to be 
irreversible.  NHBD protocols that employ a short asystole time601 run the risk of 
designating a patient dead when a patient’s brain continues to be living.602  Under 
the current paradigm, a patient in this state is not yet dead.  Protocols that do not 
allow for sufficient time for determining irreversibility may allow for greater 
viable organ procurement, but run the risk of violating the Dead Donor Rule. 
A third possibility remains.  One could employ the cardiopulmonary death 
criterion, minus the short asystole time to ensure that irreversibility is met to the 
satisfaction of the concerns expressed above.  This would allow the employment 
of Shewmon’s controlled method, though modified with a longer wait period to 
ensure that the patient is really dead.  A consequence of this would be a reduction 
                                                 
600Whetstine, 243.  Whestine notes that , based on limited studies, it is 
impossible to know whether a two minute or a five minute “no touch” protocol is 
sufficient to exclude auto-resuscitation.  Nonetheless, the ability to auto-
resuscitate is not the issue, if manual resuscitation efforts could restore circulation 
function.  See pages 199-200. 
 
601The Pittsburgh protocol originally called for a death pronouncement 
after two minutes of asystole.  See: R. M. Arnold and Stuart J. Youngner, 
"Ethical, Psychological, and Public Policy Implicatons of Procuring Organs from 
Non-Heart-Beating Cadavers," Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, no. Special 
Issue (1993). 
 
602Veatch, Transplantation Ethics, 209. 
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of viable organs due to the greater length of time necessary prior to procurement 
to ensure irreversibility is satisfied.603   
While no alternative is without its problems, the third suggestion seems to 
be the least troubling.  Although a thorough investigation of these alternatives is 
beyond the scope of this dissertation, this preliminary suggestion is offered as a 
means to expand discussion in terms of how society might proceed to further 
organ donation in light of the major problems that call into question the ethical 
sustainability of brain death as a means for organ procurement.  In attempt to 
further such discussion, the following policy recommendations are presented. 
 
7.5 Policy Recommendations 
The following policy recommendations are an attempt to balance 
autonomy, death, and organ donation in a more meaningful way.  First, as 
suggested in the previous section, social policy should recognize a standard of 
death that is consistent with current medical science and is generally 
understandable to the average person.  A form of the cardiopulmonary criterion, 
which focuses on the permanent cessation of the circulatory and respiratory 
functions, is best suited to accomplish these goals.  Second, in an effort to satisfy 
the ethical and legal requirements of informed consent, social policy should 
respect personal autonomy by requiring transparency through disclosure of the 
diagnosis of death and the procedure used to procure organs and tissues.  This 
                                                 
603 Organ deterioration could be minimized if organ preserving 
medications are used during the wait.  See Shewmon’s suggestion as articulated 
earlier. 
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requires that the individual be informed as to the definition and diagnosis of 
death, the procedures employed in procuring organs and tissues for donation, and 
be given the opportunity to specify the extent of his or her anatomical gift.   
Finally, consideration should be given to the means for satisfying the informed 
consent process.  This could be accomplished through the use of a form (advanced 
directive), containing signatures from the potential organ donor and a physician, 
indicating the potential donor’s informed consent and directive of extent for 
donation.  These policy considerations are offered as a means of furthering 
discussion specific to safeguarding patient choice and the integrity of the medical 
profession in general. 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 265
REFERENCES 
 
 
 
 
Abe, Tomoko. "Philosophical and Cultural Attitudes Against Brain Death and 
Organ Transplantation in Japan." In Beyond Brain Death: The Case 
Against Brain Based Criteria for Human Death, ed. Michael Potts, Paul 
A. Byrne and Richard G. Nilges, 66, 191-200. Dordrecht, The 
Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000. 
 
Alexander, Marc. "The Rigid Embrace of the Narrow House: Premature Burial 
and the Signs of Death." Hasting Center Report 25 (1980). 
 
American Academy of Neurology (Quality Standards Subcommittee). "Practice 
Parameters for Determining Brain Death in Adults." Neurology 45 (1995): 
1012-14. 
 
American Bar Association. American Bar Association Annual Report.:, 1978, 
100. 
 
Anderson, J. Kerby. "A Biblical Appraisal of Euthanasia." In Living Ethically in 
the 90's, ed. J. Kerby Anderson. Wheaton: Scripture Press Publications, 
1990. 
 
Anderson, Mark. "Never Mind the Singularity, Here's the Science." Wired 
Magazine2008, http://www.wired.com/medtech/drugs/magazine/16-
04/ff_kurzweil_sb. 
 
Aquinas, Thomas. Treatis on Man. Translated by James F. Anderson. Westport: 
Greenwood Press, 1962. 
 
Arnold, J. D., T. F. Zimmerman, and D. C. Martin. "Public Attitudes and the 
Diagnosis of Death." JAMA 206 (1968): 1949-1954. 
 
Arnold, R. M., and Stuart J. Youngner. "Ethical, Psychological, and Public Policy 
Implicatons of Procuring Organs from Non-Heart-Beating Cadavers." 
Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, no. Special Issue (1993): 103-278. 
 
Arnold, Robert M., and Stuart J. Youngner. "The Dead Donor Rule: Should We 
Stretch It, Bend It, or Abandon It?" Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 3, 
no. 2 (1993): 263-278. 
 
Arras, John D., and Bonnie Steinbock. "Defining Death, Foregoing Life 
Sustaining Treatment and Euthanasia." In Ethical Issues in Modern 
 266
Medicine, ed. John D. Arras and Bonnie Steinbock. Mountain View, CA: 
Mayfield Publishing, 1998. 
 
Arts, W. F. M., et al. "Unexpected Improvement after Prolonged Posttraumatic 
Vegetative State." Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery and Psychiatry 48 
(1985): 1300-1303. 
 
Associated Press. Doctors Transplant Windpipe with Stem Cells. 
http:www.lancet.com, 2008. Accessed 24 November 2008. 
 
Baggini, Julian, and Peter S. Fosl. The Philosophers Toolkit: A Compendium of 
Philosophical Concepts and Methods. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 
2003. 
 
Barber, Norm. The Nasty Side of Organ Transplantation: The Cannibalistic 
Nature of Transplant Medicine. Third Edition ed. Adelaide, Austrailia: 
Norm Barber, 2007. 
 
Barnard, Christiaan, Curtis Bill Pepper. One Life. Oxford: Macmillan, 1969. 
 
Beauchamp, Tom L., and James F. Childress. Principles of Biomedical Ethics. 4th 
ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994. 
 
Beckwith, Francis J. "The Explanatory Power of the Substance View of Persons." 
Christian Bioethics 10 (2004): 33-54. 
 
Beecher, H. K. "Ethics and Clinical Research." New England Journal of Medicine 
274 (1966): 1354-1360. 
 
________. "Ethical Problems Created by the Hopelessly Unconscious Patient." 
New England Journal of Medicine 278 (1968): 1427. 
 
Beecher, Henry K. "Definition of Irreversible Coma, Manuscript Draft of 11 
April, 1968, 1968.". Henry K. Beecher Manuscripts, Holmes Hall, 
Harvard Medical School. 
 
Beecher, Henry K., and H. I. Dorr. "The New Definition of Death: Some 
Opposing Views." International Journal of Clinical Pharmacology 5 
(1971): 120-124. 
 
Belkin, Gary S. "Brain Death and the Historical Understanding of Bioethics." 
Journal of the History of Medicine 58 (2003): 325-361. 
 
Berger, Jeffrey T, Fred Rosner, & Eric J. Cassell. "Ethics of Practicing Medical 
Procedures on Newly Dead and Nearly Dead Patients." Journal of General 
Internal Medicine 17, no. 10 (2002): 774-778. 
 267
 
Bernat, James L. "How Much of the Brain Must Die on Brain Death?" The 
Journal of Clinical Ethics 3, no. 1 (1992): 25. 
 
________. "A Defense of the Whole-Brain Concept of Death." Hasting Center 
Report 28 (1998): 17. 
 
________. "Refinements in the Definition and Criterion of Death." In The 
Definition of Death, ed. Stuart J. Youngner, Robert M. Arnold and Renie 
Schapiro, 83-92. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999. 
 
________. "On Irreversibility as a Prerequisite for Brain Death Determination." In 
Brain Death and Disorders of Consciousness, ed. Calixto Machado and D. 
Alan. Shewmon, 161-168. New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum 
Publishers, 2004. 
 
Bernat, James L., Charles M. Culver, & Bernard Gert. "On the Definition and 
Criteria of Death." Annals of Internal Medicine 94 (1981): 389-391. 
 
Bernstein, I. M., M. Watson, G. M. Simmons, P. M. Catalano, G. Davis, R. 
Collins. "Maternal Brain Death and Prolonged Fetal Survival." Obst 
Gynecol 74 (1989): 434-37. 
 
Black, P. "Brain Death." New England Journal of Medicine 229 (1978): 338-344. 
 
Bleich, J. David. "Establishing Criteria of Death." In Jewish Bioethics, ed. Fred  
Rosner and J. David Bleich, 297-315. Hoboken, NJ: KTAV Publishing 
House, Inc., 2000. 
 
Boghossian, Paul. Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructionism. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
 
Bondi, Massimo. J'accuse: Against the Heart-Beating Brain Death. Canonici 
Lateranensi: Universita' di Roma, 2006. Press Release, 8. 
 
Bostrom, Barry A. "Euthanasia in the Netherlands: A Model for the United 
States?" Issues in Law and Medicine 4 (1989): 486. 
 
Brierly, J.D., et al. "Neocortical Death after Cardiac Arrest." Lancet 2, no. 7724 
(1971): 560-5. 
 
Brock, Dan W. "Cloning Human Beings: An Assessment of the Ethical Issues Pro 
and Con." In Ethical Issues in  Human Stem Cell Research, II, E1-E15. 
Rockville, MD, 1999. 
 
 268
________. "The Role of the Public in Public Policy on the Definition of Death." 
In The Definition of Death, ed. Stuart J. Youngner, Robert M. Arnold and 
Renie Schapiro, 293-307. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1999. 
 
Brody, Baruch A. "How Much of the Brain Must be Dead?" In The Definition of 
Death: Contemporary Controversies, ed. Stuart J. Youngner, Robert M. 
Arnold and Renie Schapiro, 71-82. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1999. 
 
Bünnagel, Wolfgang. "Living with My New Heart." Curative Education & Social 
Therapy Christmas.New Year (1996): 17-19. 
 
Byrne, Paul A., Sean O'Reilly, Paul M. Quay, and Peter W. Salsich, Jr. "Brain 
Death-the Patient, the Physician, and Society." Gonzaga Law Review 18 
(1982/83): 429-516. 
 
Byrne, Paul A., and Walt F. Weaver. ""Brain Death" Is Not Death." In Brain 
Death and Disorders of Consciousness, ed. Calixto Machado and D. Alan 
Shewmon, 43-50. New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, 2004. 
 
Campbell, Courtney S. "Fundamentals of Life and Death: Christian 
Fundamentalism and Medical Science." In The Definition of Death: 
Contemporary Controversies, ed. Stuart J. Youngner, Robert M. Arnold, 
& Renie Schapiro. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999. 
 
________. "A No-Brainer: Critcisms of Brain-Based Standards of Death." 
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 26, no. 5 (2001): 539-551. 
 
________. "Harvesting the Living? Separating "Brain Death" and Organ 
Transplantation." Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 14, no. 3 (2004): 
301-318. 
 
Caplan, Arthur L. & Daniel H. Coelho. The Ethics of Organ Transplants: The 
Current Debate. Buffalo: Prometheus, 1999. 
 
Capron, Alexander Morgan. "Legal Definition of Death." Annals of the New York 
Academy of Science 315 (1978): 349-356. 
 
________. "The Bifurcated Legal Standard for Determining Death: Does it 
Work?" In The Definition of Death, ed. Stuart J. Youngner, Robert M. 
Arnold and Renie Schapiro, 117-136. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1999. 
 
________. "Brain-Death: Well Settled yet Still Unresolved." The New England 
Journal of Medicine 344, no. 16 (2001). 
 269
 
Capron, Alexander Morgan , and L. R. Kass. "A Statutory Definition of the 
Standards for Determining Human Death." University of Pennsylania Law 
Review 121 (1972): 87-118. 
 
Carson, Ronald A., Jaime L. Frias, and Richard J. Melker. "Research with Brain-
Dead Children." IRB, (1981): 5-6. 
 
Catechism of the Catholic Church. Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1994. 
 
Center, National Catholic Bioethics. Faq's on Brain Death. 
http://www.ncbcenter.org/FAQ_BrainDeath.asp, Accessed: December, 
2006. 
 
Chiong, Winston. "Brain Death without Definitions." Hasting Center Report 35, 
no. 6 (2005): 20-30. 
 
Clarke, W. Norris. Explorations in Metaphysics. South Bend, IN: University of 
Notre Dame, 1994. 
 
Clauss, Ralf, and Wally Nel. "Drug Induced Arousal from the Permanent 
Vegetative State." Neurorehabilitation 21, no. 1 (2006): 23-28. 
 
Coimbra, C. G. "Implications of Ischemic Penumbra for the Diagnosis of Brain 
Death." Braz J Med Biol Res 32 (1999): 1479-1487. 
 
Coller, Barry S. "The Newly Dead as Research Subjects." Clinical Research 37 
(1989): 487-94. 
 
Cranford, Ronald E. "The Persistent Vegetative State: The Medical Reality." 
Hasting Center Report 18 (1988): 27-32. 
 
"Cruzan V. Director, Missouri Department of Health.".: U.S. Supreme Court, 
1990. 
 
Damian, Maxwell S. "Neuroprotection Becomes Reality: Changing Times for 
Cerebral Resuscitation." In Brain Death and Disorders of Consciousness, 
ed. Calixto Machado and D. Alan Shewmon, 143-150. New York: Kluwer 
Academic/Plenum Publishers, 2004. 
 
Daneffel, M.B., J.E. Kappes, D. Waltmire, and et al. "Knowledge and Attitudes of 
Health Care Professionals About Organ Donation." Journal of Transplant 
Coordination 2 (1992): 127-130. 
 
 270
de Frias, Casado, F. Balboa de Pas, A. Perez Martinez, and C. Palacio Mestres. 
"Inappropriate Secretion of Antidiuretic Hormone and the Effect of 
Lithium on Its Treatment." Journal of Pediatrics 96 (1980): 153-55. 
 
"Death." In Iowa Code, Section 702.8, 1999. 
 
"Death and Disposition of the Body." In Texas Statute, Title 8. 
 
"A Definition of Irreversible Coma: Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the 
Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death." 
Journal of the American Medical Association 205 (1968): 337-340. 
 
Delmonico, F. L., and J. G. Randolph. "Death: A Concept in Transition." 
Pediatrics 51 (1973): 234-239. 
 
Delsol, Chantal. Icarus Fallen: The Search for Meaning in an Uncertain World. 
Translated by Robin Dick. Wilmington: ISI Books, 2003. 
 
DeMere, M. "Statement." In Hearing Before the Missouri Select Committee on 
the Definition of Death, 1976. 
 
Deng, Mario C. "Effect of Receiving a Heart Transplant: Analysis of a National 
Cohort Entered on to a Waiting List, Stratified by Heart Failure Severity." 
British Medical Journal 231 (2000): 540-545. 
 
"Dennis C. Vacco, Attorney General of New York, Et Al., Petitioners V. Timothy 
E. Quill Et Al.".: U. S. Supreme Court, 1997. 
 
The Determination of Brain Death and its Relationship to Human Death, ed. R. J. 
White, H. Angstwurm, & I. Carrasco de Paula. Vatican City: Pontificia 
Academia Scientarum, 1989. 
 
"Determination of Death." In Code of Virginia, 54.1-2972. 
 
"Determination of Death." In Delaware Laws, Title 24. 
 
"Determination of Death." In Oregon Statute, ORS 432.300, 1997. 
 
DeWeese, Garett J. , and J. P. Moreland. Philosophy Made Slightly Less Difficult. 
Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2005. 
 
Dorff, Elliot N. Matters of Life and Death: A Jewish Approach to Modern 
Medical Ethics. Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society, 1998. 
 
Dorff, Elliot N. , and Louis E. Newman, eds. Contemporary Jewish Ethics and 
Morality: A Reader. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. 
 271
 
Döşemeci, L., M. Cengiz, M. Yilmaz, A. Ramazanoĝlu, “Frequency of spinal 
reflex movements in brain-dead patients,” Transplant Proc 36(2004): 17-
19. 
 
DuBois, James M. "Organ Transplantation: An Ethical Road Map." The National 
Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 2, no. 3 (2002): 413-453. 
 
Dyck, Arthur J. Life's Worth: The Case Against Assisted Suicide. Grand Rapids: 
Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2002. 
 
Eberl, Jason T. "A Thomistic Understanding of Human Death." Bioethics 19, no. 
1 (2005): 29-48. 
 
Editor. "Surgery: The Ultimate Operation." Time, December 15, 1967, 64-72. 
 
Edwards, Steven D. , and Kevin Forbes. "Nursing Practice and the Definition of 
Death." Nursing Inquiry 10, no. 4 (2003): 229-235. 
 
Elliot, J.M. "Brain Death." Trauma 5 (2003): 23-42. 
 
Engelhardt, H. Tristram, Jr. "Redefining Death: The Mirage of Consensus." In 
The Definition of Death: Contemporary Controversies, ed. Stuart J. 
Youngner, Robert M. Arnold and Renie Schapiro, 319-331. Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999. 
 
Evans, C. Stephen. "Human Persons as Substantial Achievers." Philosophia 
Reformata 58, no. 1 (1993): 100-112. 
 
Evans, D. W. "Heart Transplants: Some Oberations and Objections." Cambridge 
Review 103 (1982): 338-9. 
 
Evans, D. W., and L. C. Lum. "Brain Death." Lancet 2 (1980a): 1022. 
 
Evans, David W. "The Demise of 'Brain Death' in Britain." In Beyond Brain 
Death: The Case Against Brain Based Criteria for Human Death, ed. 
Michael Potts, Paul A. Byrne and Richard G. Nilges, 66, 139-158. 
Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000. 
 
Feinberg, John S., and Paul D. Feinberg. Ethics for a Brave New World. Wheaton: 
Crossway Books, 1993. 
 
Field, D. R., E. A. Gates, R. K. Creasy, A. R. Jonsen, R. K. Laros. "Maternal 
Brain Death During Pregnancy." JAMA 260 (1988): 816-22. 
 
 272
Finnis, John. Aquinas: Moral, Political, and Legal Theory. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998. 
 
Focke, Renate. "Renate Focke's Story." The Life Guardian, 
http://thelifeguardian.com/?action=mother_greinertAccessed 28 October, 
2007. 
 
Fost, Norman. "Research on the Brain Dead." Journal of Pediatrics 96 (1980): 
54-56. 
 
Fox, Mark D. "Stewards of a Public Trust: Responsible Transplantation." The 
American Journal of Bioethics 3, no. 1 (2003): v-vii. 
 
Frame, John M. Medical Ethics: Principles, Persons, and Problems. 
Phillipsburgh, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 1988. 
 
Franz, H. Study of Donor and Nondonor Families. Washington, D.C.: Presented 
at the Annual Meetings of the Division of Transplantation, 1996. 
 
Frost, Norman. "The Unimportance of Death." In The Definition of Death: 
Contemporary Controversies, ed. Stuart J. Youngner, Robert M. Arnold 
and Renie Schapiro, 161-178. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1999. 
 
Futterman, Laurie G. "Presumed Consent: The Solution to the Critical Donor 
Shortage?" American Journal of Critical Care 4, no. 2 (1995): 383-388. 
 
Garcia, Robert K. "Artificial Intelligence and Personhood." In Cutting-Edge 
Bioethics, ed. John F. Kilner, C. Christopher Hook, & Diann B. Uustal, 
39-51. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2002. 
 
Geisler, Norman L. Christian Ethics: Options and Issues. Grand Rapids: Baker 
Book House, 1989. 
 
Gelb, Adrian W., and Kerri M. Robertson. "Anaesthetic Management of the Brain 
Dead for Organ Donation." Canadian Journal for Anaesthesia 37, no. 1 
(1990): 806-812. 
 
George, Robert P., and Christopher Tollefsen. Embryo: A Defense of Human Life. 
New York: Doubleday, 2008. 
 
Gervais, K. G. Redefining Death. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986. 
 
________. "Advancing the Definition of Death: A Philsophical Essay." Medical 
Humanities Review 3, no. 4 (1989): 7-9. 
 
 273
Giacino, J. T., S. Ashwal, N. Childs, R. Cranford, B. Jennett, D. I. Katz, J. P. 
Kelly, J. H. Rosenberg, J. White, R. D. Zafonte, N. D. Zasler, “The 
minimally conscious state: definition and diagnostic criteria,” Neurology 
58 (2002): 349-353. 
 
Giacomini, Mita. "A Change of Heart and a Change of Mind? Technology and the 
Redefinition of Death in 1968." Social Science Medicine 44, no. 10 
(1997): 1465-1482. 
 
Glannon, W. “Neurostimulation and the minimally conscious state,” Bioethics 22 
(2008):337-345. 
 
Glaves-Innis, Georgetta. "Organ Donation and Incompetents: Can They Consent?  
Comparative Analysis of American and Canadian Laws of Consent and 
Brain Death Determination." Touro International Law Review 10 (1994): 
155-163. 
 
Glendon, Mary Ann. Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse. 
New York: Free Press, 1991. 
 
Graham-Rowe, Duncan. "World's First Brain Prosthesis Revealed." 
www.newscientist.com, March 12, 2003 2003. 
 
Green, M. "Aristotle and Modern Biology." Journal of the History of Ideas 33 
(1972): 411. 
 
Green, Michael B. , and Daniel Wikler. "Brain Death and Personal Identity." 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 9 (1980): 105-33. 
 
Greenberg, Gary. "As Good as Dead." The New Yorker, August 13 2001, 36-41. 
 
Greinert, Renate. "Renate Greinert's Story." The Life Guardian, 
http://thelifeguardian.com/?action=mother_greinertAccessed 28 October, 
2007. 
 
Grene, Marjorie. "Aristotle and Modern Biology." Journal of the History of Ideas 
33, no. 3 (1972): 395-424. 
 
Grossman, Kathy Lynn. "When Life's Flame Goes Out: Death is Difficult to 
Define, Legally and Morally." USA Today, October 5 2005, D 1. 
 
Guerit, Jean-Michel. "The Concept of Brain Death." In Brain Death and 
Disorders of Consciousness, ed. Calixto Machado and D. Alan Shewmon, 
15-22. New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, 2004. 
 
 274
"Halakhah." In Encyclopedia Judaica, ed. Cecil Roth, 7, 1156-57. Philadelphia: 
Coronet Books Inc., 1994. 
 
Haldane, John , and Patrick Lee. "Aquinas on Human Ensoulment, Abortion and 
the Value of Life." Philosophy 78 (2003): 255-278. 
 
Hasker, William. The Emergent Self. Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1999. 
 
________. "Persons as Emergent Substances." In Soul, Body, and Survival: 
Essays on the Metaphysics of Human Persons, ed. Keven Corcoran, 107-
119. Ithica: Cornell University Press, 2001. 
 
Health, National Institute of. "An Appraisal of the Criteria of Cerebral Death: A 
Summary Statement. A Collaborative Study." JAMA 237, no. 10 (1977): 
982-986. 
 
Heaney, Stephen. "Aquinas and the Presence of the Human Rational Soul." The 
Thomist 56 (1992). 
 
Higashi, K., et al. "Five-Year Follow-up Study of Patients with Persistent 
Vegetative State." Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery and Psychiatry 44 
(1981): 552-554. 
 
Hill, David J. "Brain Stem Death: A United Kingdom Anaesthetist's View." In 
Beyond Brain Death: The Case Against Brain Death Criteria for Human 
Death, ed. Michael Potts, Paul A. Byrne and Richard G. Nilges, 159-169. 
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001. 
 
Hippocrates, Hippocrates, Vol. I: Ancient Medicine, Airs, Waters, Places, 
Epidemics 1 & 2. Oath, Precepts, Nutriment, trans. W. H. S. Jones 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984.) 
 
Iserson, Kenneth V. "Live Verses Death: Exposing a Misapplication of Ethical 
Reasoning." Journal of Clinical Ethics 5 (1994): 261-66. 
 
Ivanhoe Newswire. "Artificial Brain Parts on the Horizon." www.news14.com, 
May 30, 2006 2006. 
 
Iwai, A., T. Sakano, M. Uenishi, H. Sugimoto, T. Yoshioka, T. Sugimoto. 
"Effects of Vasopressin and Catecholamines on the Maintenance of 
Circulatory Stability in Brain-Dead Patients." Transplantation 48 (1989): 
613-17. 
 
"Jerry W. Canterbury, Appellant, V. William Thornton Spence and the 
Washington Hospital Center, a Body Corporate, Appellees." In 150 U.S. 
 275
App. D.C. 263, 464 F, 2d 772: United States Court Of Appeals For The 
District of Columbia Circuit, 1972. 
 
Joffe, Ari R. "The Neurological Determination of Death: What Does it Really 
Mean?" Issues in Law and Medicine 32, no. 2 (2007): 119-140. 
 
Joffe, Ari R. , and Natalie Anton. "Brain Death: Understanding of the Conceptual 
Basis by Pediatric Intensivists in Canada." Archives of  Pediatrics & 
Adolescent Medicine 160, no. 7 (2006): 747-752. 
 
"John Moore V. Regents of the University of California." In 51 Cal.3d 120, 271 
Cal.Rptr. 146, 480: Supreme Court of California, 1990. 
 
Jonas, Hans. Philosophical Essays: From Ancient Creed to Technological Man. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974. 
 
Jones, D. A. "Metaphysical Misgivings About 'Brain Death'." In Beyond Brain 
Death: The Case Against Brain Based Criteria for Human Death, ed. 
Michael Potts, Paul A. Byrne and Richard G. Nilges, 91-119. Dordrecht, 
The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000. 
 
Jouvet, M. "Diagnostic Electrosouscorticographique Da La Mort Du Systeme 
Nerveux Central Au Cours De Certains Comas.," Electroencephalography 
and  Clinical  Neurophysiology 3 (1959). 
 
Kafetsios, Konstantinos , and Eric LaRock. "Cognition and Emotion: Aristotelian 
Affinities with Contemporary Emotion Research." Theory & Psychology 
15, no. 5 (2005): 639-657. 
 
Kagan, Shelly. Normative Ethics. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998. 
 
Kant, Immanuel. "Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals." In Kants' 
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. New York: Harper & Row 
Torchbook, 1964. 
 
Karakatsanis, K. G. "'Brain Death': Should it be Reconsidered?" Spinal Cord 46 
(2008): 396-401. 
 
Karakatsanis, K. G. , and J. N. Tsanakas. "A Critique of the Concept of "Brain 
Death"." Issues in Law and Medicine 18, no. 2 (2002): 127-141. 
 
Kelly, David F. Contemporary Catholic Health Care Ethics. Washington, D. C.: 
Georgetown University Press, 2004. 
 
________. Critical Care Ethics: Treatment Decisions in  American Hospitals. 
Kansas City: Sheed & Ward, 1991. 
 276
 
Kilner, John F., Nigel M. de S. Cameron, and David L. Schiedermayer, eds. 
Bioethics and the Future of Medicine. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans 
Publishing Co., 1995. 
 
Kolakowki, Leszek. Modernity on Endless Trial. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1990. 
 
Koppelman, Elysa R. "The Dead Donor Rule and the Concept of Death: Severing 
the Ties that Bind Them." The American Journal of Bioethics 3, no. 1 
(2003): 1-9. 
 
Korein, Julius, and Calixto Machado. "Brain Death: Updating a Valid Concept for 
2004." In Brain Death and Disorders of Consciousness, ed. Calixto 
Machado and D. Alan Shewmon, 1-14. New York: Kluwer 
Academic/Plenum Publishers, 2004. 
 
Koterski, Joseph. "Book Review of John Lizza's Persons, Humanity, and the 
Definition of Death." International Philosophical Quarterly 47, no. 3 
(2007): 385-87. 
 
Lamb, David. Death, Brain Death, and Ethics. London: Croom Helm, 1985. 
 
Lang, Christoph J. G., and Josef G. Heckmann. "How Should Testing for Apnea 
be Performed in Diagnosing Brain Death?" In Brain Death and Disorders 
of Consciousness, ed. Calixto Machado and D. Alan. Shewmon, 169-174. 
New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, 2004. 
 
LaRock, Eric F. "Dualistic Internaction, Neural Dependence, and Aquinas's 
Composite View." Philosophia Christi 3, no. 2 (2001): 459-472. 
 
________. "Is Consciousness Really a Brain Process." International 
Philosophical Quarterly 48 (2007): 201-229. 
 
Law, New York Task Force on Life and The. The Determination of Death. New 
York, 1986. 
 
Lee, Patrick. Abortion and Unborn Human Life. Washington, DC: Catholic 
University of America Press, 1996. 
 
________. "Human Beings are Animals." In Natural Law and Moral Inquiry: 
Ethics, Metaphysics, and Politics in the Work of Germain Grisez, ed. 
Robert George, 135-151. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 
1998. 
 
 277
________. "The Pro-Life Argument from Substantial Identity: A Defense." 
Bioethics 18, no. 3 (2004): 249-263. 
 
Lee, Patrick, and Robert P. George. Body-Self Dualism in Contemporary Ethics 
and Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 
 
Lee, Patrick , and Robert P. George. "The Wrong of Abortion." In Contemporary 
Debates in Applied Ethics, ed. Andrew I.  Cohen and Christopher 
Wellman, 13-26. New York: Blackwell Publishers, 2005. 
 
Liao, Matthew. "The Organism View Defended." The Monist 89, no. 3 (2006): 
334-350. 
 
Lizza, John P. "The Conceptual Basis for Brain Death Revisited: Loss of Organic 
Integration or Loss of Consciousness?" In Brain Death and Disorders of 
Consciousness, ed. Calixto Machado and D. Alan Shewmon, 51-60. New 
York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, 2004. 
 
________. Persons, Humanity, and the Definition of Death. Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2006. 
 
Lock, Margaret. "Inventing a New Death and Making it Believable." 
Anthropology & Medicine 9, no. 2 (2002): 97-115. 
 
________. Twice Dead: Organ Transplants and the Reinvention of Death. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002. 
 
Machuga, Ric. In Defense of the Soul: What it Means to be Human. Grand 
Rapids: Brazos Press, 2002. 
 
Marti-Fabregas, J., et al. "Decerebrate-Like Posturing with Mechanical 
Ventilation in Brain Death." Neurology 54 (2000). 
 
Martin, Lauri , and David Nancarrow. "Woman Who Woke Up After 6 Years 
Relapses." http://www.kktv.com/home/headlines/6347997,html2007. 
 
Martyn, Susan R. "Using the  Brain Dead for Medical Research." Utah Law 
Review 1 (1986): 1-28. 
 
McArdle, John. "Xenotransplantation: An Opportunity to Promote Alternatives." 
AV Magazine1998, 6-9. 
 
McCarthy, Michael. "Study Surveys Brain-Death Guidelines in 80 Nations." The 
Lancet 359 (2002): 139. 
 
 278
McClintock, Barbara. "The Significance of the Genome to Challenge." Science 
226 (1984): 792-801. 
 
McMahan, J. The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002. 
 
Menikoff, Jerry. Law and Bioethics: An Introduction. Washington, DC: 
Georgetown University Press, 2001. 
 
Miles, Stephen. "Death in a Technological and Pluralistic Culture." In The 
Definition of Death, ed. Stuart J. Youngner, R. M. Arnold, & Renie 
Schapiro, 311-318. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999. 
 
Mitchell, C. Ben. "Nazi Germany's Euphemisms." In Dignity and Dying, ed. John 
F. Kilner, Arlene B. Miller and Edmund D. Pellegrino. Grand Rapids: 
Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1996. 
 
________. "The Church and the Cultural Imperative." In Bioengagement, ed. 
Nigel M. de S. Cameron, Scott E. Daniels, & Barbara J. White, 211-219. 
Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2000. 
 
Mohandas, A. , and S. N. Chou. "Brain Death: A Clinical and Pathological 
Study." Journal of Neurosurgery 35, no. 2 (1971): 211-218. 
 
Molinari, Gaetano F. The Nincds Collaborative Study of Brain Death: A 
Historical Perspective. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services, 1980, Monograph No. 24. 
 
Mollaret, P. , and M. Goulon. "A State Beyond Coma. Preliminary Report." 
Revue Neurologique 101 (1959): 3-15. 
 
Moreland, J. P. "Humanness, Personhood, and the Right to Die." Faith and 
Philosophy 12, no. 1 (1995): 95-112. 
 
Moreland, J. P., and Scott B. Rae. Body & Soul: Human Nature & the Crisis in 
Ethics. Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2000. 
 
Morioka, Masahiro. "Reconsidering Brain Death: A Lesson from Japan's Fifteen 
Years of Experience." Hasting Center Report 31, no. 4 (2001): 41-46. 
 
Nagel, T. "Death." In The Metaphysics of Death, ed. J. M. Fischer, 63-72. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993. 
 
Nagel, Thomas. The Last Word. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. 
 
Nakajima, Michi. Invisible Death. Mienai Shi: Bungei Shunju, 1985. 
 279
 
Neslon, Stephen N. ""the Least of These": A Christian Moral Appraisal of Vital 
Organ Procurement from "Brain-Dead" Patients." Ethics & Medicine 20, 
no. 1 (2004): 7-19. 
 
Nevins, Daniel S. "Dead or Alive? Halakhah and Brain Death." Conservative 
Judaism 57, no. 2 (2005): 3-29. 
 
"New Jersey Declaration of Death Act." In New Jersey Statutes Annotate, 23, 
1991. 
 
News, BBC. Liver Cells Grown from Cord Blood. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/6101420.stm, October 31, 2006 2006. 
Accessed November 2, 2005 2005. 
 
________. US Scientists Have Successfully Grown Fully Functioning Bladders in 
the Lab, and Implanted them into Patients with Bladder Disease. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/4875244.stm, 2006. Accessed May 22, 
2006 2006. Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/4875244.stm. 
 
Nilges, Richard G. "Organ Transplantation, Brain Death, and the Slippery Slope: 
A Neurosurgeon's Perspective." In Beyond Brain Death: The Case Against 
Brain Based Criteria for Human Death, ed. Michael Potts, Paul A. Byrne 
and Richard G. Nilges, 66, 249-258. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 2000. 
 
Novak, David. "Judaism." In Encyclopedia of Bioethics, ed. Warren T. Reich, 3, 
1302. New York: Macmillan, 1995. 
 
Olick, R. S. "Brain Death, Religious Freedom, and Public Policy: New Jersey's 
Landmark Legislative Initiative." Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 1, 
no. 4 (1991): 275-292. 
 
O'Reilly, Kevin. Redefining Death: A New Ethical Dilemma. American Medical 
News, 2009. Accessed 22 January 2009. Available from 
http://www.amednews.com. 
 
Orr, Robert D. , and Gilbert Meilander. "Ethics and Life's Ending." First Things 
145 (2004): 31-37. 
 
Ott, Barbara B. "Defining and Redefining Death." American Journal of Critical 
Care 4, no. 6 (1995): 476-480. 
 
Ott, Harald C., Thomas S. Mathiesen, Saik-Kai Goh, Laren D. Black, Stefan M. 
Kren, Theoden I. Netoff, and Doris A. Taylor. "Perfusion-Decellularized 
 280
Matrix: Using Nature's Platform to Engineer a Bioartificial Heart." Nature 
Medicine 14, no. 2 (2008): 213-21. 
 
Parfit, Derek. Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986. 
 
Paul II, Pope John. "Discourse of John Paul II to the Participants of the Working 
Group." In Working Group on the Determination of Brain Death and its 
Relation to Human Death, ed. R. White, H. Angstwurm & I Carrasco de 
Paula, xxv. Vatican City: Pontificia Adacemis Scientiarum, 1992. 
 
________. Evangelium Vitae. Vatican City: 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf
_jp-ii_enc_25031995_evangelium-vitae_en.html, 1995. 
 
________. Address of John Paul II to the 18th International Congress of the 
Transplantation Society. Rome: 
http://cnserver0.nkf.med.ualberta.ca/misc/Rome/Encyclical.htm, 2000. 
 
Pediatrics, American Academy of. "Report of Special Task Force: Guidelines for 
the Determination of Brain Death in Children." Pediatrics 80 (1987): 298-
300. 
 
Pellegrino, Edmund D. "Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia: Rebuttals of 
Rebuttals--the Moral Prohibition Remains." Journal of Medicine and 
Philosophy 26, no. 1 (2001): 93-100. 
 
Pernick, Marin S. "Brain Death in Cultural Context: The Reconstruction of Death, 
1968-1981." In The Definition of Death: Contemporary Controversies, ed. 
Stuart J. Youngner, Robert M. Arnold and Renie Schapiro, 3-33. 
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999. 
 
Pius XII, Pope. "The Prolongation of Life: An Address of Pope Pius XII to an 
International Congress of Anesthesiologists." The Pope Speaks 4 (1958): 
393-308. 
 
Plum, Fred. "Clinical Standards and Technological Confirmatory Tests in 
Diagnosing Brain Death." In The Definition of Death, ed. Stuart J. 
Youngner, R. M. Arnold, & Renie Schapiro, 34-65. Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1999. 
 
Potts, Michael. "A Requiem for Whole Brain Death: A Response to D. Alan 
Shewmon's 'The Brain and Somatic Integration'." Journal of Medicine and 
Philosophy 26, no. 5 (2001): 479-491. 
 
________. "Letters: Editor's Choice: Deep Seated Fear." British Medical Journal 
325 (2002): 598. 
 281
 
________. "Pro-Life Support of the Whole Brain Death Criteria: A Problem of 
Consistency." In Beyond Brain Death: The Case Against Brain Based 
Criteria for Human Death, ed. Michael Potts, Paul A. Byrne and Richard 
G. Nilges, 66, 121-138. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 2000. 
 
Potts, Michael, and D. W. Evans. "Does It Matter That Organ Donors Are Not 
Dead? Ethical and Policy Implications." Journal of Medical Ethics 31 
(2005): 406-409. 
 
Potts, Michael, Paul A. Bryne, and Richard G. Nilges. "Introduction." In Beyond 
Brain Death: The Case Against Brain Based Criteria for Human Death, 
ed. Michael Potts, Paul A. Byrne and Richard G. Nilges. Dordrecht, The 
Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000. 
 
Powner, David J., Michael Hernandez, Terry E. Rives, "Variability among 
Hospital Policies for Determining Brain Death in Adults." Critical Care 
Medicine 32, no. 6 (2004): 1284-1288. 
 
President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and 
Biomedical and Behavioral Research.  Defining Death: A Report on the 
Medical, Legal, and Ethical Issues in the Determination of Death. 
Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1981. 
 
Price, David. Legal and Ethical Aspects of Organ Transplantation. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
 
Puccetti, R. "The Case for Mental Duality: Evidence from Split-Brain Data and 
Other Considerations." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (1981): 93-123. 
 
Purcell, Jr., Edward A. The Crisis of Demoncratic Theory: Scientific Naturalism 
and the Problem of Value. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1973. 
 
Putnam, Hilary. The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002. 
 
Rado, Leslie. "Cultural Elites and the Institutionalization of Ideas." Sociological 
Forum 2, no. 1 (1987): 42-66. 
 
Randell, T. T. "Medical and Legal Considerations of Brain Death." ACTA 
Anaesthesiologica Scandinavica 28 (2004): 139-144. 
 
Repertinger, S, W. P. Fitzgibbons, M. F. Omojola, and R. A. Brumback. "Long 
Survival Following Bacterial Meningitis-Associated Brain Destruction." 
Journal of Child Neurology 21 (2006): 591-595. 
 282
 
Rescher, Nicholas. Objectivity: The Obligations of Impersonal Realism. Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997. 
 
Research, President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine 
and Biomedical and Behavioral. Making Health Care Decisions: The 
Ethical and Legal Implications of Informed Consent in the Patient-
Practitioner Relationship. 3 vols. Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1982. 
 
Rix, Bo Andreassen. "Brain Death, Ethics and Politics in Denmark." In The 
Definition of Death, ed. Stuart J. Youngner, Robert M. Arnold and Renie 
Schapiro, 227-238. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999. 
 
Robertson, John A. "Research on the Brain-Dead." IRB, (1980): 4-6. 
 
________. "The Dead Donor Rule." Hasting Center Report November-December 
(1999): 6-14. 
 
Robinson, J. "Personal Identity and Survival." Journal of Philosophy 85 (1988): 
319-28. 
 
Roper, A. H. "Unusual Spontaneous Movements in Brain-Dead Patients." 
Neurology 34 (1984): 1089-1092. 
 
Rorty, Richard. Consequences of Pragmatism. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1982. 
 
Rosner, Fred. "The Definition of Death in Jewish Law." In The Definition of 
Death: Contemporary Controversies, ed. Stuart J. Youngner, et al, 210-
221. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999. 
 
Saposnik, G., J. Maurino, and J. A. Bueri. "Movements in Brain Death." 
European Journal of Neurology 8 (2001): 209-213. 
 
Schiff, N. D., MD, D. Rodriguez-Moreno, MS., A. Kamal, MD, K. H. S. Kim, 
MD, PhD, J. T. Giacino, PhD, F. Plum, MD and J. Hirsch, PhD. "Fmri 
Reveals Large-Scale Network of Activation in Minimally Conscious 
Patients." Neurology 64 (2005): 514-523. 
 
Schlett, James. Insurers Turning to Incentives to Promote Healthy Lifestyles. 
http://www.dailygazette.com, 3 October 2008. Accessed 5 January 2009. 
 
Schoen, Wendy L. "Conflict in the Parameters: Defining Life and Death in 
Missouri Statues." American Journal of Law and Medicine, (1990). 
 
 283
Seifert, Josef. "Brain Death and Euthanasia." In Beyond Brain Death: The Case 
against Brain Based Criteria for Human Death, ed. Michael Potts, Paul A. 
Byrne and Richard G. Nilges, 201-227. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 2000. 
 
________. "Consciousness, Mind, Brain, and Death." In Brain Death and 
Disorders of Consciousness, ed. Calixto Machado and D. Alan Shewmon, 
61-78. New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, 2004. 
 
Seifert, Josef. "Is 'Brain Death' Actually Death?" Monist 76, no. 2 (1993): 175-
203. 
 
Sgreccia, Elio. "Vegetative State and Brain Death: Philosophical and Ethical 
Issues from a Personalistic View." Neuro Rehabilitation 19 (2004): 361-
366. 
 
Shewmon, Alan D. "The Metaphysics of Brain Death, Persistent Vegetative State, 
and Dementia." Thomist 49, no. 1 (1985): 24-80. 
 
________. "The Brain and Somatic Integration." Journal of Medicine and 
Philosophy 26, no. 5 (2001): 457-478. 
 
________. "The Dead Donor Rule: Lessons from Linguistics." Kennedy Institute 
of Ethics Journal 292 (2004): 277-300. 
 
Shewmon, D. Alan. "Recovery from 'Brain Death': A Neurologist's Apologia." 
Linacre Quarterly, (1997): 30-95. 
 
________. "'Brainstem Death,' 'Brain Death' and Death: A Critical Re-Evaluation 
of the Purported Evidence." Issues in Law and Medicine 14, no. 2 (1998): 
125-146. 
 
________. "Chronic Brain Death." Neurology 51 (1998): 1538-1545. 
 
________. "The ABC of PVS: Problems of Definition." In Brain Death and 
Disorders of Consciousness, ed. Calixto Machado and D. Alan Shewmon, 
215-228. New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, 2004. 
 
________. "The "Critical Organ" for the Organism as a Whole: Lessons from the 
Lowly Spinal Cord." In Brain Death and Disorders of Consciousness, ed. 
Calixto Machado and D. Alan Shewmon, 23-42. New York: Kluwer 
Academic/Plenum Publishers, 2004. 
 
Shewmon, D. Alan, and Elisabeth Sietz Shewmon. "The Semiotics of Death and 
its Medical Implications." In Brain Death and Disorders of 
 284
Consciousness, ed. Calixto Machado and D. Alan Shewmon, 89-114. New 
York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, 2004. 
 
Schiff, N. D., J. T. Giacino, J. J. Fins, “Deep brain stimulation, neuroethics, and 
the minimally conscious state: moving beyond proof of principle,”  
Archives of  Neurology 66 (2009):697-702. 
 
Shuster, Evelyne. "Determinism and Reductionism." In Gene Mapping: Using 
Law and Ethics as Guides, ed. George J. & Sherman Elias Annas. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1992. 
 
Siegler, M., and D. Wikler. "Brain Death and Live Birth." JAMA 248 (1989). 
 
Siminoff, Laura A. "The Dead Donor Rule: Not Dead Yet." The American 
Journal of Bioethics 3, no. 1 (2003): 30. 
 
Siminoff, Laura A., and Alexia Bloch. "American Attitudes and Beliefs about 
Brain Death: The Empirical Literature." In The Definition of Death, ed. 
Stuart J. Youngner, Robert M. Arnold and Renie Schapiro, 183-193. 
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999. 
 
Siminoff, Laura A., Christopher Burant, and Stuart J. Youngner. "Death and 
Organ Procurement: Public Beliefs and Attitudes." Kennedy Institute of 
Ethics Journal 14, no. 3 (2004): 217-234. 
 
Singer, Peter. "Is the Sanctity of Life Ethic Terminally Ill?" In Bioethics: An 
Anthology, ed. Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer, 292-300. Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2001. 
 
________. Rethinking Life and Death. New York: St. Marin's Press, 1994. 
 
Smith, David H. "On Being Queasy." IRB, (1980): 6-7. 
 
Smith, Peter J. "Coma Recovery after 19 Years Poses Questions about Terri 
Schiao." http://www.lifesite.net/ldn/2006/jul/06070409.html2006. 
 
Smith, Tony. "Clincal Freedom." British Medical Journal 295, no.  19-26 
December (1987): 1583. 
 
Soccio, Douglas J. Archetypes of Wisdom: An Introduction to Philosophy. 6th ed. 
Belmont: Wadsworth, 2007. 
 
Sperling, Daniel. "Breaking the Silence: The Illegality of Performing 
Resuscitation Procedures on the Newly Dead." Annals of Health Law 13, 
no. 2 (2003-04). 
 
 285
"State of Connecticut V. Barry Guess.",, 852: Appellate Court of Connecticut, 
1997. 
 
Steineck, Christian. ""Brain Death," Death, and Personal Identity." KronoScope 3, 
no. 2 (2003): 227-249. 
 
Sugimoto, Tateo, Yuko and Chihior. Kita Kamoshirenai Seifuko. Tokyo: Nami 
Shobo, 1986. 
 
Taylor, R. "Reexamining the Definition and Criteria of Death." Seminars in 
Neurology 17, no. 3 (1997): 265-270. 
 
Titmuss, R. M. The Gift of Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy. 
New York: Vintage Books, 1971. 
 
Tomlinson, Tom. "The Conservative Use of the Brain-Death Criterion: A 
Critique." Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 9 (1984): 377-393. 
 
Tonti-Filippini, Nicholas. "Revising Brain Death: Cultural Imperialism." Linacre 
Quarterly 65, no. 2 (1998): 51-72. 
 
Tooley, Michael. Abortion and Infanticide. New York: Oxford University Press, 
1983. 
 
Torrey, R. A., ed. The Fundamentals. Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 2003. 
 
Truog, Robert D. "Is it Time to Abandon Brain Death?" Hasting Center Report 
27, no. 1 (1997): 29-37. 
 
________. "Organ Donation without Brain Death?" Hasting Center Report 35, 
no. 6 (2005): 3. 
 
Truog, Robert D. , and J. T. Fletcher. "Brain Death and the Anencephalic 
Newborn." Bioethics 4 (1990): 199-215. 
 
Truog, Robert D. , and W. M. Robinson. "Role of Brain Death and the Dead-
Donor Rule in the Ethics of Organ Transplantation." Critical Care 
Medicine 31 (2003): 2391-96. 
 
"Uniform Determination of Death Act." In South Carolina Code of Laws, Article 
6. 
 
Unos Research Data. Denice Tripp, 2006. Accessed March 6 2006. Available 
from http://www.optn.org/data/. 
 
 286
van Lommel, Pim. "About the Continuity of Our Consciousness." In Brain Death 
and Disorders of Consciousness, ed. Calixto & D. Alan Shewmon 
Machado, 115-132. New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, 
2004. 
 
Vautier, B. Holly. "Defining Death." In Dignity and Dying, ed. John F. Kilner, 
Arlene B. Miller and Edmund D. Pellegrino. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. 
Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1996. 
 
Veatch, Robert M. Death, Dying, and the Biological Revolution. New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1976. 
 
________. "Generalization of Expertise." Hasting Center Report 1, no. 2 (1973): 
29-40. 
 
________. "Research on "Nonconsentables."." IRB, (1981): 6-7. 
 
________. "The Dead Donor Rule: True by Definition." The American Journal of 
Bioethics 3, no. 1 (2003): 10-11. 
 
________. "The Death of Whole-Brain Death: The Plague of the Disaggregators, 
Somaticists, and Mentalists." Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 30, no. 
4 (2005): 353-378. 
 
________. "The Impending Collapse of the Whole-Brain Definition of Death." 
Hasting Center Report 23, no. 4 (1993): 18-24. 
 
________. "The Whole-Brain Oriented Concept of Death: An Outmoded 
Philosophical Formulation." Journal of Thanatology 3 (1975): 13-30. 
 
________. Transplantation Ethics. Washington, DC: Georgetown University 
Press, 2000. 
 
Veatch, Robert M. , and J. B. Pitt. "The Myth of Presumed Consent: Ethical 
Problems in New Organ Procurement Strategies." Transplantation 
Proceedings 27, no. 2 (1995): 1888-92. 
 
Wallace, W. A. "St. Thomas on the Beginning and Ending of Human Life." Studi 
Tomistici: Sanctus Thomas de Aquino Doctor Hodiernae Humanitatis 58 
(1995). 
 
Warren, Mary Ann. "On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion." The Monist 57, 
no. 1 (1973): 43-61. 
 
Watanabe, Yoshio. "Brain Death and Cardiac Transplantation: Historical 
Background and Unsettled Controversies in Japan." In Beyond Brain 
 287
Death: The Case Against Brain Based Criteria for Human Death, ed. 
Michael Potts, Paul A. Byrne and Richard G. Nilges, 66, 171-190. 
Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000. 
 
Whetstine, Leslie Mary. "An Examination of the Bio-Philosophical Literature on 
the Definition and Criteria of Death: When is Dead Dead and Why Some 
Donation after Cardiac Death Donors are Not." Dissertation, Duquesne 
University, 2006. 
 
White, Hillary. New Jersey Looking to Harvest More Organs by Easing "Brain 
Death" Criteria. LifeSite, 2006. Accessed June 16 2006. Available from 
http://www.lifesite.net/ldn/2006/jun/06061605.html. 
 
Wicclair, Mark R. "Informed Consent and Research Involving the Newly Dead." 
Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 12, no. 4 (2002): 351-372. 
 
Wiggins, David. Sameness and Substance. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1980. 
 
Wijdicks, E. F. "Brain Death Worldwide: Accepted Fact but No Global 
Consensus in Diagnostic Criteria." Neurology 58 (2002): 20-25. 
 
________. "The Diagnosis of Brain Death." New England Journal of Medicine 
344 (2001): 1215-21. 
 
Wijdicks, E. F., and J. L. Bernat. "Chronic "Brain Death" (Letter)." Neurology 53 
(1999): 1369-70. 
 
Wikler, D. "Brain Death: A Durable Consensus." Bioethics 7 (1993): 239-41. 
 
Wolstenholme, G. E. W. , and M. O'Connor. Ethics in Medical Progress: With 
Special Reference to Transplantation. Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1966. 
 
Yanagida, Kunio. "Sakurifaisu: Waga Musuko Noshi No 11 Nichi." Bungei 
shuniju 72 (1994): 126-151. 
 
Youngner, Stuart J. "Defining Death: A Superficial and Fragile Consensus." 
Archives of Neurology 49 (1992): 570-72. 
 
Youngner, Stuart J., M. Allen, E.T. Barlett, and et al. "Psychological and Ethical 
Implications of Organ Retrieval." New England Journal of Medicine 313 
(1985): 321-24. 
 
Youngner, Stuart J., R. M. Arnold, and M. A. DeVita. "When Is Dead?" Hasting 
Center Report 29, no. 6 (1999): 14-21. 
 288
 289
 
Youngner, Stuart J., and Robert M. Arnold. "Philosophical Debates About the 
Definition of Death: Who Cares?" Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 
26, no. 5 (2001): 527-537. 
 
Youngner, Stuart J., and E. T. Bartlett. "Human Death and High Technology: The 
Failure of the Whole Brain Formulations." Annals of Internal Medicine 99 
(1983): 252-258. 
 
Zamperetti, Nereo, Rinaldo Bellomo, Carlo Alberto Defanti, & Nicola Latronico. 
"Irreversible Apnoeic Coma 35 Years Later: Towards a More Rigorous 
Definition of Brain Death?" Intensive Care Medicine 30 (2004): 1715-
1722. 
 
